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This study seeks to re-examine the encounter between the Confucian tradition and western modernity. 
The late nineteenth and twentieth centuries are widely regarded as the twilight of Confucianism.  The 
inability of Confucian learning to deal with the challenges brought by Western intrusions led to its 
rejection by modern Chinese intellectuals for Western knowledge and institutions. More importantly, 
the fall of the imperial state in 1912 caused the institutional collapse of Confucianism and caused it, 
metaphorically, to become a “wandering spirit” (youhun游魂). China’s encounter with the forces of 
modernity such as democratic politics, nationalism, science and industrial capitalism not only 
challenged the Confucian tradition, but also introduced new categories and organizations for its 
reinvention and revival in the modern period. In particular, this dissertation examines the reformation 
of Confucianism as a “religion” (zongjiao宗教) in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth 
century.   The Western concept and institution of “religion” allowed Confucianism to break free from 
its attachment to the imperial state to become an autonomous agent of moral civilizing transformation 
for China and the whole world. This study focuses on the emergence of the state-religion movement 
and the Confucian redemptive societies, the two main expressions of Confucian religious inventions 
and revival in republican China. The state-religion movement aimed to institute Confucian religion 
(kongjiao孔教) as the national faith of China and the redemptive societies espoused a mission of 
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s Confucianism a religion? This question, Zheng Jiadong, a modern scholar of 
Confucianism, contends is a problem brought about by the challenges of modernity 
(xiandai wenti 现代问题), produced by the influx and acceptance of western culture, 
epistemic frameworks, taxonomies and semantics in the late nineteenth and twentieth century. 
Zheng argues that Confucianism was historically a holistic tradition encompassing subjects 
such as religion, philosophy, science, history, ritual practices, ethics and arts. This Confucian 
tradition was truncated according to new conceptual categories derived from the modern 
West.
1
 In a similar vein, Wilfred Cantwell Smith asserts that “For the major living religious 
traditions of the world, however, modernity has conferred names that did not exist… the 
question ‘Is Confucianism a religion?’ is one that the West has never been able to answer, and 
China never able to ask.”2  
                                                 
1 Zheng Jiadong 郑家栋, Duanlie de chuantong: xinyang yu lixing zhijian 断裂的传统：信仰与理性之间
(Tradition in Ruptures: Between Faith and Rationality)（Beijing: CASS Press, 2001）  







In China, there was no local concept comparable to the Western notion of “religion”. 
The modern discourse of “religion” and other western concepts such as “liberty” (Ch. ziyou Jp. 
jiyū 自由) and “revolution” (Ch. geming Jp. kakumei 革命) entered China through the 
mediation of Japan.
3
 The neologism zongjiao (shūkyō in Japanese) was employed first by 
Japanese scholars to translate the term “religion,”4 and later introduced into China through 
Japanese academic works at the end of the nineteenth century. Traditionally, jiao 教 or 
teaching was the term used to describe and distinguish the various indigenous and foreign 
cultural-spiritual traditions, including the illegal heterodox teachings (xiejiao 邪教). In the 
Chinese discourse of jiao, Confucianism was deemed as the archetypal jiao, the Orthodoxy in 
which other teachings were measured in imperial China.  
Chen Hsi-yuan has demonstrated that in the late nineteenth century, the Chinese drew 
a clear distinction between jiao and “religion.” In the 1893 World’s Parliament of Religions in 
Chicago, the Chinese official representative Peng Guangyu 彭光誉 (1844-?) translated 
“religion” phonetically as erlilijing 尔厘利景 and argued that  it should be called shamanism 
(wu 巫) in Chinese as both were similar in meaning, which was related to the worship of 
divinities (shen神). As such, Peng believed the “religion” that westerners spoke of was no 
different from the heterodox teachings espoused by the “White Lotus” sectarians and the 
Taipings. In short, Peng was trying to interpret the foreign “religion” according to Chinese 
categories and emphasize its heterodox status vis-à-vis the Confucian orthodoxy. However, in 
the first two decades of the twentieth century, Confucianism gradually lost its position as the 
archetypal and orthodox jiao and the western concept of “religion,” which was based on 
                                                 
3 See Federico Masini, The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and its Evolution toward a National Language: 
the Period from 1840 to 1898 (Berkeley: Project on Linguistic Analysis: University of California, 1993) and Lydia 
Liu, Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity-China, 1900-1937 (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1995) 
4 Jason Ananda Josephson, “The Invention of Japanese Religions” in Religion Compass 5/10 (2011), pp.589–597; 
Isomae Juni’ichi, Modern Japanese Religious Discourses and their Genealogy: Religion, State, and Shinto 
(Iwanami Shoten, 2003), p. 36. Isomae illustrated that there was no term in Japanese language equivalent to the 
concept of “religion” before the nineteenth century. The need for local term corresponding to “religion” arose in 
the 1860s when Japan signed diplomatic treaties with the Western powers guaranteeing religious freedom for 
Christian missionaries and local converts. Isomae described how the translation for “religion” shifted from shūshi 
(宗旨) or shūmon (宗門) to shūkyō (宗教) from the end of the Edo era to the beginning of Meiji. He argued that as 
the neologism shūkyō became the dominant translation for “religion” in the Meiji period, Japanese understanding 





Christianity, became the dominant paradigm in which the Chinese understand and analyzed 
their own tradition, society and history. Ever since then, the question whether Confucianism 
is a religion became a subject of incessant, never-ending disputes in the Chinese intellectual, 
cultural and socio-political realms.
5
  
The fact that “religion” was neither a universal phenomenon nor culturally neutral 
concept was brought to scholars’ attention forcefully by Talal Asad. He persuasively shows 
that the “religion” as we understand today, a system of subjective or privatized beliefs 
regarding the sacred, was created by the unique history of the West.
6
 The creation of 
“religion” in the West was a gradual process happening between sixteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and can be traced to the secularization of European societies as a result of the 
Protestant Reformation, the Enlightenment and the emergence of disciplinary nation-states. 
During the Reformation, Protestantism redefined religion as characterized by belief in a 
transcendental God and dismissed ritual practices and worship of Catholicism as “magic” or 
“superstitions.” The devastating wars of religion following the Reformation led to the 
emphasis of religious toleration and pluralism, and the redefinition of religion as “private 
beliefs” separate from the “public secular” sphere in order to contain religious conflicts. The 
Enlightenment thinkers in the eighteenth century created a historicist discourse of religion. 
They perceived “religion” as “irrational”, a relic of human’s immature past and destined to be 
eliminated as the world enters the modern age. They optimistically foresaw the weakening of 
religious authority, its privatization, and eventual displacement by reason and science. The 
centralizing absolutist states and the succeeding nation-states which emerged between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth century further sought to appropriate the secular authority of the 
churches and was instrumental to the institutionalization and differentiation of “religion” from 
the public sphere of politics, society and economy. In modern nation states, citizenship is the 
                                                 
5  See Chen Hsi-yuan 陈 熙 远 , Confucian Encounters with Religion: Rejections, Appropriations, and 
Transformations (London: Routledge, 2005) and also his “‘Zongjiao’-yige Zhongguo jingdai wenhua shi de 
guanjian mingci” ‘宗教’一个中国近代文化史的关键名词 (‘Religion’- One Important Concept in Modern 
Chinese Cultural History) in Xinshi xue 新史学 Vol.13 No.4 (December 2002)  
6 Talal Asad, The Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of  Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: 





primary mode of identity and it subsumes and transcends primordial identities such as race, 
gender and religion. The Constitution of modern liberal nation-states in the West stipulated 




The universalization of the Western concept of “religion” in China and elsewhere was 
the result of the globalization of Western influence through the expansion of imperialism and 
missionary evangelism in the nineteenth century. The building of European empires (later 
joined by the new imperialist powers of the United States and Japan) intensified in this 
century, especially in the post-1870s period of territorializing “New Imperialism”, whereby 
competition from new imperial powers such as Germany and Russia led to the scramble for 
land-holding colonies on a global scale. By the end of the nineteenth century, with the 
exception of a few states, most parts of the world were under colonial direct or indirect rule. 
Simultaneously, “religion” was created by colonial authorities through the introduction and 
creation of secularity. “(T)he real impact of nineteenth-century imperialism”, as Thomas 
Dubois pointed out, “was to unify the conceptual vocabulary used in the representation of 
religion, and further that this was not simply a function of naked European power, nor was 
this necessarily intentional. Rather, it was brought about primarily by organizational changes 
in states and civil institutions and actually accelerated after the decline of imperialism itself.”8  
Paradoxically, paralleling the globalization and secularizing influence of Western 
imperial powers was the great burst of Christian evangelical energies and the spread of 
Christianity to all parts of the world in the nineteenth century. The new world discovered and 
connected by Western imperialism, industrial capitalism and technologies excited Christian 
imagination to the prospect of converting great “heathen” areas outside of European 
Christendom and making Christianity a “world religion.” From the last decade of the 
eighteenth century, missionary societies were organized and financed by laities for the 
                                                 
7 For the secularization of the West, Charles Taylor provided a detailed account of the complex process in his A 
Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), see especially Chapter 2.     
8 Thomas D. Dubois, “Hegemony, Imperialism, and the Construction of Religion in East and Southeast Asia” in 





proselytization of the Christian faith. Christian missionaries not only introduced the lexicon of 
“religion” to the native societies they tried to convert, more importantly, their aggressive 
proselytization and attack on local spiritual traditions as “superstitions” spurred the 
emergence of indigenous religious reform movements to counter the threat of Christianity.  
These movements initiated by the elites sought to modernize indigenous spiritual 
traditions into the Protestant model of “rational religion” by purging it of “irrational” or 
“superstitious” elements. Moreover, Christian organizational and missionary techniques such 
as the Church institution, Sabbath and religious press, which were perceived as the 
institutional strength of Christianity, were keenly adopted by religious reformers to compete 
with the foreign faith for religious believers.
9
 The global expansion of Christian missionary 
activities spurred the reformation and growth of other faiths into “world religions” and led to 
the development of, what C.A. Bayly called, “empires of religion” in the nineteenth century. 
Bayly rightly argued that the modern world was not a secular one as we witnessed the great 
revival and global expansion of religions in the nineteenth century. Islamic, Buddhist, 
Christian, Hindu and Confucian religious movements emerged and religions developed global 
institutional networks through the harnessing of modern communicative and transportation 
technologies. 
10
   
 The historical processes in the globalization of “religion” and religious revivals 
outlined above therefore problematize the antithetical relationships between religion and 
secular, tradition and modernity as purported by modernization theory and in national and 
imperial historiographies. In his study of the colonial interactions between India and Britain, 
Peter van der Veer debunked the essentialist notion of a secular modernizing Britain 
encountering a traditional religious India. Against the teleological secularization thesis of the 
demise of religion in the modern world, van der Veer argued that religion was an important 
force in the modernization of Britain and colonial India. He shows how the public sphere that 
                                                 
9 In their study of the reform of Sri Lankan Buddhism in the nineteenth century, Richard Gombrich and Gananath 
Obeyesekere argued for the “Protestantization” of Buddhism. See their Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change 
in Sri Lanka (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) especially Chapter 6 “Protestant Buddhism.” Peter Van 
der Veer also detected a similar development in the Hindu and Muslim reform movements in India. See Chapter 2 
of his Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994)  





is instrumental for the formation of modern nation-state was created in Britain by voluntary 
Christian evangelical societies and in India by Hindu revivalist movements with nationalistic 
agendas. Furthermore, rather than marginalizing religious growth, the institutionalization of a 
secular colonial state and education together with the challenges of Christian missionary 
societies gave strong impetus to Indian religious modernism and led to the establishment of 
modern Hindu and Islamic missionary societies, schools, universities and hospitals.
11
 He 
rightly argues that “The separation of church and state as the sign of secularity did not result 
in a secular society in Britain or India; rather, it indicated a shift in the location of religion 
from being part of the state to being part of the emerging public sphere.”12  
 Historically, the secular and religious are thus mutually constitutive or interdependent 
in constituting modernity in the West and Asia. In Asia, the invention of “religion” was a 
modern project undertaken by Asian elites in the context of the encounter between Asian 
societies and the expanding West. Asian elites converted, using a religious metaphor, to 
Western conception of “religion” to become modern. While the legitimacy of pre-national 
states in Asia rested on religious cosmologies and ritual practices, the authority of the modern 
states is grounded not just on secular principles such as scientific knowledge, economic 
development, bureaucratic rationalization and popular sovereignty, but also on a reframing of 
religiosity. In their formation of a modern nation-state, Asian power holders and enlightened 
intellectuals differentiated the secular and religious and invented “religion” as a separate 
category through the adoption of western political model. The concept of “religion” was 
conceived with Christianity, more specifically Protestantism as the archetype. Institutionally, 
“religion” is defined as a social organization constituted by a community of believers who 
pledge exclusive faith to a single God and a set of doctrines. Indigenous religious systems 
were measured against this new model and those that failed to meet the definition were 
                                                 
11 Peter van der Veer, Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in Britain and India (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), see Chapters 1 and 2.  





violently attacked and eliminated by elites and the state in the name of modernization. 
13
  At 
the same time, indigenous religious elites also sought to modernize their spiritual traditions 
according to the Protestant religion to gain legal protection under the freedom of religion as 
enshrined in the new constitution, and most importantly as van der Veer demonstrates in 
Indian revivalist movements, they saw Christian organizational model as a superior model for 
the expansion of their faith in the new era of religious competition and globalization.  
  
CONFUCIAN RELIGIOSITY AND THE 
MODERN TRANSFIGURATION OF CONFUCIANISM 
This study is on the invention of the Confucianism as a “religion” in the late Qing and 
Republican period (1880-1937), the era in which the Chinese society experienced great 
changes associated with modernization with the introduction of Western ideas and institutions 
and the fall of the imperial state in 1911. The first chapter discusses the crucial role played by 
Kang Youwei康有为 (1858-1927) in recasting Confucianism into kongjiao 孔教, a modern 
religion in the image of Protestantism in the 1890s. Liang Qichao 梁启超  (1873-1929) 
remarked that his teacher was a “religionist” (宗教家 zongjiaojia) whose attempt in 
reforming Confucianism was the “Martin Luther of the Confucian religion.” 14  The 
reformation of Confucianism was motivated by the attack of Christian missionaries on the 
“barbarism” of Chinese religion and the displacement of Confucianism by aggressive 
Christian proselytization. Kang’s refashioning of Confucianism as a “religion”, however, did 
not mean that his action was a mimicry reacting out of an inferior complex produced from the 
confrontation with the West.  On the contrary, “the West” was strategically employed by 
Kang to make Confucianism, after being absorbed and appropriated for dynastic interests for 
centuries, an institutionalized religion independent from the imperial state. In Kang’s vision, 
                                                 
13 For the shift in state legitimization in Asian states, see Charles F. Keyes, Laurel Kendall and Helen Hardacre eds. 
Asian Vision of Authority: Religion and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1994)  
14 Liang Qichao 梁启超, “Nanhai Kang xianshen zuan”南海康先生传(Biography of Mr Kang Youwei) in Xia 
Xiaohong 夏晓虹 ed. Zhuiyi Kang Youwei 追忆康有为 (Reminiscing Kang Youwei) (Beijing: SDX Joint 





the new Confucian religion would morally rejuvenate the Chinese nation and the world. His 
Kongjiao would also triumph and absorb other religions to become the universal religion of 
mankind. 
 Far from producing a state of despair, Thomas Metzger shows that encounter with the 
West has brought about optimism in Neo-Confucians in escaping from their predicament. The 
main goal of Neo-Confucians is achieving sagehood, the moral perfection of the self, and 
world ordering. This concern with inner and outer moral transformation is express in Neo-
Confucian moral-religious quest of “sageliness within and kingliness without” (neisheng 
waiwang内圣外王). The predicament, according to Metzger, was the constant frustrations 
experienced by Neo-Confucians in correcting the moral failures of the outer realm and their 
lack of means in doing so. The arrival of the West in the nineteenth century brought about 
institutions and techniques of transformation such as science, democratic politics and 
industrial economy that offer Neo-Confucian modernizers the means for the ordering of the 
outer realm.
15
 For Kang Youwei, the introduction of the Church institution provided him with 
a novel organizational tool for the moral enlightenment and transformation (jiaohua教化) of 
China and the world. 
 One important correction that Metzger made to the conventional scholarship on 
Confucianism is to show that it is a tradition with an intense religious dimension. Arguing 
against the Weberian view that Confucianism is a secular doctrine preaching harmony with 
the world, Metzger persuasively demonstrates that Neo-Confucianism possessed the 
transformative inner tension similar to Protestantism that Max Weber identified as the 
spiritual root of Western modernity. In a recent study of Chen Hongmou陈宏谋 (1696-1771), 
a prominent official in the 18
th
 century, William Rowe demonstrated how Cheng-Zhu Neo-
Confucianism developed a “compulsive sense of mission” in Chen in the ordering (jingshi经
                                                 
15 Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving Political Culture 





世) and salvation of the world (jiushi救世). 16 This same inner tension is also present in Kang 
Youwei and revealed in the “chronological autobiography” in which Kang documented his 
quest for sagehood from 1877 to 1898. At the age of 20, Kang gave up studying for the civil 
service examination and retreated to the mountains resolved to gain spiritual enlightenment. 
He returned from his religious retreat with the confidence that he had become a sage and 
savior with a messianic mission to save China and the world.
17
 The religious-redemptive 
aspect of Kang Youwei’s thinking is often ignored in historical studies which saw him more 
as a practical reformer than a religious thinker. Hsiao Kung-chuan, in his seminal study on 
Kang Youwei, had mistakenly maintained that “Kang’s conception on the religion was 
essentially secular”18He added “(His) entire Confucian-religion movement lacked emotional 
or spiritual appeal, whatever may have the merit of its doctrine. Indeed one may hesitate to 
call it a religious movement at all.”19  
The distortion in reading of non-Western religious traditions is a result of interpreting 
them through the lens of “religion” derived from the Western Protestant model. In the 1970s, 
Western scholars began to revise the prevailing “secular” reading of Confucius and the 
Confucian tradition.  Notably, Hubert Fingarette questioned the binary of secular and religion 
and showed that in Confucianism the sacred is found in the secular, particularly in mundane 
rituals (li 礼).20 Later scholars such as William Theodore Debary, Tu Weiming, Rodney 
Taylor and Kiril Thompson demonstrated in their works the deep religious dimension in Song 
and Ming Confucians from the Mind-Heart school (xinxue 心学) or what is known in the 
West as Neo-Confucianism.
21
  The distinction between secular and religious is therefore not 
                                                 
16 William T. Rowe, Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001)  
17  Kang Youwei, “Chronological Autobiography of Kang Youwei” in Lo Jung Pang (ed.) Kang Yu-Wei: A 
Biography and A Symposium (Tuscon: The University of Arizona Press, 1967) 
18  Hsiao Kung-ch’uan, A Modern China and a New World: K’ang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1975), p. 161  
19Ibid, p. 122 
20 Hubert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) 
21 Wm. Theodore De Bary, Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1981); Tu Weiming, Centrality and Commonality. An Essay on Confucian 
Religiousness (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); Rodney Taylor, The Religious Dimensions of 
Confucianism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); Kiril Thompson, "The Religious in Neo-





tightly drawn in Chinese culture and one recent scholar suggests that Confucian religiosity 
can be regarded as a kind of “secular religiosity”.22 Indeed, Mary Evelyn Tucker illustrates:  
The art of Confucian spirituality might be described as discovering one’s 
cosmological being amidst daily affairs. For the Confucian the ordinary is the locus of 
extraordinary; the secular is the sacred; the transcendent is in the immanent. What 
distinguishes Confucian spirituality among the world’s religious tradition is an all-
encompassing cosmological context that grounds its world-affirming orientation for 
humanity. This is not a tradition that seeks liberation outside the world. The way of 
the immanence is the Confucian way. 
23
  
 For the Confucian tradition oriented towards this-worldly salvation, the secularization 
of the state after the 1911 revolution and the establishment of the Republican government has 
engendered a sense of crisis in the future of the Confucian tradition among Confucians. The 
fall of the imperial state following the 1911 revolution also meant the collapse of institutional 
imperial Confucianism with the end of the state cult and the imperial civil service examination. 
State secularization, however, also offered promise for religious revival for Chinese 
religions.
24
  The whole religious landscape and state-religion relationship were profoundly 
transformed in the republican period as the state redefined its role from being a guardian of 
orthodoxy to the guarantor of religious freedom. 
 Chapter 2 focuses on the creation of the Confucian Association (Kongjiaohui孔教会) 
in 1912 and its effort to revitalize Confucianism by instituting it as a religion (kongjiao) and 
the state-religion (guojiao 国教) to suit the new sociopolitical structures of the republican 
period.  This chapter explores how the Confucian Association attempted the radical invention 
                                                 
22 Tan Sor Hoon, “Secular Religiosity in Chinese Politics: A Confucian Perspective” in Michael Heng Siam-Heng 
and Ten Chin Liew eds. State and Secularism: Perspectives from Asia (Singapore: World Scientific Press, 2010) 
23 Mary Evelyn Tucker, “Introduction” in Confucian Spirituality edited by Tu Weiming and Mary Evelyn Tucker 
(New York: Herder and Herder, 2003), p. 1  
24 For Chinese Buddhism, Holmes Welch made a strong case that there was a Buddhist revival in China in the 
laissez faire atmosphere of the early republican period. See his The Buddhist Revival in China (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1968).   See also Don A. Pittman’s Toward A Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu’s 
Reform  (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001) Daoism also experienced a period of reformation and 
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of Confucianism into a proselytizing “religion”, notably through the creation of a Confucian 
church with religious paraphernalia such as holy land, clergy, religious scriptures and rituals. 
The Confucian Association also launched a massive socio-political campaign to 
institutionalize the Confucian religion that it had invented as the state-religion of China in 
1913 and 1916. The current consensus in scholarship is to interpret the Confucian state-
religion movement as conservative in nature. Benjamin Schwartz perceptively points out that 
conservatism in China was primarily cultural conservatism not socio-political conservatism as 
most intellectuals were more interested in the preservation of the cultural order rather than 
defending the traditional socio-political status quo.
25
 Many believe that what the Confucian 
Association espoused was cultural nationalism, as one writer argues, “The Confucian religion 
movement was not a religious movement by nature, but a cultural nationalistic movement. 
Conservatism, nationalism, and culturalism are the main elements of the movement’s basic 
beliefs.”26  
In the context of colonial India, Partha Chatterjee suggests that cultural nationalism is 
a response to the threat of Westernization and to maintain the equivalence of Indian 
civilization to Western civilization. Chatterjee shows that Indian nationalist discourse divided 
the colonial world into two realms: the outer-material realm of economy, statecraft, science 
and technology which the West was more advanced, and the Indians readily admitted their 
inadequacies and adopted western material culture for progress; and the inner-spiritual realm 
of religion and culture which had to be guarded jealously against any foreign intrusion to 
guarantee Indian cultural identity. This inner-spiritual/exterior-material dichotomy made it 
possible for nationalists to adopt western modernity, and at the same time, assert their 
independence and distinctiveness against the West. 
27
 In China, the inner/outer dichotomy was 
expressed by the essence (ti 体)/ practical use (yong 用) formula promoted by Confucian 
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reformers during the Self-Strengthening movement (zhiqiang yundong自强运动) from 1861 
to 1895. Confucian reformers who were learned in foreign affairs (yanwu 洋务) sought to 
modernize China through the practical use of Western technology and economic methods, at 
the same time, maintained the moral-civilizational essence of China, which they believed was 
superior than the West.  
Religion is an important element in this nationalist project, and it has to be 
modernized and nationalized so as to provide a basis for the construction of citizenship and 
cultural-national identity against the assault of Westernization, which, to the Chinese, were 
often in the forms of Christian missionization and conversion. However, the political 
appearance of the Confucian religion movement, as I will argue, did not mean that it was a 
form of secular nationalism merely cloak in religious veneer. The argument that I am pursuing 
is that in the case republican Confucian religion movement, Confucian ideas and ritual 
practices were not rhetorical forms to frame nationalist claims, rather the movement possessed 
a strong and genuine religious character and content. In short it can be regarded as a form of 
religious nationalism as distinct from secular nationalism in the ordering of public life 
according to religious values and principles. Furthermore, the Confucian religion movement, 
though, oriented to the Chinese nation-state, also had a transnational character seeking to 
spread Confucian morality afar for universal salvation. 
Nationalism, a political ideology that postulates the identification of individuals with 
the nation and legitimizing the nation-state, is for a long time regarded as secular and 
antithetical to religion.  In his influential Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson defines 
the nation as an imagined community which was made possible by the rise of print capitalism, 
and the demise of the hierarchical and multi-ethnic Christendom and dynastic realm following 
the Reformation and the emergence of democratic revolutions in Europe between the sixteenth 





and it was, in various “modular forms” exported outside the West with the globalization of 
Western economic and political powers.
28
   
This secularist bias in the understanding of nationalism has been criticized recently by 
scholars who demonstrated that the separation between religion and politics was far from true 
in reality. There were multiple connections between religion and nationalism in the modern 
era. They show that religionists and nationalists were often indistinguishable and the motifs, 
ideologies, discourses and practices of religion and nationalism were creatively combined to 
create new religious and socio-political movements.
29
 In China, there was a busy traffic 
between secular and religious ideas and practices
30
, which was, ironically, eventually severed 
by the campaigns of the Confucian Association to institute the Confucianism as the state-
religion in the republican era. Chapter 2 will also examine the state-religion controversy 
provoked by the campaigns of the Confucian Association and the aftermath. The Confucian 
state-religion movement prompted the other religions, especially Protestantism to campaign 
for the freedom of religious belief and appropriation of Confucianism by Yuan Shikai袁世凯 
(1859-1916) for his monarchical attempt stirred the emergence of the iconoclastic anti-
religious and anti-Confucian New Cultural movement.  
Chapter 3 will examine the development of Confucian redemptive societies, more 
specifically, the Worldwide Ethical Society (Wanguo Daodehui 万国道德会). The huge 
waves of redemptive societies that emerged in late Qing and early Republican periods were 
seldom connected with the Confucian religion movement in academic studies. Developed 
concurrently with the Confucian Religion movement in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century, the redemptive societies were diverse in composition. Some of the 
redemptive societies defined themselves as Buddhist and Daoist, while others such as the 
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Daodehui maintained Confucianism as their roots. (yiru weizong 以儒为宗 ).  After the 
dissipation of the Confucian religion movement, Confucian redemptive societies were the 
main force in the religious reformation and revival of Confucianism in the twentieth century. 
Indeed, commanding millions of adherents, redemptive societies became the main torch 
bearers of Confucianism in the republican period.  
In contrast, to the state orientation of the Confucian state-religion movement, 
Confucian redemptive societies aimed to syncretize all world religions into one universal faith 
so as to spread and realize the Confucian ideal of Great Commonwealth (datong大同) for 
world salvation. I suggest that the Confucian redemptive societies developed historically from 
late imperial “popular Confucianism” (minjian rujiao民间儒教).  At the popular level, since 
late Ming, Confucian concepts and idioms have been “religionized” as a set of beliefs or 
doctrine for individual spiritual-moral cultivation and universal salvation.  In chapter 3, I will 
examine the religious thoughts of Wang Fengyi 王凤仪 (1864-1937), an illiterate religious 
preacher and the spiritual leader of the Daodehui, to discuss how Confucian religiosity is 
transmitted and articulated at the popular level.  
In sum, this study attempt to show that Confucian religiosity is the core of the 
Confucian tradition and the driving force behind its modern development and reformation. In 
the concluding chapter, I will revisit the Levensonian thesis of the modern fate of 
Confucianism. Joseph Levenson believed that Confucianism had become a dead intellectual 
tradition in the modern era and the state-religion movement was largely a backward and 
“conservative” movement by the traditionalists to revive Confucianism as a “religion.” In 
other words, the Confucian encounter with modernity is a story of decline and displacement. 
One must ask: Can the religious reformation of the Confucian tradition in the Confucian 
religion and redemptive society movements constitute a renaissance and revival of 









          
Chapter One 
Kang Youwei as Martin Luther of Confucian Religion, and  
Birth of Kongjiao 1890-1911 
 
 
n June 19, 1898, Kang Youwei submitted the memorial “Request the Negotiation of 
Regulations on Religious Disputes, Rectifying the Structure of Civil Service 
Examination and Setting up Confucian Temples throughout the Empire”, to emperor 
Guangxu 光绪 (r.1875-1908). Kang began by explicating the gravity of the problem of religious 
disputes with Christian missionaries, which often led to wars and foreign encroachments. This was the 
case, he argues, because “Western nations spread commerce and religion through the use of military 
force….In the beginning, they use religion to change (the loyalty) of people in other countries, and 
later exploit religious conflicts to colonize other nations.” To deal with the thorny religious disputes, 
Kang proposed the establishment of Kongjiao as the state religion of China and to negotiate 
regulations on religious affairs with the Catholic Pope. Kang also requested the creation of state-
O 
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sanctioned Confucian churches in all parts of the empire, from prefectures to the remotest villages.
1
 
On July 10, Kang submitted the famous memorial “Requesting the Honoring of Confucianism as the 
State-Religion, Establishment of a Ministry of Religion and Churches, Use of Confucius’s Birth for 
Dating, and Destruction of Licentious Cults” to the throne.  In this memorial, Kang attacked the 
polytheistic religious practices of China as “barbaric” (yeman野蛮) or “superstitious” (minxin迷信) 
and described how foreigners laughed among themselves while taking pictures of Chinese temples. 
He called for the state to honor Confucius as the religious founder (jiaozhu教主) of Kongjiao and to 
adopt a new dating system based on Confucius’ birthday (kongzi jinian孔子纪年). 
 Kang also proposed the radical separation of church and state (zhengjiao fenli 政教分离) and 
the removal of all other “unworthy” spirits, including Confucian saints, from the state cult. In other 
words, a national religion dedicated solely to Confucius was conceived by the reformer, and 
institutionally, he wanted the total destruction of all improper temples and their conversion into 
Confucian temples (wenmiao文庙) and modern schools (xuetang学堂). By creating a monotheistic 
state-religion (similar to Christianity in the West), Kang explained that China could avoid the shame 
of being labeled as an uncivilized nation, and the state could unite the nation spiritually and to purify 
social morality and customs.
2
 It is clear from the above the inception of Kongjiao in the nineteenth 
century was related to China’s encounter with western imperialism and Christianity. However, the 
birth of Kongjiao cannot be interpreted simply as a reaction to the challenges of the West. As we shall 
see the western notion of religion was actually appropriated by Kang Youwei to facilitate his own 
personal agenda of breaking the traditional mold of Confucianism as a state ideology so as to 
transform it into a state and universal religion.   
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CHINESE CRISIS OF CONVERSION:  
THREATS OF IMPERIALISM AND CHRISTIANITY 
On the eve of the Wuxu 戊戌 reform, Kang Youwei established the Society for the Preservation of 
Confucianism (Baojiaohui 保教会) and called passionately for the protection of the Chinese race, 
state and religion. In late 1890s, Kang perceived that the Chinese race was in grave danger of political 
and cultural enslavements as imperialist nations increasingly threatened to carve the empire like a 
melon, and at the same time, the more organized and aggressive Christianity threatened to displace the 
Confucian teaching (jiao教).  Kang’s proposal for the establishment of Kongjiao as the state-religion 
was a response to what he perceived as the coordinated political and spiritual-cultural invasions of 
Western imperialist nations and Christianity. Kang acknowledged that the state and church were 
separated in the West, however, he observed that religious and political power cooperated in their 
incursions of non-Western societies. In his June 19 memorial, Kang highlighted to the emperor that 
Western imperialist nations often utilized Christian incidents (jiaoan教案) as pretexts to invade other 
countries. In China, since the first year of the reign of emperor Tongzhi 同治 (r.1861-1875) foreign 
powers had been exploiting religious disputes to encroach on Chinese sovereignty, and in the recent 
Jiaozhou Bay incident, Lunshun, Kowloon, Weihaiwei and the Bays of Dalian and Guangzhou were 
ceded to foreign powers.  “One religious dispute has led to such cession, now foreign churches dotted 
the empire, conflicts can be provoked anytime…one spark can set the whole plain on fire.”3 He 
argued that Christian incidents were difficult to resolve simply because there were no mutually agreed 
religious laws (jiaolu教律) to settle the disputes. This is why China was often at the mercy of the 
demands of Western powers whenever disputes with the missionaries occurred. He calculated that the 
establishment of the Confucian church and its enactment of religious laws with the Christian church 
would ease imperialist pressures through the depoliticization of religious tensions.  
Kang’s proposal of the separation between state and church also served to remove the 
political support of European states to Christianity in China. Christianity, for Kang Youwei, was as 
                                                          
3 Kong, Kang Youwei wuxu zhen zouyi, p. 256  




menacing as imperialism. While imperialist nations subjugate other countries politically, Christianity 
sought to eliminate their religions. In a letter written to a friend in 1894, Kang cautioned that 
Christianity depended on state power for propagation, and except for Confucianism, Buddhism and 
Islam in Asia, the Christian religion had eliminated all other religions in the world. He asserts, “If we 
are strong (in national strength), Confucian learning, the soul of China, can be spread to the world. If 
we cannot strengthen ourselves, then both our nation and religion will be destroyed.”4 In the mind of 
most Chinese elites, Christianity was “a religion of love spread by force.” It was perceived as the 
ideological arm of imperialism, and its right to propagate in China was depended on the political 
power of Western nations.
5
  Indeed, Christianity was proscribed as heterodoxy (yiduan异端) in 1724 
by emperor Yongzheng 雍正 (r.1722-1735) and activities restricted to Canton and Macau till early 
nineteenth century. It was legalized and protected by the unequal treaties China signed with foreign 
powers after her defeat in the First and Second Opium Wars. The Sino-French Treaty of Tianjin 
(signed in 1858 and revised as the Convention of Beijing 1860), in particular, revolutionized Christian 
missions in China by granting legal status to Catholicism. The treaty permitted Catholic priests the 
freedom to preach their religion and to lease or purchase lands for the construction of religious 
buildings in all provinces. Chinese converts were also guaranteed religious freedom to practice 
Christianity without official harassment or punishment. The same privileges were granted to 
Protestant missionaries due to the most-favoured nation clause.  
The recognition of freedom of religion by the Tianjin Treaty “opened” up China for 
Christianity and the presence and socio-political power of the religion reached unprecedented 
magnitudes in the period after 1860.  From 1860-1900, we witnessed the gradual expansion of 
Christian missions from the coastal cities to all parts of the empire. Christianity and foreign 
missionaries were protected legally by extra-territorial rights and the politico-military power of 
Western imperial nations. France, in particular, established herself as the sole champion and protector 
of Roman Catholic missions, and, to the resentment of Chinese government and non-Christian 
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population, intervened aggressively on behalf of Catholic missionaries and converts in defend and 
furthering of their interests in China.
6
  This period was also a time of unparalleled institutional 
expansion for Christianity in Chinese history. Catholic and Protestant missionaries introduced to 
China the science and benefits of Western civilization so as to make the Chinese receptive to religious 
conversion. To the fear and envy of Confucian elites, mission societies built social institutions such as 
churches and chapels, schools, hospitals, orphanages, publishing houses, anti-footbinding societies, 
and “charity halls” (shantang善堂) for the poor and destitute. Education, in particular, was one area 
in which the missionary influence remained strong until the rise nationalism and anti-Christian 
movement in the 1920s and 1930s, and exerted great cultural impact on Chinese elites.
7
 
With the expansion of Christianity in China after 1860, we also witnessed the sudden surge in 
anti-Christian protests and violence in the last decades of the nineteenth century. These sporadic anti-
Christian disturbances vary in intensity and scale, from vandalism of church properties to catastrophes 
such as the Tianjin Massacre (1870) and the Boxer Uprising (1899-1900). These anti-Christian 
incidents, as Paul Cohen has demonstrated, were sporadic, and often led and directed by the scholar-
gentry elites who perceived Christianity as a heterodox (xiejiao邪教) or seditious teaching backed by 
gunboats. Chinese elites also were unhappy with missionary usurpation of socio-legal privileges of 
the scholar gentry class and viewed foreign missionaries as their socio-political rivals in Chinese 
society.
8
 Cohen believed that the clashes between Chinese elites and Christian missionaries were 
fundamentally cultural. He explains: 
(T)he missionary was deeply-and unavoidably-committed to the proposition that the true 
interests of the Chinese people could be served only by means of a fundamental reordering 
of Chinese culture…The vast majority of missionaries, Protestants and Catholic, were 
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intolerant of Chinese culture and unwilling or unable to make meaningful adjustments to it. 
They devoted themselves tirelessly to religious proselytizing and tended to relegate secular 
change to a position of secondary importance. Although narrowly conservative in personal 
and religious outlook, their impact on the Chinese scene was the very opposite of 
conservative. For these were the missionaries whose demands on the native culture were 
the most unyielding-and hence, from a Chinese standpoint, the most overtly iconoclastic 
….Thus, although, some missionaries concentrated on attacking the old order in China 
while others placed more emphasis on erection of a new order, all missionaries, by nature 
of the very calling, posed a revolutionary challenge to the traditional culture. It is for this 
reason, more than any other, that so many Chinese felt so threatened.
9
   
The conflict between Chinese culture and Christianity was in fact manifested earlier in the 
Chinese Rites Controversy in the eighteenth century. The controversy started in 1704 with the 
prohibition issued by the Holy See on the practice of Chinese ancestral worship as pagan. The Vatican 
objected the accommodative policy of the Jesuit missionaries who interpreted Confucianism as a 
“secular” philosophy and Chinese ancestral worship and sacrifice to Heaven as “civil” rather than 
“religious” ceremonies. The confrontation between the Chinese imperial state and Papal authority led 
to the expulsion of non-Jesuit missionaries by emperor Kangxi康熙 (r.1662-1722) in 1706 and the 
ban of Christianity by his son 18 years later. 
10
 The political balance of the Chinese state and the 
Christian missionaries reversed a century later when Western imperialism overcame Chinese political 
resistance to Christian proselytization. Certainly, it is simplistic to view Christian missionary 
movements as the ideological arm of Western imperialism
11
, however, from the Chinese perspective, 
“Jesus Christ came into China riding on a cannon-ball.”12    
While the Jesuits sought to “complement Confucianism and replace Buddhism” (buru yifo补
儒易佛) in their conversion strategy, 19th century missionaries defined the purpose of their mission as 
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the conquest of China for Christ.  Missionaries saw Confucianism as one of the main obstacles in the 
conversion of China and were relentless and uncompromising in their attack on what they considered 
heathenism. Ironically, even these missionaries who developed a sympathetic understanding of 
Confucianism viewed the teaching as deficient and their main aim of studying the classics was to 
overcome it eventually. As the British missionary Joseph Edkins (1823-1905) puts it, “to overthrow 
the religion of the East…The careful study of the articles of heathen’s faith, and of the superstitions to 
which his religious susceptibilities cling, becomes necessary.”13  
Chinese elites were alarmed by the attack of Christian missionaries on Chinese culture, 
particularly Confucianism, and the conversion of the Chinese people to Christianity. Religious 
conversion posed as a revolutionary threat to them because of Christian exclusivist notion of religion. 
Like other societies outside of Abrahamic monotheism, the idea that one must subscribed only to one 
single God and religion was something foreign to the Chinese people.  Christian conversion was 
unsettling simply because it was not merely “religious”, it involved the alteration of cultural and 
national identity. Christian converts upon entering the religion had to renounce “pagan” or 
“superstitious” practices, most notably ancestor worship was an object of missionary condemnation, 
and reject participation and contribution in communal rituals and festivals. Many missionaries also 
tried to introduce intellectual and material aspects of, what they believed as, superior Western culture 
together with the gospel to “civilize” the Chinese.  Furthermore, there was a concern about the 
political loyalties of the Chinese converts. Kang Youwei warned the throne that Christian conversion 
in changing the hearts and minds of the Chinese people was in fact the vanguard of Western 
encroachment. Thus the common saying at that time: “one more Christian, one less Chinese.”  
To Chinese elites, the ignorant and illiterate masses and ethnic minorities were most 
susceptible to Christian conversion.  For Kang, the lure of Christianity to the masses was not its 
doctrinal superiority, but the practical benefits to be gained from associating with a religion protected 
by the imperial powers. He writes, “provincial and county officials fear foreign missionaries and 
Chinese converts as though they are tigers. Whenever there’s a lawsuit, once (the person) joins the 
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foreign religion, any wrongdoing will become right. Devious characters (jianmin 贱民) joined the 
religion for legal protection and to oppress the local people. Ignorant people saw the benefits (of 
conversion) and followed en masse.”14 As for ethnic minorities, the civilizing influence of the Han 
Chinese has not penetrated these communities yet. Kang lamented that in the ethnic minorities 
inhabited regions such as the border of Guangdong and Yunnan, there was not a single elementary 
school and shamans (wu巫), instead of Confucian scholars, were assigned as the libationers (jijiu祭
酒) in communal rituals. “This is why the minority groups are confused by Protestantism.”15  
Indeed, it was not in the treaty ports, but in the anarchic frontier region of Thistle Mountain in 
Guangxi that the foreign Christian religion attracted a mass following among the beleaguered Hakka 
minority and fermented the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864), the bloodiest uprising in the nineteenth 
century that caused the death of 20 million and nearly toppled the Qing dynasty. The rebellion was led 
by Hong Xiuquan 洪秀全 (1814-1864), a failed scholar who came into contact with the Christian 
religion at Canton, and became convinced that he was the second son of God (shangdi 上帝) and of 
his messianic mission to realize on China the “Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace” (taiping tianguo
太平天国).  Hong derived his messianic vision from the Christian tract Good Words to Admonish the 
Age (quanshi liangyan劝世良言) written by the first Chinese protestant evangelist, Liang Fa 梁发 
(1789-1855). The Good Words was published in 1832 and contained few and repetitive themes such 
as monotheism and the omnipotence of one true God, idol worship and moral decline, Jesus as God’s 
son and the savior of man, and the eternal salvation of the believers and the damnation of unbelievers. 
Taiping ideology is certainly not confined to Christianity. Hong Xiuquan was a religious innovator 
who synthesized the Christian themes he learned in Good Words with the native Confucianism, 
Buddhism, Daoism, Mohism and popular shamanism to create a new dynamic religion.
16
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For our discussion, the Taiping rebellion is remarkable in three ways. First, Protestant 
monotheism and anti-superstition was wedded with Confucian moral purism to produce an 
iconoclastic attack on Chinese religion in the Taiping movement. This is made possible as both 
Protestantism and Confucian fundamentalism shared the same antagonistic attitude towards heterodox 
beliefs, idol worship, extravagant and wasteful rituals, and debauched religious specialists, which 
were connected to the present moral degeneration of the populace.    At the beginning of the Taiping 
movement, as Robert Weller stimulatingly documented, the main activities of Hong Xiuquan’s 
Society of God Worshipers (Bai Shangdi hui 拜上帝会) was not political subversive but religiously 
iconoclastic. The god-worshippers furiously combatted the many temple cults that dotted the 
mountainous region of Guangxi. It was complaints against their destructions of local temples that 
brought the movement to the attention of the authorities and eventually its suppression and the 
outbreak of the rebellion.
17
  Second, another area of rapprochement between Protestantism and 
Confucianism as witnessed in the Taiping movement was the optimistic belief in salvation through 
moral transformation and behavior. Indeed, Hong Xiuquan millenarian vision of a Heavenly Kingdom 
of peace, equality and justice looked very much like the Confucian utopia of datong in which 
humanity achieved their highest stage of development in morality and public spirit. Third, the unity of 
politics and teaching, the basis of kingship in imperial Confucianism, was unavoidably attacked in the 
process of creating an institutionalized religion and theocracy through the legitimation of a 
transcendental authority. Joseph Levenson observes that the Taiping rebellion was revolutionary 
because the authority of its monarch was derived from a transcendental Heaven and this directly 
assault the premise of an immanent Heaven in imperial Confucianism.
18
 Thus, the Taipings attacked 
all monarchs since the first emperor of China as blasphemers who usurped the divine status and 
authority of the transcendent God and saw their crusade as battling the blasphemers and to restore the 
classical pre-imperial monotheistic religion of China.
19
 The Taiping rebellion demonstrated the 
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religious and political impacts brought about by the interaction between evangelical Protestantism and 
Confucianism in the nineteenth century, and the three developments of the Taiping rebellion outlined 
above, as we shall see in the following, are also found in Kang Youwei’s movement to create a 
monotheistic Confucian religion and nation. 
 
STATE RELIGION AND CREATION OF A CONFUCIAN NATION 
The specter of Christian conversion and its grave threat to the Chinese state and teaching exerted a 
strong influence on Kang Youwei’s belief in the necessity of a “national doctrine and church” to 
counter the spiritual invasion of the West.  In face of Christian expansion, Kang was alarmed by the 
feebleness of Confucianism and the spiritual disunity of China. In the June 19 memorial, he complains 
“China only honor the Sage in name, therefore there is only veneration but no affection (for 
Confucius).” While licentious temple worshipping undeserving and animalistic spirits dotted the 
empire, Kang observed that Confucian temples could only be found in cities not in villages” and other 
than literati, the masses were not allowed to worship Confucius or taught the Sage’s teaching.20 Even 
for the literati class, according to Kang, few were true and dedicated Confucians as most scholars 
studied the Confucian classics mainly to pass the civil service examination. The spiritual unity of 
China, for Kang, could be achieved by two projects— the construction of a state-religion and the 
destruction of all other religions and temple cults in China.  
In the creation of a state-religion, Kang Youwei basically appropriated Christianity as the 
organizational model. While Kang was alarmed by the expansion of Christianity and the 
accompanying increase in religious tensions, he was impressed with the institutional strength of 
Christianity. He admits, “Although Christianity is shallow in teaching, their practice is orderly and 
numerous; our teaching may be refined but crude in practice.” He noticed that missionary societies 
were formed in Western societies to undertake the massive task of propagating the faith. He was 
fascinated with the fact that all Christians, “Rulers and subjects, men and women, gather once every 
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seven days to worship their God and recite the scriptures.” Like other religious reformists in Asia and 
the middle-east, Kang wanted to adopt the practices and ideas of Christianity such as churches, 
Sabbath, religious calendar (yesu jinian 耶稣纪年), catechism, scriptures reading and singing of 
religious hymns to strengthen Confucianism organizationally and to compete more effectively against 
the foreign religion for converts.  
The institutionalization of a national church and religion, for Kang, also served the purpose of 
creating a united Chinese nation. At the end of the 19
th
 century, the Western notion of nationhood was 
gaining currency among Chinese nationalists, both reformers and revolutionaries, who believed that it 
was the only way for China to become united against the threat of imperialism, and gain respectability 
as an equal and sovereign member in the international system of  nation-states.  The problem, 
however, that plagued Chinese nationalists continuously, as John Fitzgerald points out, was to find the 
cement that could bind, to them, “the heap of loose sand” together into a national community (qun, 
shehui 群 ,社会).21   Kang’s motivation for the creation of a national doctrine, as Liang Qichao 
revealed, was because “he thought that Chinese people lacked civic virtues (gongde功德) and are 
disunited as a group, and would not survive in the world; (thus) he wished to unite them, however, 
without something which everyone respect and accept, it is impossible to unite the people emotionally 
and enhance their nature.”22  
In the nineteenth century, Christian missionaries were the main intermediaries in transferring 
to China the model of “religious citizenship.”23 Missionaries introduced civic rituals such as flag 
raising and the singing of national anthem and promoted the view that religion (Christianity) was 
crucial in the creation of a cohesive nation and moral citizens in the West. The Christian model of 
religious citizenship inspired Kang Youwei’s national religion movement.  Institutionally and ritually, 
the creation of empire-wide Confucian churches would serve to unite the rulers and subjects into one 
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single national body. Doctrinally, Kang believed that Confucian concept of humanness (ren仁) could 
cement the Chinese people together.  Infusing it with scientific terminologies he read from western 
translated books, Kang reinterpreted humanness as a kind of ether (chi 气) or light and electricity 
(guangdian光电) that permeated the whole world. Drawing from Buddhism and Christianity, Kang 
perceived it also as the mind of compassion (buren zhixin不忍之心) in human beings that produced 
the power of affinity (aili 爱力) or attraction (xishe zhili 吸摄之力) in them.  Kang perceived the 
concept of love and the power of affinity in Christianity as a similar but inferior copy of humanness in 
Kongjiao. For Kang, humanness is the universal force that produces civility in men and induces the 
formation of social groups.
24
 Religion was also important for the intellectual and moral “renewal of 
the people” (xinmin新民).  Kang wrote to the throne that the country was weak because of the moral 
degeneration of the people. He lamented that customs and hearts of the people have degenerated to 
such a bad state that few thought about protecting the nation when it was in trouble.  Kang argued that 
the only way to reform the people and strengthen the nation was through the institutionalization of 
Kongjiao as the state religion:  
Rulers govern the people with laws and regulations, while teachers instruct their hearts with 
morality and reasons. Consequently, laws work from the outside and moral teachings enter the 
inside (of men). This is why the rise and fall of all nations in the world depend on whether their 
religion flourish or not...Your servant humbly believe that we cannot establish a nation without 
preserving the hearts of people and stirring their sense of loyalty and righteousness; this cannot 
be achieved without the veneration of Confucius.
25
 
While religion was essential for the intellectual and moral development of the nation, its 
antithesis, superstitions was understood to be an impediment to progress. Vincent Goossaert 
persuasively argued that the Wuxu reforms signaled the shift from the traditional dichotomy of 
orthodoxy/heterodoxy in imperial China to the modern religion/superstition divide. In the July 10 
                                                          
24 Kang Youwei, “Zhongyong zhu” 中庸注 (Zhongyong Annotated) in Jiang Yihua姜义华 and Zhang Ronghua 张荣华 eds.  
Kang Youwei Quanji (KYWQJ)康有为全集 (Complete works of Kang Youwei) Vol.7 (Beijing: Beijing renmin daxue 
chubanshe, 2007), p.  4 
25 Kong, Kang Youwei bianfa zouzhang jikao, pp.  259-260 




memorial, older Confucian prejudices against immoral temple cults, debauched Buddhist and Daoist 
clergies and wasteful religious festivals were subsumed under the attack on superstition.  Thus the 
main criticism directed by the religious reformers against temple cults was not merely that it was 
“immoral” (yin淫) or “improper” but that it was irrational or unscientific. In other words, Chinese 
religion was evaluated outside of Chinese world-view, and according to the yardstick of post-
Enlightenment and post-Reformation notion of rational religion. Together with this shift in discourse 




 Most importantly, Western discourse of religion/superstition provided Kang with the 
justification to launch a totalistic attack on the pluralistic Chinese popular religion from a universal 
perspective derived from outside Chinese culture. The Chinese categories of orthodoxy (zheng 正) 
and heterodoxy (xie邪), Rebecca Nedostup points out, “operated within a closed system of mutual 
opposition and, therefore, mutual need.”27   The dichotomy of heterodoxy and orthodoxy rested on the 
trope of “purity” as heterodox ideas and practices are viewed not as absolute falsehoods, but corrupted 
versions of the orthodox ones. Furthermore, Liu Kwang-ching and Richard Shek argue that many 
“heterodox” ideas and practices were tolerated by the state in late imperial China as long as they did 
not challenge the core of imperial orthodoxy of lijiao礼教, the Three Bonds (sangang三纲) of ruler-
subject, husband-wife, and parents-child.
28
 In contrast, the categories of religion and superstition in 
Protestant missionary discourse are mutually exclusive and rested on the evolutionary belief that the 
progress of science will eliminate superstition characterized by irrational magic and wasteful rituals 
and lead to the triumph of religion (i.e. rational Protestantism).  
  In the 10 July memorial, Kang blamed the degeneration of Chinese intellect and culture on 
the irrationality or “superstitious” nature of Chinese religious practices. Kang blamed the current 
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sorry state of affairs on the Confucian elites who did nothing to spread the true teachings of Confucius 
and also the lax state which encouraged the proliferation of “immoral” temple cults and sacrifices to 
undeserved spirits such as Guandi 关帝, Mazu 妈祖 and Wenchang 文昌. In contrast to Chinese 
religious customs, Kang explained, “Americans and Europeans only pray to the Heavenly God, and 
their temples only worship the religious founder (i.e. Jesus Christ)…this served to guard their innate 
goodness and made them orderly and deferential.”29  In the same memorial, Kang proposed large 
scale temple destruction and confiscation of religious properties for school construction (huimiao 
banxue 毁庙办学 ). In contrast, to Zhang Zhidong 张之洞 (1837-1909) who proposed in his 
Exhortation to Build Schools (quanxue pian 劝学篇 ) the confiscation of 70 percent of temple 
properties for the construction of modern schools, Kang wanted the total destruction of all non-
Confucian temples inside or outside the Official Sacrifice (sidian 祀典).30  He wanted to create a 
national religion exclusively for Confucius, even temples for other saints of Confucianism were not 
excluded from his plan to transform all temples to national churches dedicated to the Sage.  
The July 10 edict can be seen as a socio-political project to encourage the creation of talent 
for the state, more importantly, it was also a religious project to reform the spiritual life of the Chinese 
people totally.
31
 Indeed, for Kongjiao activists, educational and religious reforms were intricately 
related to the creation of a new citizenry and the progress of the nation. As Liang Qichao explained in 
his “On the Religious Reform of China”:  
The rise and fall of a nation depends entirely on the intellect and abilities of its citizens. The 
progress and decline of intellect and abilities on the other hand, depends entirely on citizens’ 
thoughts. The superiority or inferiority of thoughts and their diffusion or obstruction, rested 
entirely on the customs and (religious) faith of citizens…The West achieved its current level of 
civilization due to religious reformation and the renaissance of ancient learning. 
32
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RELIGION AT THE CIVILIZATIONAL LEVEL 
It is clear that Kang Youwei’s effort to create a Confucian religion was also a response to Protestant 
civilizational discourse of religion. Kang was extremely sensitive to Western, often Christian, 
criticism of Chinese religion as barbaric. He complained that “The Westerners say we are a country 
without religion (jiao教) and have degraded us into the rank of third-class barbaric state. This is why 
in recent years the foreign diplomats to our country are all transferred from Africa. (The foreign 
nations) attacked and humiliated us at will, like how they deal with savages.”  
In missionary discourse of Religion, Christianity was conflated with Civilization and 
barbarism with heathenism. Christian conversion was commonly asserted by the missionaries as an 
awakening from heathenism, a process of the moral transformation of the Self and the progression of 
culturally deprived society into the brotherhood of civilized Christian nations.
33
 Robert Morrison 
(1782-1834), the first Protestant missionary in China, for instance, declared that the goal of his 
mission was to peacefully and gradually shed “The light of Science and Revelation” onto the whole of 
East Asia. For Morrison, as for the later generations of missionaries in China that came after him, the 
Christian missionary enterprise was much more than preaching the Gospel, it was increasingly being 
defined as a “civilizing project.” 34 Western missionaries increasingly styled themselves as apostles of 
the gospel of civilization, or what one scholar called “evangelical modernity”35 whereby the Christian 
religion together with other aspects of Western society such as rational science, democracy and 
capitalism were preached for the uplifting of other “decadent races” to the level of Western 
(Christian) Civilization. 
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 In his Evidence of Christianity (Tiandao Suyuan天道溯源), a Chinese Christian catechism 
text, highly influential and widely circulated in East Asia, American Presbyterian M.A.P Martin 
(1827-1916) attributed the political and cultural-technological strengths of the West, especially 
Protestant nations, to the civilizing influence of reformed Christianity:  
Having rejected the falsehoods of the Pope (jiaowang 教王), (Protestant countries) progress 
steadily and customs greatly improved. Having identified the sacred teachings, it was expounded 
in other areas; as a result (these nations) knew the heavenly mandate, improved on their political 
system and investigate scientific principles (wuli 物理). These nations became increasingly 
powerful and wealthy when governance improves, people contented in peace and after scientific 
principles are understood.
36
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Martin praised Great Britain as the greatest nation in the world because of her Protestant piety. He 
wrote that Great Britain in the reign of emperor Jiaqing嘉庆 (r.1796-1820) dispatched missionary 
teachers (jiaoshi 教士) to many parts of the world. These missionaries civilized the illiterate and 
cannibalistic savages (yi夷) of the southern sea with the Gospel. The Christian converts “destroyed 
their licentious cult, follow the true God, moved into earthen houses, wear clothing, ceased fighting 
and cultivate moral discipline.”  In the more advanced societies of India and Burma, the colonized 
subjects speedily improved in morality and culture as they discarded their defective religions for 
Christianity.  Martin concluded that nations who followed Christianity were civilized swiftly while 
others who turned their backs on Jesus declined.
37
  
 Christian civilizational discourse of religion, as Martin’s catechism has clearly shown, 
presented Religion as the signifier of Civilization, and (Protestant) Christianity as the only “one true 
religion.” Brian Stanley has illustrated that the association of Christianity with Civilization in 
missionary thinking is based on 4 assumptions. The first “was the belief that the cultures which 
missionaries were penetrating were in no sense religiously neutral—rather they were under the control 
of the Evil One. ‘Heathen’ societies were the domain of Satan in all their aspects— not merely 
religion, but economics, politics, public morals, the arts, and all that is embraced by the term 
‘culture’”. The second underlying assumption was that nineteenth century Britain was the model of 
civilization because she was “religious”: “It was Christianity and above all that national recognition of 
God and the word of God in the Protestant Reformation, which had made Britain what she was. The 
Bible had made Britain great. She was the archetype of the Christian nation, and God’s design was to 
create more Christian nations on the same pattern.” The third missionary assumption was “the implicit 
faith in human progress which was one of the legacies of the Enlightenment to Christian thought.” 
Evangelical missionaries believed that the gospel helped European Protestant nations to progress to 
the highest stage of civilization, which was defined by commercialism, while the rest of the world 
stagnated at lowest stages of development such as hunting-gathering and agriculture. The last 
assumption was simply that the approach of the missionaries in civilizing the “heathen” people had 
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 Missionaries were optimistically convinced of the spiritual-moral strength of their 
religion. This is validated by the fact that “savages”, such as the ones from the southern sea mentioned 
by M.A.P Martin, converted to Christianity en masse and adopted the moral-cultural values and 
material facets of western civilization.    
In the case of China and in other “more sophisticated civilizations”, as Timothy Fitzgerald 
points out, missionaries “were quicker to abandon the language of heathen and barbarian to develop a 
new approach to the greater civility of Christianity: This was the world religion approach: there are 
positive aspects to ‘the religions of the world’ such as Hinduism, though they fall short of 
Christianity.” 39  Following their Jesuit predecessors, Nineteenth century missionaries commonly 
identified Chinese religions as constituted by the “three teachings” (sanjiao三教) of Confucianism, 
Buddhism and Daoism. For missionaries, the history of Chinese religions was a story of progressive 
degeneration of the true path of monotheism in the course of time to widespread “superstitions” and 
“idolatry.” The ancient Chinese people worshipped only one Supreme God known as “Lord of 
Heaven” (shangdi 上帝), however the one true teaching became corrupted overtime and become 
separated into the ‘three teachings.” While Protestant missionaries attributed the dire state of Chinese 
religion to the corrupted priesthood, mindless ritualism and idol worship in Buddhism and Daoism, 
descriptions strikingly similar to how they represented the “Romish Church”40, they were on the 
whole sympathetic in their reading of Confucianism.  Missionary-scholar James Legge (1815-1897), 
for example, wrote that “the teaching of Confucianism on human duty is wonderful and admirable” 
and “his (Confucius’) utterances are both in harmony with the Law and the Gospel. A world ordered 
by them would be a wonderful world.”41 However, Legge hastened to add that “It is not perfect 
indeed” as compared to Christianity as Confucianism was too “secular” or ‘this-worldly” in its moral 
teaching. Without the realization of Sins and the aid of the Holy Spirit as preached by Christianity, 
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Legge argued, human efforts alone would be inadequate in the elimination of moral ills.  In other 
words, Christianity was a higher civilizing force than Confucianism, as Legge wrote “His (Confucius) 
simple views of society and government were in a measure sufficient for the people while they dwelt 
apart from the rest of mankind…Of the earth earthy, China was sure to go into pieces when it came 
into collision with a Christianly-civilized power.”42  
For missionaries, Christian ethics was superior to Confucian ethics of “three bonds and five 
constant virtues” as they were derived from God’s revelation while Kongzi is just a man, and it tend 
to breed particularism as compare to Christian universalism.  Furthermore, they argued that Confucian 
self-cultivation is inadequate in the elimination of Chinese moral weakness and social ills without the 
aid of the Holy Spirit.  In missionary view, as an imperfect jiao, Confucianism was the cause for the 
degeneration of China’s moral fabric and her national weakness. Christianity “completes” 
Confucianism by adding God in the Confucian five relationships (wulun), it paves the way for the 
rejuvenation and modernization of China. 
The missionaries were in fact the dominant agent of cultural transmission in China in the 
nineteenth century. Kang Youwei’s understanding of the West, including the concept of religion, was 
largely mediated by the missionaries in this period.  American and British missionaries like Timothy 
Richard (1845-1919), Allen J. Young (1836-1907), Gilbert Reid (1857-1927), M.A.P Martin and John 
Fryer (1839-1928) were recruited by the Chinese government as teachers and translators in the 
Translation Bureau (Tongwen guan同文馆) and Jiangnan Manufacturing Bureau. They also launched 
China’s earliest newspapers and established the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General 
Knowledge Among the Chinese in 1887. Missionaries’ writings and translations maintained that the 
West was a superior civilization because of their Christian religion. German missionary Ernst Faber 
(1839-1899) boasted “Western nations progress today all because of the moral-civilizing force 
(jiaohua教化) (of Christianity).  It’s a result of having good morality to restrain people’s nature, and 
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good learning to manage people’s livelihood.”43 The bulk of Kang’s early knowledge of the West was 
gained from translations of Western books he bought from the Jiangnan Manufacturing Bureau when 
he visited Shanghai in 1882. In 1891, he admitted that “(After) I bought and read the western works 
translated by the Manufacturing Bureau, then I began to know their political system, religion and 
customs, and gained insights to their fundamental features.”44   Kang also became a subscriber of the 
missionary The Globe Magazine (Wangguo gongbao 万国公报 , initially Church News) in the 
following year.
45
  Kang’s interest and hunger for Western knowledge was stimulated by his visit to 
foreign controlled Hong Kong and Shanghai in 1879 and 1882.  After the visits, Kang writes, “I am 
impressed by the organization and administration of the westerners, and I realized that we must not 
look upon them as barbarians.”46   
Although Kang agreed that the West was more superior in military power, material wealth 
and scientific advancement, he rejected missionaries claim that China was without religion or 
Confucianism was defective as compared to Christianity. In response to the charge, he argued that the 
reason why China did not progress out of the Age of Chaos was simply because the true principles of 
Confucius were concealed in history.  In 1891 and 1897, Kang published his two highly controversial 
works,  An Inquiry into the Forged Classics of Xin Dynasty (Xinxue weijing kao新学伪经考) and 
Confucius the Reformer (Kongzi gaizhi kao孔子改制考), which shook Chinese intellectual tradition 
like  “a cyclone, a volcanic eruption, and a huge earthquake.”  The first book argued that the Ancient 
Text Confucianism, which was established by the imperial state as the orthodoxy for 2000 years since 
the Han dynasty, was not the true doctrines of Confucius but spurious teachings forged by Liu Xin刘
歆 (50BC-23 AD). In his second book, Kang made Confucius into the founder of Confucianism and 
the progenitor of Chinese civilization. He cited the evidences such as Confucian robe (rufu 儒服), 
Confucian commandments (ruxing儒行), and the three years mourning period to demonstrate that 
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Confucius was a founder of a religion with its distinct attire, code of conduct and institutions.
47
 These 
aspects of Confucianism were diffused into the daily lives of the Chinese people after it defeated other 
teachings and became the state-religion in the Western Han dynasty. It was after the falsification of 
the classics by Liu Xin in the later Han dynasty, Kang argued that: 
“The authorship of Confucius’ classics shifted to the Duke of Zhou, and Confucius was 
relegated from the sage-king to a teacher. The Gongyang 公羊 Learning overthrown, the 
principles of reform disappeared and the doctrine of the Three Ages were concealed. (The 
prospect for) the rule of Great Peace and the joy of the Great Commonwealth became bleak 
and undeveloped. Our Chinese civilization was corrupted by Buddhist and Daoist learning in 
the Wei, Jin, Sui and Tang dynasties, and thrown into upheaval by the Di, Qiang, Turks, 
Khitans and Mongols…as a result the Chinese people suffered under tyrants and the despotic 
rule of the barbarians for two thousand years.”48  
Kang perceived his mission as akin to that of Martin Luther in the case of the Protestant 
Reformation, that is, to reinstate Confucius as the religious founder of China and to restore the true 
teachings of Confucius from the falsehood of imperial Confucianism.  “For what Kang attempted to 
do” as Hsiao Kung-chuan argued was to discredit the tradition of imperial Confucianism—a tradition 
that had its roots in the Neo-Confucian philosophy of Chu Hsi (Zhu Xi) and subsequently became the 
ideological tool of imperial rulers, with political and intellectual implications hardly foreseen by Chu 
Hsi.”49 For Kang, the main fault of Zhu Xi朱熹 (1130-1200) is that he was misled by Liu Xin and did 
not recognized Confucius as the author of the six classics and narrowed the vastness of his teaching to 
merely The Analects (lunyu论语). 50 The Song Learning of Zhu Xi only taught self-cultivation this is 
why the universal salvationist doctrine of Confucius is hidden.  Kang also criticized Xunzi荀子 (313-
238 B.C.) for his positivistic interpretation of Confucius’ teaching, which drastically narrowed the 
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great teaching of the Sage.  The true principles of Confucianism, according to Kang, are 
progressivism not conservatism, universal love not self–cultivation, universalism not national 
provincialism, assertiveness and not passiveness, valuing the soul and not the love of the physical 
body.
51
   
From the New Text tradition, Kang Youwei apotheosized Confucius into a divine messiah of 
the whole world and the “uncrowned king” (suwang 素王) responsible for the germination of the 
Chinese civilization. Kang declared that Confucius was “a sage-king, a teacher of ten-thousand 
generations, a protector of the myriad people, a religious founder for the whole world,” who was 
given the Mandate of Heaven (tianming天命) to save all mankind.52  He claimed that the doctrines of 
the Three Ages (sanshi三世) in the Gongyang Text and the Great Commonwealth (datong大同) in 
the Book of Rites (Liji 礼记) were the true world redeeming teachings of Confucius. The Gongyang 
doctrine of the Three Ages presented history as a cycle of the three epochs of the Age of Disorder 
(chu luanshi 初乱世), the Age of Approaching Peace (shengping shi 升平世) and the Age of 
Universal Peace (taiping shi 太平世). Kang utilized Western evolutionary ideas into his textual 
reconstruction of the cyclical concept of the Three Ages and refashioned it into a linear progressive 
doctrine of change. He creatively synthesized the concept of the Three Ages with the utopian idea of 
Datong from the article “Evolution of Rites”(liyun 礼运) in the Book of Rites. The “Evolution of 
Rites” describes two contrasting epochs of Lesser Prosperity (xiaokang 小康 ) and the Great 
Commonwealth. Lesser Prosperity is a world characterized by human selfishness (shi私), violence 
and faulty institutions, whilst the Great Commonwealth is an utopia of human perfection pervaded 
with tranquility, socio-economic justice and equality (tianxia weigong 天下为公).  Kang associated 
the Ages of Disorder and Approaching Peace with the epoch of Lesser Prosperity and the Age of 
Universal Peace with the utopian Great Commonwealth.  
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  Kang Youwei expressed these ideas more concretely in his later Book of Great 
Commonwealth (Datong shu 大同书). In the book, Kang maintained that the core principle of 
Confucius is the idea of humanness (ren 仁) which he also equated with the Buddhist notion of 
compassion, a mentality that “can’t bear” (buren zhixin 不忍之心) to see the sufferings of humans 
and other beings in the world.
 53
  He insisted, like Mencius and Wang Yangming王阳明 (1472-1529) 
before him, that the nature of humans is good as they all possess ren. Kang believed that ren is a 
virtue endowed by Heaven and he cited the following approvingly from Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 
(179-104BC) without much elaboration:  “Man receives his mandate of Heaven. He takes ren from 
Heaven and thus become a man of ren…ren is the mind of heaven”. Echoing Wang Yangming who 
says that “the man of ren takes Heaven and Earth, and all things as one with himself”54, according to 
Kang, ren is what allows man to achieve oneness with Heaven (tianren heyi 天人合一). Kang 
explains, “ren means to form one body with all things” and “when the self and others are not 
separated, when all things form one body, and when the feeling of compassion is aroused, then that is 
the short cut of finding ren.”55  
 Through his application of the Gongyang evolutionary idea of the Three Ages on ren, Kang 
endowed ren with cosmic and historical significance. Similar to the rational Spirit in Hegelian 
philosophy, ren evolves or matures progressively to a higher stage of development in history:  
Confucius instituted the scheme of three stages. In the Age of Disorder, ren cannot be extended 
far and therefore people are merely affectionate to their parents. In the Age of Approaching Peace, 
ren is extended to one’s own kind (类 lei) and therefore people are humane to all people. In the 
Age of Universal Peace (Great Community), all creatures form a unity and therefore people love 
all creatures as well. There is distinction and gradation in ren because there are stages in historical 
progress. 56 
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In its historical progress towards the Age of Universal Peace, ren will gradually but progressively 
overcome the boundaries (界 jie), such as class, sex, race and nationality that divided humanity and 
cause sufferings. In Kang’s Great Commonwealth, social institutions such as the family will disappear 
and its functions assume by public institutions. Women will attain absolute equality vis-à-vis men in 
political, economic and social arenas. Nation-states will wither away and be replaced with a world 
government, which is subdivided into regional governments (5238 in total according to the division of 
total habitable land area of the globe by Kang). Regional governments are in-charge of administering 
public economic and social institutions in their area of jurisdiction, and they are subjected to 
supervision from the representatives of the world government. Kang’s utopia will also be a world of 
material abundance and a classless society where private property and poverty are eradicated.
57
  
In essence, the Great Commonwealth is an utopian vision of Kang’s reformed Confucian 
religion. Kang believed that his reformed Confucian religion, as I shall further explain later, was a 
World Religion greater than Christianity in religious-civilizational truth and that through 
proselytization the teachings of Confucius would spread to the whole world. As his disciple Liang 
Qichao declares:    
The reason why Westerners think our doctrine so superficial and vulgar scholars personally 
ridicule our teachings lies in their failure to understand why Confucius was a sage, We have to 
make this clear by drawing out for detailed examination on the basis of recent events the principles, 
institutions, subtle words, and great meanings of the Six Classics. Then, the true face of Confucius, 
as a model for all generations whose morality shall blanket the entire world, shall emerge. Two 
citations from the Analects of Confucius: “The master wanted to settle among the Nine Barbarians 
of the East”; and he said: “I shall get upon a raft and float out to sea.” After all, the teachings of 
Confucius were not merely for the governing of one state, but the governance of the entire realm. 
Thus, it says (in the Doctrine of the Mean): “His Fame overspreads the Middle Kingdom and 
extends to all barbarous tribes.” 58 
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STRATEGIC OCCIDENTALISM AND APPROPRIATING RELIGION 
The term “strategic Occidentalism” is coined by James Ketelaar to demonstrate the agency of Meiji 
Buddhists in the appropriation of Western authority for the promotion of their own religious ideas and 
projects. As Ketelaar perceptively argues, “In fact the ‘Occident,’ to twist Edward Said’s reading of 
the Orient back on itself, was itself constituted as an object ‘suitable for study in the academy, for 
display in the museum, (and) for the theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, other words, 
even as the Occident carefully constructed mosaics of images of the Orient, images of the Occident 
were used as elements in discursive strategies in Japan. These images of the ‘Occident,’ in turn, 
allowed for elaborate ‘stagings’ of the ‘Occident’ conducive to the advancement of particular political 
projects.”59 I would like to argue in this section that Kang Youwei’s Kongjiao movement could be 
understood as an example of strategic Occidentalism, in which the West was appropriated for his 
creation of an independent Confucian religion.   
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Figure 2.  Kang Youwei, the modern reformer of Confucianism  




To begin, Kang Youwei’s suggestion to the throne of the establishment of a national 
Confucian Church separated from the state during the 1898 reforms was radical and the first in 
Chinese history.  In imperial China, there was no sharp differentiation of the religious and secular or a 
bifurcation of authority between the state and church as in the history of Europe. The imperial state 
was based on religious underpinnings and the emperor had absolute secular and religious authority in 
imperial ideology of the unity of teaching and governing. “The point about China’s imperial power”, 
Anthony Yu writes, “is not to encourage the separating of the realms of the sacred from the profane, 
the divine from the human, the religious from the secular.” “For the Chinese emperor, his claim to 
transcendence and his name, after all, is already Gaozu or Gaodi, High Ancestor or High (di 帝) 
derives from creating and incorporating transcendence, an act that is at once indivisibly religious and 
political.” 60    In short, the Caesar is the Pope, the Pope is Caesar.  
The history of the imperial state and Confucians had been one of tension and cooperation. 
Confucians distinguished between traditions of the Way (daotong道统) and governance (zhitong治
统), between Truth and Power.  Beginning from Confucius and Mencius, Confucians have regarded 
themselves as autonomous spokespersons and guardians of the transcendental Heaven by which the 
mundane socio-political order was to be assessed.
61
 Confucians, as the defender of the Way (Dao), 
often acted as the critics of political power or become eremitics in protest of immoral political 
authority. Confucius himself argues that, “When the Way prevails in the kingdom, he (the nobleman) 
will show himself; when it is suppressed, he will keep concealed.”  Tension arose as the imperial state 
also claimed monopoly of access to the transcendent and the most famous clash in Chinese between 
political authority and the Confucians was the “burning of books and burying of scholars” by the First 
Emperor of China. The episode of “burning of books and burying of scholars”, however, was an 
anomaly in the historical relations between the imperial state and Confucians. Since the Han dynasty, 
the imperial state was very successful in coopting Confucian claims on transcendence authority by 
establishing Confucianism as the state orthodoxy and the canonization of the master and his disciples 
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in the state cult.
62
 Moreover, the state bureaucracy, school system and examination system since the 
Tang Dynasty were instrumental in co-opting Confucian literati and buttressing the imperial claim 
that teaching and ruling originated from the same source.
63
 By the early and mid-Qing Dynasty, under 
energetic and centralizing emperors Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong, the imperial state managed to 
deprive the claims of Confucians as representatives of transcendent authority of Heaven and unified 
Truth and Power in the hands of the imperial state for the last time.
64
  
 In his The Trouble with Confucianism, Wm. Theodore de Bary identified two main reasons 
why historically Confucianism did not function as an independent moral-power outside of the state. 
The first major problem, according to de Bary, was the reliance by Confucian nobleman (junzi君子) 
on political rulers to realize the “prophetic” message they derived from Heaven. Unlike the prophets 
in the Abrahamic tradition, however, the prophetic message of the noble man was not for the people 
but the political rulers. Confucians believed that the transformation of the society must come from the 
top through the rule of the sage-kings, whose virtuous (de徳) rule and examples radiated from the 
center to all corners of the polity. In reality, Confucians discovered that political rulers were seldom 
sage-kings, the paragons of humaneness and righteousness (yi义). Closely related to the first problem 
was that in imperial China there were no social institutions other than the family and the state from 
which the Confucians could leverage on to uplift the people culturally and morally and transform 
society. De Bary contrasted the transformative and educational role that the church in the West 
performed and the weakness of religious institutions in China:  
Religious organizations in China were fragmented, with little of either horizontal or vertical 
structures. They offered no broad institutional base for schools, colleges, or universities such as 
the church supported the West.… What might pass as a “church” in the form of a religious 
hierarchy beyond local level, was most often simply a loose family relationship. Temples were 
identified customarily by forms of religious praxis, rather than by schools of doctrine. 
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Superintendents of religious bodies were appointed by the throne, not elected or chosen by any 
independent constituency. Instead of springing up organically from some autonomous grassroots 
communities or representing a creedal congregation, they served at best as intermediaries 
between the ruler and his people.
65
 
 Kang Youwei was a “prophetic nobleman” who wanted to order or redeem the world 
according to what he believed were the true principles of Confucianism. At the age of 20, Kang 
abandoned his studies altogether and started a spiritual quest with the aim to “rest his mind-heart and 
settle his destiny” (anxin liming 安心立命).66 He secluded himself from others and immersed in the 
practice of quiet sitting and mind cultivation. Kang experienced a spiritual enlightenment through 
these activities, as he writes, “Sitting quietly by myself, I suddenly come to the realization that the 
universe and its myriad of things were all part of me. A light dawned within me, and believing that I 
was a sage, I would be happy and laugh; then, thinking of the suffering of the people in the world, I 
would be sad and cry.”67 At the age of 22, Kang further secluded himself by living in the Xiqiao 
Mountain, practicing quiet meditation while enjoying the natural beauty. He devoted his time to 
reading of Daoist and Buddhist books and getting rid of his impure thoughts.
68
    At the end of his 
spiritual quest when he was 26 years old, Kang believed that he had attained sagehood, and as the 
awakened one (xianjue zhe先觉者), was given the Mandate by Heaven to save mankind and lead 
them to the path of the Great Commonwealth: 
The purpose of my creation was to save the masses of living things, even if instead of residing in 
heaven, I would go to purgatory to save them; even if instead of going to the Pure Land, I had 
come to the unclean world to save them; and instead of being an emperor or a king, I become a 
common scholar. Instead of enjoying cleanliness, instead of enjoying pleasure, instead of exalted 
positions, I would rather go among the masses of living things to be on hand to save them. Thus 
everyday the salvation of society was uppermost in my thoughts and every moment the salvation 
of society was my aim in life, and for this aim I would sacrifice myself. Since there are many 
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worlds, some large and some small, I could only sympathize and try to save the men who lived 
close to me and whom I should meet. I would appeal to them everyday and hope that they would 
listen to me. I made this my principle, my aim to fulfill.
69
   
In his encounter with Christianity, Kang was impressed with the organizational strength of the 
western religion and the moralizing influence that it could exert on Western nations and the societies 
that the West encountered. He wished that a Confucian church could be established to carry out his 
mission to save China and the world.  As the Chinese statesman and reformer, Chen Baozhen陈宝箴 
(1831-1900) rightly observes:  
When China came into contact with the West after the removal of the maritime ban, Kang Youwei 
saw that the King of Jiao (Jiaohuang 教皇 i.e. the Pope) is venerated by the European nations, and 
managing their politics, he thought that the strength of foreign nations is a result of this. On the 
other hand, China’s jiao and politics are separated since the Zhou and Qin dynasties. Although 
there was Confucius whose wisdom matches Yao and Shun, and was unparallel in history, 
however the Way was not carried out at that time and did not benefit the later ages. (As a result) 
The rulers and ministers deemed noble while teachers and scholars regarded as based, coercive 
power thrived while moral authority declined. This is why the country has unorthodox rule, 
families have different customs, and the scholars and people are ignorant. Although Emperors 
Yinzheng and Yang Guang were despotic, their way could be implemented, while Confucius’ jiao 
is disorganized and ill-disciplined. He sees this as a far cry from the political power wielded by the 
King of jiao and his followers. Hence…he gave (Confucius) the title of the uncrowned king …and 
venerates Confucius as the founder of religion, wishing to counter the strength of Catholicism and 
Protestantism, and to enlighten the people and to carry out Confucius’ governance and teaching.70         
 From the above, we can see that the West and Christianity were reference points for Kang 
Youwei to criticize the state of affairs in China and to legitimize his project of creating a Confucian 
religion. As early as 1888, the youthful Kang claimed that the separation of politics and religion was a 
universal principle (gongli公理). He argued, as he did in the memorial to emperor Guangxu during 
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the Wuxu reform that politics and religion were two affairs of different natures and their duties cannot 
be assumed by one person. He warned that it would certainly bring harm if the ruler usurps the 
religious authority of the religious teachers (jiaoshi教士) or vice versa.  Through the principle of the 
separation of politics and religion, Confucianism could be released from its traditional and limited 
role as the ideological apparatus of the imperial government and to be proselytized as the World 
religion. This point is highlighted by an interesting letter written by Liang Qichao to Kang Youwei in 
the early 1890s just before their involvement in the reform movement: “(people) don’t know the 
purpose of our group is proselytizing (chuanjiao传教), not involvement in politics; we are concerned 
with the salvation of the world and the world’s countless beings, not the salvation of one country. 
What’s the end of one country to do with us? ” 
 The salvation of the country became an over-riding concern of Kang Youwei only after the 
disastrous defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War (1895-1896). The defeat by Japan was 
particularly devastating for the Chinese as Liang Qichao remarked that the war awakened the Chinese 
people “from the dream of 4000 years.” 71 Chinese nationalism developed as a result of the fear for 
the survival of China as a socio-political entity. In protest of the signing of the humiliating Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, Kang organized the other jinshi进士 and wrote the “ten thousand words petition” to the 
emperor urging the rejection of the treaty and fundamental reforms. Kang saw the emperor as exerting 
a transformative power in the sweeping reform of autocratic and backward China. In his Esoteric and 
Exoteric Essays of Master Kang, Kang Youwei glorified imperial Confucianism by praising the 
model of a dynamic absolute monarch.
72
  However, what Kang wanted in reality was to end autocracy 
with autocratic power (junquan君权).73 During the 1898 reform, Kang presented the emperor with his 
An Account of the Reform of Russia Tsar Peter and Study of Japan’s Reforms as successful models of 
“revolution from above.” The steps of reform as shown in the examples of Russia and Japan was first 
to create a reformist autocracy and from there gradually progress to parliamentarianism. Thus, as 
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Peter Zarrow accurately points out, “Kang’s ultimate challenge to the monarchy was to lead itself out 
of existence.” And through his transformation of Confucius as the divine “uncrowned king”, “Kang 
essentially transferred the charisma surrounding the emperor to Confucius, who in turn legitimated the 
actions of a strong, reformist emperor if one is to be found.”74 Stripped of his sacred aura and, 
eventually, political power, the emperor in Kang’s design of constitutional monarchy (xujun gonghe 
虚君共和), will be nothing more than a unifying symbol of the Chinese nation.  As Kang interestingly 
remarks “the institution of constitutional monarchy is not a form of monarchical rule; it is merely akin 
to venerating a mud and wooden statue of an inanimate God.” 75 Kang was particularly impressed 
with the unbroken Japanese imperial line (bansei ikkei万世一系) in providing the symbolic basis for 
the construction of as stable and united national community (kokutai国体). In the chaotic early years 
of republican period, Kang even suggested the descendants of Confucius should assume the symbolic 
position of the constitutional monarch as in China only the Kong clan can claim to be unbroken 
genealogically like the Japanese imperial family.
76
  
 Before his involvement in the Wuxu reform movement, Kang Youwei did not see the state as 
the primary agent in his agenda of proselytizing the Confucian religion. In 1891, Kang Youwei 
established a private academy in Guangzhou and lectured on his ideas of reformed Confucianism.  In 
the curriculum of the academy, Kang insisted on Lu-Wang moral learning (Lu-Wang Xinxue陆王心
学) as the essence (ti体) and the learning of Chinese history and western knowledge for application 
(yong用). Kang also required his students to be dressed in a standardized manner and to participate in 
Confucian ritual worship. It is probable, as Luke Kwong suggests, Kang Youwei was emulating the 
outward appearances of Christianity in running his academy. 
77
 Inspired also by Christianity, another 
innovation in Kang’s effort to create an institutional Confucian religion was his attempt to transform 
charity halls into Confucian churches.  In 1897, Kang converted the Humaneness Promulgating Hall 
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(Guangren tang广仁堂) in Guangdong and Guangxi into the Sage Learning Society (Shengxue hui圣
学会). Kang complained that “charity halls are numerous and carrying out philanthropic works widely. 
All those who truly carry out Confucius’ way of Humaneness (仁道 rendao), only did not establish 
the worship of one, the sole veneration of Confucius and also neglected the propagation of his 
learning.” 78   He lamented on the fact that many rural ignoramuses only know unworthy gods such as 
Guandi and Wenchang and not Confucius. He also warned about the eclipsed of Confucianism with 
the increasing penetration and spread of Christianity in China. Kang conceived of the Sage Learning 
Society as a Confucian “civilizing” organization with the mission of combating Chinese popular 
religion and Christianity.  For the activities of the Society, Kang proposed the worship and recitation 
of scriptures on every gengzi day (庚子日), the purchase of western books and scientific instruments, 




 CLASH OF RELIGIONS:  
PROSELYTIZING KONGJIAO AS THE WORLD RELIGION 
Kang Youwei believed that the Darwinian competition between religions in his time was not new, it 
had in fact happened in Chinese history during the Spring and Autumn and the Warring states period. 
In his Confucius the Reformer, Kang painstakingly points out that Confucius was just one religious 
founder among many others who had arose during this period and established their own religions. 
These various religions competed against one another for supremacy during these two tumultuous 
periods in Chinese history. After intense competition against its competitions, especially the Daoists 
and Mohists, Kongjiao emerged victorious and was enshrined as the state religion during the Han 
dynasty. China was not the only country that gave birth to religious founders, Kang argued that during 
ancient times the nine great continents each had their own founding sage (kaitian zisheng开天之圣) 
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who become religious teacher and created their respective civilizations.
80
   In the modern time, as 
natural barriers that separated the various continents are removed by advancements in transportation, 
religions from various continents were brought together and they compete against one another.  
In a letter to his friend in 1891, Kang explains “There is bound to be competition when 
religions meet, the result of the struggle has to depend on their respective power.” 81 Kang added that 
the reason why many religions in the world are destroyed by Christianity was because of the 
technological advancements in the West had aided the proselytization of the religion. He bemoaned 
that “if our country is earlier in our technological progress (than the West) and ships and vehicles 
could travel out of China, we would have made Europe, Mexico, Africa and Australia follow 
Confucian learning.” Moreover, Kang argued that the Christian religion is shallow in its doctrine and 
its success in religious proselytization was only a result of the use of politico-military power of the 
Western nations.  
Interestingly, Kang explained that “the reason why I am urgent in strengthening the nation is 
for the protection of (our) religion.”82 We have also seen earlier, Kang during the Wuxu reform 
wanted to utilize state power to make Kongjiao the state-religion of China and to creation Confucian 
churches in all parts of the empire. In the earlier memorial to the emperor, Kang proposed that the 
state build Confucian temples in Southeast Asia and send religious officials (jiaoguan 教官) to 
“civilize” (jiaohua教化) the Chinese there who have been long isolated from Chinese civilization and 
under the lure of Christianity. He also proposed that official titles, travel expenses and consular 
protection be given for anybody who established schools overseas.  Kang held that this strategy would 
help the “sacred teaching to spread among the barbarians and turn them into Chinese in the future.” 83 
  Kang Youwei believed that through proselytizing, Kongjiao would definitely triumph the 
shallow Christianity. Christianity, in his opinion, was unsophisticated and less complete than 
Kongjiao and Buddhism in its doctrine on the spiritual and human realms. The only merit Christianity 
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has was making the profound truth of the brotherhood and equality of men simple and clear.
84
 In fact, 
Kang perceived the Christian religion as an inferior copy of Buddhism. In his Record of Travel in 
Italy, he pointed out the similarities of Buddhism and Christianity in rituals and practices such as 
celibacy and image worship, and ideas such as soul, love of mankind, paradise and purgatory. Kang 
postulated from the similarities of the two religions that Christianity might be derived from ancient 
Indian religions. The religious ideas and practices of India were introduced to the West when the link 
was established after Alexander the Great’s conquest of India.  
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Figure 3. In 1901 Kang Youwei travelled to 
India and he visited the Qutb Minar complex 
built by the Muslim conquerors in the 12
th
 
century and the surrounding Buddhist ruins in 
Delhi.  Kang lamented on the fact that though 
Buddhism originated in India, it was extinct in its 
place of origin. Kang was convinced that the 
survival of religion depends on active 
propagation by its adherents.  









Figure 5. In 1909, when Kang Youwei passed through Jerusalem, he saw the scene of the Jews at the 
Wailing Wall expressing their grief. He was moved by the religious devotion of the Jewish people and 
sympathetically wrote a long poem.   
 
 
Figure 4. A postcard of Martin Luther and his former residence Kang Youwei purchased when he 
visited Germany in 1904. Kang admired Luther for his reform of Christianity and regarded him as one of 
the greatest figure in European history  




 In Kang Youwei’s conception of religion, Christianity, Buddhism, and other religions 
belonged to “divine way” (shendao神道) and were archaic as compare to the human way (rendao人
道) of Kongjiao:  
Jiao are of various sorts. Some instruct men by means of the divine way, others by means of 
the human way, still others by means of both the divine and human way. The essential 
significance of any jiao consists in making men avoid evil and do good….In the Ancient time, 
men were ignorant. They believed that everything beyond their clear perception was spiritual 
or divine. The sages took advantage of their belief and instilled in them the fear (of the 
unseen). As a result men had something that they feared; and something they longed for, and 
readily turned toward goodness. Hence most of the archaic religions set forth clear-cut 
doctrines on ghosts and spirits. The Buddhist, Christian, and Moslem religions made use of 
such ancient doctrines to form the conception of paradise and hell with which to influence 
men…Confucius loathed divine authority for its excessive influence (on men) and swept it 
away…Previously, the divine way was employed to control primitive men, but the human way 
was employed when progress had been made…As a founder of religion Confucius represented 
an advanced stage in cultural progress…Now as men’s intelligence gradually develops, divine 




In Kang Youwei’s scheme of divine and human way, missionary criticism of Kongjiao as “secular” 
and “this-worldly” are reversed from being negative to become positive attributes. The human way of 
Confucianism was compatible with science and suited the modern world better than the other archaic 
religions which governed men through “divine authority” (shenquan神权). Furthermore, Kang saw 
Confucianism as an inclusive religion that could encompass all the other religions. He argued that the 
teachings of Buddhism could be equated with Wisdom (zhi智), Christianity with Humaneness (ren 
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仁) and Islam with Courage (yong勇) in Confucianism.86 Thus, for Kang, Kongjiao is destined to 
unite the other religions and become the World religion.  
 
The expansion of Western imperialism and Christianity in China in the second half of the nineteenth 
century greatly alarmed Kang Youwei. For Kang, China was not only under threat politically, but her 
whole culture and civilization, that is the Confucian teachings (jiao), was at risk of being annihilated 
by the aggressive evangelical Christianity. At the heart of the crisis was the religious conversion of 
the Chinese people to Christianity. Religious conversion was menacing because of Christian exclusive 
notion of religion as well as the conflation of religious transformation with cultural conversion in their 
preaching of the gospel. While Kang worried about the weakness of Confucianism and the ability of 
the Christian religion to capture the “hearts and minds” of the Chinese people,  he was impressed with 
the organization strength of Christianity and its power in moralizing/civilizing and unifying the people 
in the West. The Christian model of religion and religious citizenship became the inspiration for 
Kang’s creation of a national doctrine and Confucian nation. The spiritual enlightenment and national 
unification of the Chinese people demanded the construction of national churches and the destruction 
of the fragmentary and “superstitious” non-Confucian religions and temple cults. Although the Wuxu 
reform was short-lived and the edict for temple seizure was not really carried out, it heralded the 
beginning of violent destructions of Chinese religion by successive regimes in the twentieth century. 
  Religious reform was also prompted by Protestant civilizational discourse of religion. Kang 
was sensitive to the charge of western missionaries that China was uncivilized or semi-civilized 
(meaning without a moral or rational religion like Christianity). However, this does not mean that 
Kang Youwei was reacting passively against Christian/Oriental discourse of China. As we have seen 
in this chapter, western discourse was strategically used by Kang in his project of making Kongjiao 
independent from the imperial state. Western discourse of secularism was argued by Kang as 
universal principle against the imperial discourse of the unity of governance and teaching. 
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Confucianism was to function as an autonomous agent and it would no longer need the son of heaven 
and the imperial state as its mediums of transformation. Indeed, Kang Youwei believed that Kongjiao 
could serve a greater purpose than the betterment of the Chinese nation, it could be the World religion 
that would bring mankind to the highest level of civilizational achievement, that’s the ideal of his 
“Great Commonwealth”. He was optimistic that through proselytizing, Kongjiao would triumph over 
other archaic “divine ways” and spread to the whole world. As we shall see in the next chapter on the 
Kongjiao movement in the Republican period, however, it was not an easy task for the diffused, to 
borrow CK Yang’s terminology, Confucianism to become an institutional religion.87   
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Chapter Two  
Confucianism on the Procrustean Bed of Religion:  




u Ying-shi has described contemporary academic Confucianism (ruxue 儒学) 
metaphorically as a “wandering spirit” (youhun游魂) which has no bearing on the 
daily lives and practices of the Chinese people. This modern predicament of Confucianism, 
according to Yu, was the result of the complete collapse of traditional Chinese socio-political 
institutions from the fall of the imperial system to the iconoclastic May-Fourth movement. He 
pointed out that traditional Confucianism was “an intellectual system that seeks the total 
regulation of the human order, from the whole process of life and death of individual, to the 
structuring of the family, state and the world.”1 Historically, Confucianism was fused with 
traditional socio-political institutions and through them it was able to shape the whole 
Chinese social order in the imperial era. The demise of traditional socio-political institutions 
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in modern times, therefore, spelled the end of institutionalized Confucianism, and ruxue 
became a “wandering spirit” devoid of identity and body ever since. In a similar vein, Gan 
Chunsong argued that since its establishment as the state ideology in the Han dynasty, 
“Confucianism (rujia 儒家) existed mainly in institutionalized form in traditional Chinese 
society.” 2 In his view, Confucian praxis and its status as the “truth” was achieved through the 
power and institution of the imperial state, and the fall of the monarchy and the civil service 
examination inevitable brought the collapse of institutionalized Confucianism. Gan identified 
the late Qing New Policies (Xinzheng新政), which introduced western political institutions 
and modern school system, as the beginning of the collapse of institutionalized Confucianism. 
The Kongjiao and the state-religion movement in the republican period was motivated by 
Confucianists’ aspiration to reinvent the Confucian tradition institutionally in the container of 
“religion” after the disintegration of imperial Confucianism. 
 
STATE SECULARIZATION AND REPUBLICAN KONGJIAO MOVEMENT 
Shortly after the founding of the Chinese republic in Nanjing, Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培(1868-
1940) the first education minister of the provisional government proposed abolishing 
sacrifices to Confucius and reading Confucian classics in schools. Cai argued that “loyalty to 
the monarch and venerating Confucius” (zhongjun, zunkong 忠君，尊孔) advocated in the 
Qing education system went against the spirit of Republicanism and the freedom of belief 
(xinjiao ziyou 信教自由 ) that were enshrined in the new Chinese Constitution. Cai 
emphasized that a distinction must be made between the secular-humanistic scholarship of 
Confucius and the later religious-imperial Confucianism (Kongjiao 孔教 or Rujiao 儒教). 3  
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In the provisional National Education Conference held in July and August of the same year, 
he submitted for deliberation the “Proposal for the abolishment of Confucius worship in 
schools” and listed three reasons why this needed to be done. First, the use of religious 
ceremonies to worship Confucius, which was common in schools of the previous dynasty, 
was inappropriate simply because the Sage was not a religionist. (zongjiao-jia 宗教家). 
Second, the objectives of schools, as a secular institution, and religious organizations are 
markedly different, thus the practice of religious ceremonies in schools distort the principles 
of Confucius and go against the secular aims of education. Third, freedom of religious beliefs 
is one of the three fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. Confucius worship 
in public schools is against this cardinal principle and children of other religions might not 
want to be admitted due to their difference in faith.
4
 In February 1912, the Ministry of 
Education abolished the reading of classics in primary schools, and on 24 October of the same 
year, Classical Learning (jingxue 经学) was removed as a subject in higher education (daxue 
大学).  
While the anti-Confucian stance of revolutionaries such as Cai Yuanpei was 
understandable as Confucianism provided the ideological and ritual underpinnings of the 
imperial state for centuries, the separation of state from religion was more informed by the 
Western liberal conception of politics and society. Nevertheless, iconoclastic attack on 
Confucianism did not emerge until a few years later during the New Culture Movement and 
many leaders of the new Republic still believed that Confucian teachings were important in 
the moral cultivation of the citizens. The architects of the Republic were deeply committed to 
modernizing China according to the secular and liberal-democratic principles of the West. 
The idea of freedom of religion that Cai Yuanpei used as a justification for the abolishment of 
Confucius worship and classic reading in public schools hinges on the secularization of 
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society. Secularization, as José Casanova defines it, is the “functional differentiation and 
emancipation of the secular spheres-primarily the state, the economy, and science-from the 
religious sphere and the concomitant differentiation and specialization of religion within its 
own newly found religious sphere.” 5 As discussed in the first chapter, the Wuxu reform 
marked the beginning of the separation of politics and “religion.” Although Kang Youwei’s 
idea of a national Confucian church was not accepted by the throne, his proposal for the 
creation of a secular constitutional monarchy based on popular sovereignty was adopted by 
the imperial state and implemented under the New Policies. With the advent of the New 
Policies, the imperial state shifted the claims of its legitimacy from “governing the realms by 
teaching from the Divine Way” (yishendao shejiao 以神道设教) to being the representative 
of the “nation.” 6  
Kuo Ya-pei brilliantly demonstrated that the engineering of a secular constitutional 
monarchy by the Qing state entailed the overhaul of its entire ritual system. In 1906, in an 
effort to construct Confucius as the cultural-national icon of the Chinese nation, the state cult 
of the sage was promoted from middle sacrifice to grand sacrifice, and all public schools had 
to sacrifice to Confucius in spring and autumn. At the same time, the emperor was 
desacralized as the legitimacy of the regime no longer rested on his ritual role as the son of 
heaven, mediating the earthly realm and cosmic forces. The Ministry of Rites (libu 礼部) 
became defunct with the overhaul of the state ritual system and the abolishment of the civil 
service examination.
 7
 As the imperial regime secularized itself in the New Policies era, the 
Qing government cut its traditional connection with the territorial local cults and abolished 
the “cultural nexus of power” that linked local society with the imperial state for centuries. 
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The imperial state terminated the canonization of local deities in 1904 and many of local cults 
were categorized as “superstitious”, and their material and symbolic resources seized by the 
centralizing state to construct public schools and a vertically integrated nation-state.
 8
 
In the 1905 Decree on Education, the Qing court decreed the abolishment of state 
examinations and the introduction of natural sciences in school curriculum. At the same time, 
a Ministry of Education was established by the court to oversee the construction of a 
centralized national system of western style schools to replace the old private academies 
(shishu 私塾). 9 The result was “Both legally and in practice”, as one scholar accurately 
commented, “the position Confucian studies had held in traditional education was finally 
totally overthrown.”10 The New Policies, however, retained the study of the classics as the 
basis of citizen’s moral education (xiushen 修身). Schools were ordered to venerate and 
sacrifice to Confucius at the beginning of the school terms in spring and autumn and on 
Confucius’ birthday. Republican education reform was even more radical and thorough than 
the New Policies. It made Confucius and Confucianism irrelevant to the new state. For the 
first time in two thousand years since its installation as the state orthodoxy in the Han dynasty, 
Confucianism was totally separated from the state.  
The last religious vestiges of the old imperial state were entirely swept away with the 
establishment of the Republic in 1912. State sacrifices to heaven, imperial ancestors and 
cosmic forces were discontinued by the republican government. In their place, the new regime 
adopted the Gregorian calendar and invented a new set of civic rituals and festivals.
11
  The 
republic officially proclaimed the separation of church and religion and the freedom of 
religious belief was written into the provisional constitution on 11
 
March 1912. The freedom 
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of religious beliefs, however, was only guaranteed by the state to “religion.”  Republican 
definition of “religion” was largely based on the church-like institutional model of 
Christianity. Thus, although the freedom of religious beliefs stipulated legal equality for the 
development of all religious institutions, in reality, only Christianity was guaranteed the 
“freedom” while indigenous religious systems were threatened with illegality, or worst, state 
destruction as “superstitions.” In short, Republican state secularization was a dual action of 
differentiation and destruction. At the level of praxis, it involved the state separating the 
secular and religious into two distinctive spheres, and acting as an arbiter of religion 
distinguishing “religion” from “superstitious.” The former is tolerated by the modernizing 
state and the latter to be eliminated in anti-superstitious campaigns in the name of 
modernization and progress.
12
   
The legal position of Confucianism became precarious after it lost its position as the 
state orthodoxy.  The first years of the republic witnessed attempts to destroy Confucian 
temples (wenmiao 文庙 ) and seizure of temple properties. The National Education 
Conference convened by the Ministry of Education in Beijing on 13 July 1912 proposed 
confiscating the sacrificial lands of all Confucian temples in the country to provide resources 
for the building of modern schools.
13
 At the local level, there were sporadic attempts by 
zealous revolutionaries and bureaucrats to act on the proposal of the National Education 
Conference. In Sichuan, for instance, the local education officer, Chen Cangqi ordered the 
destruction of a Confucian temple at Yucheng, Ba County.
14
 In Xiangshan County, one Qin 
Rongzhang demolished the local Confucian temple and on the same plot of land, he 
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constructed a western style building which was to become the new primary school.
15
 It was 
reported that public uproars were provoked by the destruction of local Confucian temples in 
both cases.  The most infamous case which stirred up much public uproar locally and 
attracted national attention was the Zhong Rongguang case.  
 Zhong Rongguang 钟荣光 (1866-1943) was a Christian and professor of the 
missionary built Lingnan University in Guangdong. Zhong was appointed the head of the 
Education Bureau for Guangdong province after the founding of the Republic.  As the chief 
education official, Zhong was infamous locally for his suppression of “superstition” among 
the people. He forbade the installation of “idols” in local temples and appropriated temple 
properties for public use. He also set up an exhibition hall within the Education Bureau office 
in which the statues of idol he confiscated from various temples were put on display to 
educate the people. However, what gained him national notoriety was the education bill he 
had his representative propose for him on the National Education Conference. The bill 
proposed the removal of all religious tablets, images and statues in public schools as they 
violated the principle of religious freedom. The education bill immediately stirred up public 
outcries and protests from all sectors of Guangdong.
16
 Zhong’s action was accused by some to 
be targeting against Confucianism and promoting the advancement of Christianity. This was 
so, the critics argued, as only public schools sacrifice to Confucius while private Christian 
missionary schools could continue their religious practices without state intervention. 
  Republican Kongjiao movement was to a large extent stimulated by the view that 
Confucianism was under destruction in the new republic. Indeed, some equated the change in 
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regime with the change of state religion from Confucianism to Christianity.
17
 As the Zhong 
Rongguang case demonstrated, many perceived that the new republic and its officials, many 
of whom were Christians, wanted to destroy the native Confucianism and replace it with the 
foreign religion. Immediately after the Ministry of Education announced that it would abolish 
classic reading and the Confucian rituals in public schools, many Confucian societies such as 
the Heart Cleansing Society (Xixinshe 洗心社), Society of the Confucian Way  (Kongdaoshe 
孔道社)and Society of the Great Sage (Zongsheng-hui宗圣会)sprang up all over China in 
the name of “resisting the tide and defending the sacred way” 18  The founders of these 
Confucian societies were directly or indirectly influenced by Kang Youwei’s idea of 
Kongjiao. The most prominent among them was the Confucian Association (Kongjiao hui 孔
教会 ) established in Shanghai on 7th October 1912 (Confucius’ birthday) by Chen 
Huanzhang 陈焕章 (1881-1933), a student of Kang Youwei and a graduate of Columbia 
University, together with political elites from the previous dynasty such as Liang Dingfen 梁
鼎芬 (1859-1919), Shen Zengzhi 沈曾植（1850-1922）and Zhu Zumou 朱祖谋(1857-1931). 
After the establishment of the Confucian Association, Kang Youwei was popularly appointed 
as its first president. 
19
  
  The leaders of the Confucian Association saw the education reforms of the republic 
as “a shocking change unprecedented in history.” Chen Huanzhang claimed that the scale of 
suppression of Confucianism was comparable in history only to the “burning of books and the 
burying of scholars” witnessed in the Qin dynasty. In dismay, Chen commented: 
Veneration of the religious founder is an universal principle, however, sacrificial 
rituals for Confucius are no longer practiced. The Education Commissioner of 
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Guangdong and the Central Ministry of Education wanted to end sacrifice to 
Confucius. They foolishly thought of demarcating Confucianism outside the realm of 
education and not knowing that Confucianism is the combination of religion and 
education in one. At the same time, schools are the churches (jiaotang 教堂) of 
Kongjiao. To be demarcated outside of education is nothing but an attempt to abolish 
Confucianism. Confucianism is a combination of religion and education, this why 
Confucian temples are its academies (xuegong 学宫) and churches…. Local officials 
also dared to demolish Confucian temples…Confucian classics are the national 
essence of China. Yet the schools of the whole nation, other than universities, do not 
read the classics….Thirty years later nobody will know what is Confucianism.20   
  Chen Huanzhang maintained that the setting up of the Confucian Association was 
dictated by circumstances. “Before the Republican era there was no need for the Confucian 
Association, however after the establishment of the Republic we can’t afford not to set up 
one.”21  He explained that Confucianism was in a dire situation as compared to the other 
religions. Catholicism and Protestantism were thriving and powerful as a result of protection 
by the unequal treaties and with foreign powers as their support. Islam was strong as its 
doctrines produced unwavering loyalty in the believers towards the religion. Buddhism had 
Tibet and Mongolia as its strongholds and possessed many temples in China. It also enjoyed 
strong patronage by the literati-gentry class. Daoism advocated cultivation of the body and 
immortality and was popular among the masses. The numerous religious buildings and 
properties of other religions made Confucian temples scanty in comparison. More importantly, 
the Qing government made the promotion of Confucianism its responsibility and thus there 
was no need for the existence of the Confucian Association. However, the current Republican 
government not only disregarded that role but tried to suppress and destroy Confucianism. 
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For Chen, the Confucian Association had to shoulder the great responsibility of promoting 
Confucianism in competition with other religion and to defend it against state destruction.
22
   
   
 CONFUCIAN ASSOCIATION AND THE INVENTION  
OF CONFUCIANISM AS A RELIGION 
State secularization in the republican period, as Vincent Goossaert and Ji Zhe have elucidated, 
led to the institutional growth of Chinese religions in the republican period which was 
unprecedented in Chinese history. Unlike the West, there was no one dominant Church to 
speak of in China. Imperial state restriction on the expansion of institutional religion made 
Daoism, Buddhism and Confucianism organizationally weak in imperial times. Secularization 
and the freedom of religious belief created for the first time in Chinese history a distinct 
legitimate sphere for the development of “religion.”23 State secularization engendered a sense 
of crisis among self-professed Confucians on the destruction of their teachings, at the same 
time leaders of the Confucian Association saw it as an opportunity for the renewal and 
reinvention of Confucianism into a modern religion comparable to Christianity in terms of 
local social influence and global reach. 
   Even before the founding of the republic, leaders of the Confucian Association were 
already experimenting with the invention of Confucianism as an organized religion. As 
discussed in the earlier chapter, the Sage Learning Society was established by Kang Youwei 
in Guangxi prior to the Wuxu reform. In political exile after the failure of the reform 
movement, Kang set up Confucian temples and Confucian associations with the aid of 
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overseas Chinese in colonial Java, Singapore and Malaya.
24
 Chen Huanzhang also established 
the Confucius Venerating Society (zongsheng hui 宗圣会) in his hometown Gaoyao in 
Guangdong, and in New York while he was studying at Columbia University. In his 
recollection of the overseas Confucian revivalist movements outside China between 1898 and 
1910, Kang remarked “in these years, sacrifice to Confucius and societies venerating 
Confucius started overseas; the wave swept across Asia and America and many responded (to 
the movement).”25 
   Kang’s account demonstrated that the Confucian revival movement which began in 
the late nineteenth century was insignificant in China, as it was quickly aborted with the 
failure of the 1898 reform and the arrest and exile of Kang Youwei and his supporters. 
However, the movement found a more fertile soil in Chinese diasporas with rising 
nationalism among overseas Chinese communities. Overseas kongjiao activists saw 
Confucianism as a unifying and modernizing force capable of reforming “corrupted” and 
“superstitious” cultural practices of local Chinese communities, uniting them and 
safeguarding their Chinese identity against the twin threats of westernization and native 
acculturation. They solicited funds to build Confucian temples and schools, as well as 
advocated the practice of Confucian family rituals, using Confucius’ birthday as the basis for 
dating and celebrating it as a holiday.  
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The political-reformist appearance of the movement does not mean that 
Confucianism was a thin veneer overseas kongjiao activists used to conceal their secular 
nationalism, so as to give it respectability and mask its western origin. As Charles Coppel 
rightly pointed out in the context of colonial Indonesia, Western historians “whose interests 
lay in the phenomenon of overseas Chinese nationalism have tended to regard the 
Confucianist revival among the Chinese of Java more of a cloak for Chinese political 
nationalism than a set of religious beliefs which were sincerely believed in and which deserve 
study in their own right.”26 To demonstrate his point, Coppel quoted the following narration 
by journalist Kwee Tek Hoay (1886-1952) on the history of Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan Batavia 
(The Batavia Chinese Association), the first association formed by peranankan Chinese in 
Java in 1900 to promote Confucianism as the religion of the Chinese:  
Perhaps not many know that the association and schools of the THHK were first 
established with the principal aim of promoting the teachings of the Prophet Confucius. 
The school which was established in 1900 by the THHK Batavia was a kind of religious 
school (original emphasis), and its teachers were like priests who were required once or 
twice on the first and fifteenth of every month to give a public sermon to disseminate 
the teachings of the Prophet Confucius. Thus the initial purpose of the THHK school for 
the Confucian religion was like the Bible or mission school for Christianity or the 
Mohammadijah school for the Moslems. People felt it was necessary to revive the 
teachings of Confucius among the overseas Chinese here, because thirty or forty years 
ago our marriage and funeral precepts and customs were so confused, full of 
superstition which caused difficulties and burdensome, that they had to be changed and 
improved.... At the same time the THHK Batavia wanted to try to improve the morals 
and spiritual quality of the Chinese people by disseminating as far as possible the 
teachings of Confucius. For this purpose it was considered to be very necessary that 
children should be taught Chinese characters and language so that they could read and 
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study for themselves the books of Confucius when they had reached the right stage and 
their learning was sufficiently advanced for them to be able to read them. Before 
reaching that stage, the students were introduced by their teachers to the Confucian 
religion through explanation and discussion. The teachers were as far as possible sought 
from among those who really understood the teachings of Confucius and were able to 
explain them to the public.
27
 
From the above, unmistakably the THHK had a strong religious character. Confucius was 
venerated as a religious prophet (Nabi) who transmitted a set of religious teachings (Agama) 
from Heaven (Thian). It is also clear from the discussion of the functions of the school and 
the teachers, the secular and the religious were undifferentiated.  
The Confucian revivalist movement which gained momentum among overseas 
Chinese was reintroduced back to China after 1911 and quickly became huge social 
movement in early republican China. From its founding in October 1912 to early 1914, the 
Confucian Association expanded swiftly, it established a total of 130 branches spanning 
across China and numerous overseas cities such as Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong, Macau 
and in America.
28
 The Kongjiao Magazine was established in February 1912 with Chen 
Huangzhang as its chief editor. The magazine acted as the mouthpiece of the Confucian 
Association and was the means by with the association headquarter in Shanghai connected 
and gave directives to the branches located in and outside of China. The magazine was an 
important platform for the Confucian Association to disseminate their ideas and galvanize 
support for their project of making Confucianism into a “religion.”29 
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In its application submitted to President Yuan Shikai and the Ministries of Education 
and Interior in October 1912 for the registration of the organization, the Confucian 
Association declared that Kongjiao is a religion (zongjiao宗教) and like other religions, is 
important for the evolution of the human race and advancement of civilization. Moreover, 
Confucianism was the spirit of the Chinese nation (minzu jingshen 民族精神) crucial for the 
salvation of the society and strengthening of China. This was why, the document argued, 
“America and the European states attach great importance to religion.” 30  The Confucian 
Association not only envisioned Confucianism to assert a civilizing influence on China the 
Chinese state religion (guojiao 国教) but also on the globe as the “world religion.” The 
Charter stated “Those who are sincere in believing and following the Confucian religion, 
regardless of religion, race and nationality” are welcome to join the Confucian Association. 
Interestingly, Chen Huanzhang explained that the Confucian Association is “tolerant in its 
religious practice…It instructs without distinction, combining Buddhism, Daoism, 
Christianity and Islam into a single source.”31   
The success of Confucian Association’s project rested entirely on its ability to gain 
Confucianism recognition as a “religion.” This required the discursive fixation of 
Confucianism in the category of “religion” and the creation of an organized Confucian church 
for the religion to express and affirm itself socially. Disagreements over the definition of 
Confucianism and the status of Confucius emerged immediately after the fall of the Qing 
dynasty. In his “Preface to the Confucian Association” (Kongjiao hui xu孔教会序), Chen 
Huanzhang complained about terming Confucianism as narrowly as the Confucian Way 
(Kongdao 孔道) or Confucian Learning (Kongxue 孔学) and secularizing Confucius into a 
philosopher, politician or educator by his contemporaries.  “The people now see the 
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Confucian Way merely as a theory, a school of thought, and not as encompassing as the term 
Confucian religion (Kongjiao 孔教). The term Confucian learning is even narrower (in 
meaning).” Chen argued that Confucianism is extensive in scope as it covers everything in 
heaven and on earth, this-worldly and other-worldly. 
  Likewise, for Chen, it was sacrilegious to label Confucius anything other than a sacred 
religious founder, who single-handedly founded the Confucian religion from the truths 
received from Heaven and established the Chinese civilization, as in doing so inadvertently 
demeaned his status and historical significance. Chen argued that the meaning of the word 
teaching (jiao) includes religion (zongjiao 宗教 ), education (jiaoyu 教育 ) and moral-
civilizational transformation (jiaohua 教化 ) and Confucianism should rightly be called 
Kongjiao as it encompassed all these aspects. He maintained that out of the three, religion is 
the core of Confucianism, and unlike scholarship religion produces a deep sense of reverence, 
loyalty and faith in its adherents. Using the example of Christianity, he explains “Greek 
philosophy is something Christianity does not possess, however the hearts-minds of the 
people in Europe and America rested on Christianity and not Greek philosophy. That’s the 
difference between religion and scholarship in effect.”   
  Chen warned that Confucianism would certainly perish if it is not recognized as a 
religion. “If Confucianism is not recognized as a religion (jiao), though the Confucian Way 
may survive, it merely exists as an empty theory; although Confucian learning may survive, it 
is merely a private scholarship. Even though the six classics are not abolished people will 
view them as just one learning among the hundred schools of thought.” Chen realized that the 
rectification of names (zhenming 正名) for Confucianism is of great importance as the 
legitimate existence of the Kongjiao depends on the outcome of the discursive battle fought 
against the labels of the Kongdao and Kongxue.  Furthermore, Chen argued that religion is 
something abstract (xuwu 虚无 ) and it is the difference in name that distinguishes the 




different religions. He cautioned that “if the name of Kongjiao is not established then all the 
principles transmitted by sacred classics and the sages, and the scholarships of many 
generations of Confucian masters would be utilized by other religion…then Confucianism 
exists merely to provide resources for other religions.”32  
Even more important than the discursive battle in the creation of Confucianism as a 
religion was its institutionalization.  In his discussion of the republican Confucian movement, 
Chan Wingtsit commented that “All these arguments (from the advocates of Kongjiao), 
reasonable and factual as they are can only lead to the conclusion that Confucianism is a 
religion, certainly not in the Western sense of an organized church comparable to Buddhism 
or Taoism.”33 Chan’s comment highlighted the fact that recognition hinges primarily on the 
institutional expression of religions in distinction from one another as well as from other 
political, economic and social organizations within a differentiated secular society. Indeed, 
Vincent Goossaert vividly shows how the traditionally localized and organizationally diverse 
or diffused Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism had to organize themselves into national 
and hierarchical “church-like” associations in the beginning of the republican era to gain 
official recognition as a “religion.” Only so could they enjoy the freedom of religion and 
protection against state confiscation of their properties.
34
  
Chen Huanzhang believed that the Confucian Association could serve as a rally point 
in uniting the loose adherents to defend and promote their religion. “As a rallying point, it is 
necessary to establish a religious title (minghao名号) and specially set up an organization.”35 
In institutionalizing the Confucian religion, the Confucian Association used Song Neo-
Confucian social organizations as their blueprints. Chen explained that the main objective of 
founding the Confucian Association was “promulgating Kongjiao and saving society” 
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(changming kongjiao, jiuji shehui 倡明孔教  救济社会 ). 36  In practical terms, it means 
“making the lecturing of (Confucian) learning as the essence (ti体) and saving the society for 
practical application (yong 用); modeling on the Regulations of the White Deer Grotto 
Academy (Bailu zhi xuegui 白鹿之学规) and maintaining the Lantian Community Pact 
(Lantian zi xiangyue蓝田之乡约), sacrificing to Confucius in accompany to Heaven, reciting 
and transmitting the scriptures to emulate the sages.”37 Both the White Deer Grotto Academy 
and Community Pact were voluntary social organizations, within a “middle space” between 
the family and the state, established by Song Neo-Confucians to promote Confucian moral 
education (daoxue道学) and rituals so as to create a virtuous and harmonious society. 38 In 
short, they were “civilizing” institutions (jiaohua tuanti 教化团体) and this was what the 
Confucian Association aspired to become. 
 Organizationally, the Confucian Association was divided into the departments of 
study (jiangxi-bu讲习部)and implementation (tuixing-bu推行部). The department of study 
was subdivided into scriptural study (jingxue 经学), metaphysics (lixue 理学), political 
learning (zhengxue政学) and literature (wenxue文学), and the department of implementation 
included activities such as proselytization, ritual sacrifice and scriptures reading, examining 
rites and reforming customs (kaoli zhengsu考礼正俗) and charity (jizong济众).  It should be 
pointed out, doctrinally, the differences between New Text and Old Text Confucianism, 
which were prominent during the Qing dynasty, were eased by the Confucian Association and 
they were promulgated as a singular Confucian religion. In addition, Chen believed that for 
the Confucian religion to gain institutional strength and compete with other religions existing 
                                                          
36 “Kongjiaohui zhangcheng” 孔教会章呈 (Charter of the Confucian Association), KJHZZ, Vol.1, No.1 (February 
1913) 
37 Chen, “Kongjiaohui xu”.  
38 See Monika Ubelhor, “The Community Compact (Hsiang-yueh) of Sung and its Education Significance” and 
Chan Wingtsit, “Chu Hsi and the Academies” in Wm. Theodore Debary and John W.Chaffe eds Neo-Confucian 
Education- The Formative Stage (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) 




academies and Confucian temples must be renovated and new Confucian churches styled 
after Christian churches have to be built.  
 
   
  In fact, the Confucian Association borrowed substantially from the organizational and 
ceremonial models of Buddhism and Christianity in their reinvention of Confucianism as a 
religion. This is discernible from Chen Huanzhang’s plan for the propagation of the 
Confucian religion. Chen, the chief architect of the Confucian reformation, listed eleven 
points in his reform of Confucianism. First, Confucian churches must be set up in every cities 
and towns of China and all major cities in the world. Second, church membership must be 
established to distinguish the believers of Kongjiao from the adherents of other religions. 
Third is to make a flag for Kongjiao. Having a flag, Chen reasoned, would inspire the respect 
 Figure 6. Top: Zhong Rongguang, 
the Christian chief of the Guangdong 
Education Bureau. He made himself 
the enemy of Kongjiao by proposing 
the removal of Confucian sacrifice in 
public schools.  
Figure 7. Left:  Chen Huanzhang in 
full religious attire (rufu儒服) of the 
Confucian religion  




of people for the religion. The flag will be hung outside every homes and shop houses 
together with the national flag on every Sunday and Confucius’ birthday. Fourth is to use the 
birthday of Confucius for dating to honour the religious founder of China. Fifth, in the homes 
of every member, a prayer hall is to be set up for the worship of ancestors, the Lord on High 
(shangdi 上帝) and Confucius. Sixth, every school must sacrifice to Confucius as they are 
churches in the Confucian religion. Seventh, lectures on the classics are to be conducted in 
schools by teachers daily at the beginning of every lesson. Eighth, every Confucian church is 
to appoint a preacher (xuanjiang yuan 宣讲员) and every Sunday he/she is to gather the 
people at the Confucian temples or any public places to lecture on the Confucian religion. To 
encourage the participation of women in the religion, Chen argued against traditional 
Confucian propriety that it was appropriate for men and women attend the lectures together. 
Ninth is celebrating the birthday of Confucius as a national holiday. Tenth, Confucian 
churches must conduct rituals for weddings and funerals. Interestingly, Chen insisted that it is 
the business of religion to conduct wedding and funeral rituals and Confucian liturgists must 
compete with Daoist priests and Buddhist monks in the provision of these services. He 
predicted that a group of Confucian ritual experts would emerge as a result and would help to 
“civilize the people and reform their customs” (huamin zhengsu 化民正俗). Eleventh, the 
Confucian church must proselytize the religion aggressively. Chen argued that in the age 
whereby many religions compete against one another, the only way for Kongjiao to survive is 
to proselytize the religion aggressively.
39
 The Confucian Association targeted their 
proselytization on the youths, farmers, soldiers, workers, merchants and women.  This was 
because the younger generations were not taught the classics with the abolishment of the 
examination system, while the rest were traditionally neglected as a result of Confucianism’s 
focus on the male scholar-gentry class. Chen confidently declared that with the success in the 
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proselytization of these classes, all farms, barracks, factories and homes would be converted 
into Confucian churches in the future.
40
  
  To gain public and official recognition of and support for the Confucian religion, the 
Confucian Association held the National Confucian Conference and the Autumn Sacrifice to 
Confucius in 1913. For the Confucian Association, ritual not only was a key characteristic of 
religion, more importantly it was also what creates and holds the religious community 
together. Chen Huanzhang pointed out that “every religion must have ritual ceremonies.”41 He 
added, “Ignorant people thought that religious ceremonies are not important and don’t know 
that it is of great importance to the existence of religion.  Seeing the ritual participants 
solemnly kneel and bow today, the spectators cannot but feel a sense of awe and respect. It is 
impossible to have faithfulness (xin信) without rituals.”42   
  On 28 August 1913, the Confucian Association requested permission from the 
Ministry of Education to hold the Autumn Sacrifice to Confucius at the old Imperial 
Academy (guozi jian国子监). The petition to the Ministry of Education emphasized that as 
“the teacher of ten thousand generations” Confucius was sacrificed to by all the previous 
dynasties, and should be continued as it would have the effects of improving social discipline. 
The petition also stressed that any person revering Confucius can participate in the sacrifice 
so as to “display their common faithfulness (to Kongjiao)” and to foster “reverence to the 
religion and encourage learning.”43 The Confucian Association wanted to transform what was 
an exclusive imperial ritual into a public religious ritual. Chen argued that state sacrifices to 
Confucius in the past by the Son of Heaven and his representatives were private sacrifices 
(siji 私祭) since they represented only the intention of the monarch or were the private 
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ceremonies of one dynasty. In contrast, the sacrifice conducted by the Confucian Association 
were public sacrifice (gongji公祭) consistent with republicanism as it was prompted by the 
revering hearts of the millions of Chinese citizens towards their religious founder and 
undertaken on their behalf.
44
 
  The Ministry of Education initially declined the request of the Confucian Association 
on the ground that sacrifice to Confucius was traditionally a state ritual and without legal 
stipulation no private individual or organization can conduct it. However, according to Chen 
Huanzhang, the Ministry later relented after he pressed on with the request and admitted that 
“respecting Confucius arises commonly from the hearts of everyone.”45 The autumn sacrifice 
was held on 3 September 1913 at the old Imperial Academy in Beijing. It was reported that 
more than a thousand people attended the sacrifice. The sacrificial rite was officiated by 
representative of the Confucian Association, Li Shipin 李时品 (1868-?), President Yuan’s 
representative Liang Shiyi 梁士诒 (1869-1933), and head of the House of Representatives, 
Tang Hualong 汤化龙  (1874-1918). The autumn sacrifice was the first ever since the 
establishment of the republic in 1912 and during the ceremony many of the participants broke 
down in tears.
46
Thus, as planned by the Confucian Association, the autumn sacrifice helped to 
evoke an emotional sense of respect and belonging in the participants towards the religion. 
  Shortly after the autumn sacrifice, the National Confucian Conference was convened 
on 24 September 1913 in Qufu, Shandong. Several thousand people from various Confucian 
societies and other social and religious organizations attended the conference. Official 
representatives of Vice-president Li Yuanhong 黎元洪 (1864-1928), the parliament, Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, the Supreme Court, local governments of the 19 provinces, overseas 
Chinese and foreign delegates were also present.  Through the conference, the Confucian 
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Association sought to affirm the religious status of Kongjiao and to establish Confucius as the 
founder of the religion. Kongjiao advocates argued that all religions have their own holy land 
like Mecca for Islam and Jerusalem for Christianity and Judaism.  Qufu was chosen as the site 
of the conference because, as the birth and burial site of Confucius, it is the holy land 
(shengdi圣地) of Kongjiao for the believers. The conference was planned by the Confucian 
Association as an annual religious pilgrimage (chaosheng朝圣) undertaken by the believers 
to the holy land to celebrate the birthday of their religious founder.  
  The conference lasted for a week and the main events included tours of the holy sites 
such as the tombs of Confucius and Mencius and sacrifice to Confucius on his birthday (27 
September)
 
at the Confucian temple.
47
 Sacrifice to Confucius was the main highlight of the 
conference and it was presided by Duke Kong Lingyi 孔令贻(1872-1919), the 76th generation 
descendant of Confucius. The Confucian Association adopted the state sacrifice of sidian释
奠, which was also used in the autumn sacrifice, in replacement of the less elaborate family 
ritual traditionally practiced by the Kong clan in this sacrifice to promote it as a religious 
ceremony of the religion. In addition, the National Confucian Conference made classics 
recitation and lecturing (songjing, jiangjing颂经 讲经) and bowing to the Sage (baisheng拜
圣) the ceremonial routines of all meetings so as to praise and venerate Confucius. 48 In sum, 
Qufu, the sacred center and the sacrificial rites served to construct the Confucian religious 
community, both physically and imaginatively, and to erect a boundary between the religion 
and other faiths.  
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  The most successful outcome of the conference was gaining public acceptance for the 
commemoration of Confucius’ birthday (shengdanjie圣诞节), another “invented tradition”49 
of the Confucian Association. Kang Youwei admitted that “Celebrating the birth of Confucius 
is something unprecedented,” He argued, however, that rites must change and progress 
according to the time:  
Today all religions are fortunate to have derived blessings from their founders and 
everybody celebrates (the birthday of their founders), how can we, while blessed by our 
founder, not celebrate his birthday? This is what is meant by the meaning (of rites) arises 
according to the time. At the time when the various religions were separated, there was no 
way of comparison. This is why in the past people could afford not to hold celebration for 
the founder. Today other religions hold ceremonies to celebrate the birthday of their 
founders, not doing likewise mean that we have forgotten our founder. This is why today 
it is necessary to celebrate the birthday of Confucius.
50
  
In 1918, Chen Huangzhang and other members of parliaments proposed a bill for the 
celebration of Confucius’ birthday as a national holiday to the Congress. Chen pointed out 
that Confucius’ birthday was only celebrated in schools and not the whole society. In contrast, 
Christmas was treated with great importance and celebrated with much fanfare in western 
nations as a public holiday. The bill was passed on 26 September 1918 by a large majority in 
the parliament and the 27
th
 day of the 8
th
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RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM AND THE STATE RELIGION MOVEMENT 
Han Hua rightly pointed out that “The Confucian Association, indeed, through the convening 
of the National Confucian Conference and holding the Autumn Sacrifice at the Imperial 
Academy wanted to invent the religious rituals of the Kongjiao, to establish the status of 
Confucius as the religious founder, to affirm the “holy land” of Kongjiao, to strive to make 
Kongjiao a religion, and ultimately writing (Kongjiao) into the Constitution and create the 
condition for making it the national religion.”52 As discussed earlier, continuing with Kang 
Youwei’s idea during the 1898 reform, one key objectives of the Confucian Association was 
to install Kongjiao as the state-religion of the Chinese republic.  When the Constitution 
Drafting Committee convened at the Temple of Heaven on July 1913, the Confucian 
Association seized the opportunity and petitioned the Senate and the House of 
Representatives to constitutionally recognized Kongjiao as the national religion. “The 
Confucian Association Petition” argued that “morality (daode 道德) is the cornerstone of a 
country” and “China’s morality originated from Kongjiao.” It stated that Kongjiao has been 
the state religion of China for more than two thousand years ever since it was instituted as the 
state orthodoxy by Emperor Wu in the Han Dynasty. There had been changes in the political 
form of the state in the long history of China, however, the Way remain unchanged. Thus, the 
foundation of the state will be imperiled if the state religion is not installed. Moreover, the 
petition asserted that Kongjiao was the faith of the majority of the Chinese people and the 
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The petition was quickly rejoined by endorsement from high-ranking military and 
civil officials from almost all the provinces. Following the lead of the Confucian Association, 
other Confucian societies all over the nation also petitioned the central government to 
institutionalize Kongjiao as the state-religion. The petition by the Confucian Association 
swiftly generated interest among the public and a huge debate within and outside the 
parliament with regards to the issue of state-religion. The controversy will be the subject of 
the next section, and at this point I will like to focus on explicating the nature of the 
movement.  
 Current scholarship has largely revised earlier negative interpretation on the state 
religion movement, which saw it as a conservative or counter-revolutionary ideological 
Figure 8. Drafters of the 1913 Temple of Heaven Constitution 




movement in support of monarchial restoration.
54
 The consensus among present scholars is to 
interpret the state religion as cultural nationalistic in nature. Hsiao Kung-chuan, for instance, 
described Kang Youwei, the spiritual leader of the movement, as a “latter day Confucian 
prophet preaching cultural nationalism.”55  Likewise in his reading of Kang Youwei and the 
Kongjiao movement, Wong Young-tsu argued that the whole movement was inspired by a 
deep sense of cultural anxiety about westernization and the loss of cultural identity. “After the 
founding of the republic, Kang Youwei feared not only what he preconceived…the Republic 
being usurped by ‘the leader of the mob masses’, and also the whole-hearted imitation of the 
West and the trend of discarding the Chinese cultural essence. The latter was more damaging 
(for Kang).”56 Both Hsiao and Wong saw the main objective of the kongjiao and state-religion 
movement was to prevent the cultural death of China against complete westernization and to 
build a cohesive Chinese nation on the basis of the Confucian religion. Hsiao went as far as 
arguing that Kang sought alliance with Yuan Shikai, even though he was firmly against the 
dictator’s monarchial ambition, to find political support for his Confucian movement. “It was 
not entirely without reason, therefore, that the Confucian Society was widely condemned as 
being ‘in league with the reactionary and monarchist movement.’”57 
 There are strong evidences justifying the cultural nationalism thesis. Harumi Befu 
pointed out that cultural nationalists believed that the nation is sacred and it is shaped and 
defined by certain sacred and eternal cultural contents. Cultural nationalism is manifested 
mainly in two ways, symbolically through physical objects and discursively through language 
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 Symbolically and discursively, the Confucian Association tried to 
invent the Chinese national identity on the basis of the Confucian tradition. On the symbolic 
side, the Confucian Association wanted to fashion Confucius into a sacred religious founder, 
a cultural-spiritual hero of Chinese civilization, and the  national symbol of China. Chen 
Huanzhang asserted that “Heaven took pity on the multitudes, the Black Emperor sent down 
the divine being (of Confucius). The uncrowned king received the heavenly mandate and 
created a new religion. Confucius is the religious progenitor (jiaozu教祖) produced uniquely 
by China!...The sagacious wisdom of Confucius surpassed the other religious founders in the 
world, and this is why Chinese civilization is without peer in the whole world.”59 He boldly 
declared that “Kongjiao is the soul of China…. The whole history of China is nothing but the 
history of Kongjiao.”60  
Discursively, the Confucian Association asserted that Kongjiao is the sacred core of 
Chinese culture and the petitioners averred that the “political system can be transformed, but 
religion is something that cannot be changed.”61As Frank Dikotter has shown in his seminal 
work on Chinese racial discourse, in contrast to the revolutionaries’ racial national discourse 
of Han blood and anti-Manchuism, the reformers, prominent in the Confucian Association, 
defined the Chinese nation and race by culture.
62
 Repeating his earlier claims during the 1898 
reform, Kang Youwei equated Kongjiao with the “national essence” (guocui 国粹 ) or 
“soul”(guohun国魂) of China. He argued that China after the revolution was in a degenerated 
state, where “there is anarchy at the top and people at the bottom are uncivilized”63 because 
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the nation was losing its soul. He criticized those westernized leaders who thought that China 
would become strong if she imitated the West entirely, from political system and law to 
culture and religion.
64
 Kang argued that China was weak in her political and economic 
systems, and not her moral-religious system. What China needed, therefore, was reform of her 
outmoded political institutions and economic industrialization, not a cultural revolution. 
Citing the example of the Mexico, Kang argued that the Mexican race, despite the people 
retaining their physical features, was in fact eliminated as a result of hispanization by the 
Spaniards. Kang cautioned that the Chinese nation and race would be likewise exterminated if 
the national soul is lost.
65
 He argued that the only way to save China at the moment is to 
“restore the soul of China”66 (huanhun还魂). This could be done by “moral transformation” 
(jiaohua教化) of the people through instituting Kongjiao as the state religion and the building 
of Confucian churches.    
 In explicating the effort of the state religion movement in bringing state, culture and 
the nation in close alignment, the cultural nationalism thesis helped to throw into sharp relief 
the nexus of politics and cultural conservatism in the movement. Furthermore, cultural 
nationalism focuses on the nation rather than the state and is helpful in understanding the 
movement, which spread over the confine of the boundary of the Chinese nation-state.  
However, cultural nationalism, as a concept did not give sufficient and serious attention to the 
religious dimension. First and foremost, cultural nationalism did not distinguish a secular 
political project that appropriates religious language, symbols and images from a religious 
movement that assumes political form and deploy nationalist language. Talal Asad rightly 
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criticized studies of contemporary Islamic revival which often confused religious Islamism 
with secular Arab nationalism by interpreting the movement as an expression of cultural 
nationalism. Asad acknowledged that the motives of the cultural nationalists and Islamists 
often overlap, especially in their opposition to the cultural hegemony of the West.
67
 The main 
difference between Arab nationalists and Islamists, Asad writes, “spring from the Islamist 
project of regulating conduct in the world in accordance with ‘the principles of religion’ (usul 
uddin), and from the fact that the community to be constructed stands counter to many of the 
values of modern Western life that Arab nationalism endorses.” Among which, most 
important is secularism, “the doctrine of separating law and citizenship from religious 
affiliation and confining the latter to the private domain.”68 Furthermore, Asad argued against 
the view that Islamism is a kind of nationalism cloaked in a religious veneer. Islamism often 
takes a political or nationalist cast, even though it has transnational aspirations, because the 
nation-state is the dominant political reality that Islamists have to face. “Islamism’s 
preoccupation with state power is not the result of its commitment to nationalist ideas but of 
the modern nation-state’s enforced claim to constitute legitimate social identities and arenas. 
No movement that aspires to more than mere belief or inconsequential talk in public can 
remain indifferent to state power in a secular world.”69 
 Concurring with Talal Asad, I would argue that the state religion movement cannot 
be reduced to nationalism. While pointing out the cultural nationalistic elements in the 
thoughts of Kang Youwei, Hsiao Kung-chuan also acknowledged that he cannot be 
considered as a cultural nationalist in the ordinary sense of the term as there is a strong strand 
of religious-universalism in his thinking.
70
 The Confucian Association since its inception was 
designed as an international religious association with the aim of not only saving China but 
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also to progress the entire world into the Confucian datong utopia through the promulgation 
of Confucian teachings. The religious community that the Confucian association imagined, to 
borrow Benedict Anderson’s influential concept, was a global one.  This, however, is not 
suggesting that the state religion movement did not have any nationalist character. The 
argument that I am pursuing is that in the case of the Confucian state religion movement it is 
religion that subsumes nationalism. Though the republican state religion movement shared the 
concern of cultural nationalist movements, such as the National Essence movement, the KMT 
New Life movement and the more recent attempt by Kang Xiaoguang 康晓光 to make 
Confucianism China’s state-religion, in the cultural-moral rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, 
it did not view the nation as the highest good or politics as its ultimate concern. 
71
 
Therefore, the state religion movement can be interpreted as an example of religious 
nationalism. “The term religious nationalism”, Mark Juergensmeyer writes, “means the 
attempt to link religion and the nation-state” and “the implication of this way of speaking is 
not that religion is not necessarily antithetical to nationalism, but that religious rather than 
secular nationalism is the appropriate premise on which to build a nation—even a modern 
nation-state.” 72   Before the rise of secular nationalism in modern times, religion as an 
ideology of moral order had been historically the dominant conception and legitimation of 
political community. This was why Confucianists in the republican era fervently emphasized 
that it is acceptable to have a political revolution but not a revolution of the moral-
civilizational order.  Kang Youwei argued that the reason why China could remain unified 
and well-governed for two thousand years was because of the civilizing influence of 
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 He criticized the naïve optimism of the secular nationalists in their belief that 
China could be strengthened solely by the importation of western legal and political 
institutions. “Relying solely on law in governance and the people will do evil within the law. 
Relying solely on politics in governance and the people will be corrupted within the political 
system.” He continues, “In the present (people) who mistakenly admire the West also know 
that the western nations are powerful now not only because of politics but also as the result of 
material cause. (Didn’t they know) that the basis of morality and customs in the West is the 
result of the civilizing influence of religion (jiaohua)?...All nations even the small barbaric 
states cannot do without religion.”74  
Furthermore, citing the example of the Jewish people and the Indians under British 
rule, Kang Youwei  highlighted that despite losing their states it was Judaism and Hinduism 
that help preserved the Jewish and Indian nations from racial extinctions. Though Kang 
argued for the necessity of China having a state-religion, he was against the idea of that being 
Buddhism or Christianity. Buddhism was deemed to be unsuitable as it teaches leaving the 
mundane world (chushiyan出世) and thus was impractical for ordinary people. Christianity, 
on the other hand, was against ancestral worship and incompatible with the culture and 
customs of the Chinese people. Confucianism was the ideal choice, for Kang, as it shaped 
Chinese civilization and customs and functioned as the nation soul, the source of Chinese 
identity for China for centuries. Kang believed that Confucianism, as a humanist religion 
(rendao zhijiao人道之教) was not only suitable for China, but the whole world. “The way of 
Confucius came from Heaven, human nature came from Heaven. This is why (Confucius) 
followed human nature in making of his way.” As Confucianism is the religion of human 
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beings, Kang emphatically declared, “it is impossible for the people in the world to leave the 
way of Confucius even if they wanted to.”75  
In essence, Confucian religionists rejected the western liberal-secular notion that the 
nation-state is an abstract political community constituted by social contracts between rational 
individuals and maintain by laws. For them, the nation-state is a moral order that is founded 
and preserved by religion.  In Confucian religious-nationalist discourse, religion is a moral-
unifying force that “correct the heart-minds” of the people by instilling them with moral 
virtues, and morality is what produced an orderly and harmonious society. Liang Qichao, one 
of the signatories of the state religion petition, believed that religion has a greater effect than 
philosophy and science in the strengthening of the nation. Liang was not a consistent thinker, 
and Marianne Bastid-Brugrière has demonstrated that his position on religion shifted a 
number of times from 1895 to 1929.
76
 In his oft-quoted 1902 article Protecting the religion is 
no way to honor Confucius, Liang Qichao attacked his teacher’s idea of making 
Confucianism the state religion. Using a secularist argument, he criticized those who 
advocated for a state religion did not know that politics and religion are in fact two separate 
spheres, and religion would have no effect in preserving the Chinese state and race.  
At this point, Liang was influenced by Johann Kaspar Bluntschli’s (1808-1881) 
Theory of the state and saw religion as basically superstition, a backward force impeding the 
progress of science and the nation. However, a few months later in the article “On the 
strengths and weaknesses of a religionist and philosopher” he revised his earlier negative 
evaluation of religion.
77
 In this essay, Liang argued that in the production of truth religion is 
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inferior to philosophy, however in practical affairs (zishi治事) religion is superior. This is 
because philosophy generates skepticism while religion produces faith.  Citing the examples 
of Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658), Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), George Washington (1732-
1799), Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) and Saigo Takamori 西郷 隆盛 (1828-1877), Liang 
demonstrated how these characters accomplished works of historical greatness motivated by a 
deep sense of religiosity. He listed 5 important effects of religion in practical affairs. First, 
religion is instrumental in suppressing the selfish desires and conflicts of diverse individuals 
and uniting their spirits into one. “The spirit of religion is the spirit of an entire army” Second, 
religion gave people hope and strength to pursue their goals against adversities. Third, 
religion helped to extricate oneself from bodily pleasures and whole-heartedly devote oneself 
to the accomplishment of great undertakings.  Fourth, religion with its teaching of rewards 
and retributions improved public morality by instilling fear in man on committing evil. Fifth, 
religion instilled men with courage and resolution, to the extent of disregarding their lives in 
the attainment of great goals. 
78
 
Liang claimed that in the absence of religion, philosophical idealism can produced the 
same effects. He cited Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) and 
the anarchists as influenced by Hegelian idealism. He also argued that the “fearlessness” 
exhibited by Ming Neo-Confucians was generated by Wang Yangming’s learning of the 
Heart-mind (xinxue 心学). Wang Yangming’s philosophy was influential among the Meiji 
leaders and assisted in producing the Meiji restoration. Liang asserts that “the learning of the 
Heart-mind is in fact religion at its most superior level.” Interestingly, he distinguished in 
religion between blind superstitions (minxin迷信) and true faith (zhengxi正信), the former is 
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characterize by irrationality (fei-lixin 非理性) and the latter supra-rationality (chao-lixin超理
性). Liang believed that religion will be a progressive socio-political force if the superstitious 
elements are purged from it.  He writes “this is why in a country there cannot be people 
without faith, and there must be people destroying superstitions as well.” He declared 
confidently that superstitions can be easily destroyed, but it is impossible to eliminate 
morality in religion.
79
   
 
THE STATE RELIGION CONTROVERSY AND  
THE DECLINE OF KONGJIAO MOVEMENT 
The state-religion petition of the Confucian Association immediately generated intense public 
debates. The two key issues in debate were whether having a state religion hinders religious 
freedom and is Confucianism a religion? The Christian associations in China were aghast 
when they heard the news of the petition, and they immediately protested to the central 
government against the proposal of the Confucian Association. They argued that instituting 
Confucianism as the state-religion is against the principle of the state-church separation and 
asked for the freedom of religion to be written into the Constitution. The disunited Catholic 
and Protestant Associations quickly organized themselves into the Society for Religious 
Freedom to lobby against the state-religion movement. 
80
  Prominent Christians like Xu 
Shiying 许世英 (1873-1964) and Ai Zhiming 艾知命 also petitioned the government against 
the proposal and listed four negative consequences of having a state-religion. They asserted 
strongly that instituting Confucianism as the state-religion will incite religious conflicts, 
destroy the current unity of the five races, violate the cardinal principle of equality in 
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republicanism and lastly, the union of politics and religion obstruct the political unity of 
China as it would encourage the Buddhist and Muslim regions to secede from the republic.
81
 
Buddhist, Daoist and Muslims national associations were mixed in their reactions on the 
state-religion issue. Some joined the Christian associations to fight for the freedom of religion 
and others supported the institutionalization of Confucianism as a state-religion.
82
 
The question whether Confucianism is a religion was in fact raise earlier at the turn of 
the twentieth century. As discussed above, in 1902 Liang Qichao broke ranks with Kang 
Youwei and refuted the classification of Confucianism as a religion. Liang wrote that while 
other religions are based on otherworldly superstitious beliefs, such as the soul, afterlife and 
nirvana, Confucianism was categorically different as it is a moral humanist teaching on the 
perfection of human nature and society.
83
  In a similar vein, Zhang Taiyan章太炎 (1869-1936) 
emphasized that the historical Confucius was never a religious founder and his greatness 
solely stemmed from his secular achievements: “The reason why Confucius is a hero in China 
is because he made history, developed literature, advanced scholarship and leveled the four 
social classes.”84 Interestingly, while rejecting the assertion that Confucianism is a religion, 
Zhang also claimed that there is no religion in China. He argued that China had no state-
religion as the teachings (jiao) established by the ancient kings were akin to “present day 
social education and not religion” and the various teachings established at the end of the Zhou 
dynasty by different scholars were all humanistic doctrines. He observed that the reason why 
contemporary people wanted to refashion Confucianism as a religion was because they feared 
the intrusion of Christianity in China and wanted to find a means to combat it. In short, Zhang 
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was highly critical of the fact that Kongjiao was an invented tradition, derivative of 
Christianity. Moreover, creating a state-religion and imposing it on the people would be 
unnecessary and regressive as it would obstruct the intellectual development of the nation and 
stir up religious unrests.
85
  
 In defense, Chen Huanzhang stressed that the establishment of Kongjiao as the state 
religion did not contradict the principle of the freedom of religious belief in the constitution. 
He cited the example of the United States, a country without a state-religion or church, to 
prove his point. Chen illustrated that in the States, all public rituals, from the inauguration of 
presidents to the calendar system, were all adopted from Protestant practices.  Adherents of 
other religions such as the Catholics and Jews were granted the freedom of religious beliefs, 
but they still had to perform the public ceremonies informed by Protestantism. Using the 
example, Chen argued that freedom of religious beliefs was limited to issues of private 
concern and freedom of individuals had to be restricted in public matters. For Chen, he saw 
no contradiction between having a state-religion and the freedom of religion because he 
perceived Kongjiao broadly as, not only a “religion” in western sense of private beliefs, but 
also a civil religion in the form of ritual-ethical teaching (lijiao礼教) and public education 
(jiaoyu教育).86  
However, Chen did not attempt to separate the Confucian religion into public ritual 
and religion as witnessed by the Meiji state bifurcation of Shintoism into State Shinto (Kokka 
Shintō国家神道) and Sect Shinto (kyōha Shintō教派神道), the former was conceived as a 
set of civil ceremonies centered on the national body (kokutai国体) and emperor worship and 
the latter was a form of private belief.
87
 As civil rituals, State Shinto was “not a religion” and 
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it was compulsory for all citizens as patriotic duty to participate in the ceremonies.  The 
argument that the leaders of the Confucian Association tried to advance was that Kongjiao 
was in fact a tolerant religion that allowed its adherents to take up dual religious membership. 
As Chen Huanzhang asserts: 
The Doctrine of the Mean says ‘Everything in the world coexists and does not harm one 
another. Different teachings run in parallel and do not contradict one another. The lesser 
virtue is like small river streams and the greater virtue is seen in mighty 
transformations.’ The greater virtue and mighty transformations refers to 
(Confucianism), this is why the state-religion is elevated above the rest (duzun独尊). 
The lesser streams refers to (other religions), this why there is freedom of religious 
belief. The state-religion and the freedom of religion run in parallel and do not 
contradict one another, this is why the Confucian religion is great.
88
  
 Refuting the charge that Confucianism is not a religion, Chen Huanzhang also tried to 
demonstrate that like Christianity, which was taken as the archetype of religion, Kongjiao  has 
a religious founder, a canon, religious uniforms, belief in one single god (Heaven), spirits and 
immortality of the soul, a liturgy, missionaries, commandments, religious buildings and  
sacred grounds.
89
 Chen acknowledged that people were reluctant to classify Confucianism as 
a religion because the term was derogatorily equated with superstition. He, however, 
criticized that view as erroneous. “Things are divided into species and there are different 
grades within individual species. It will be absurd to claim that something is not part of the 
same species because it is of a different grade.” 90 Chen maintained Confucianism was in fact 
a “special religion.” By “special religion,” Chen was repeating the earlier claim made by 
Kang Youwei that Confucianism was more superior than other religions because it 
encompassed both the “Way of the Gods” and the “Way of Humanity.” Moreover, the 
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Confucian religion which stressed the Way of Humanity was more suitable for the modern 
secular age.  In short, Chen was trying to fit the Confucian religion within the traditional 
Chinese category of “teaching” (jiao) and not be constrained by the more narrow Western 
sematic category of “religion” (zongjiao).  Chen explains, “‘Zongjiao’ is a Japanese term 
(derived from the West), in Chinese language the word “jiao” suffice…There’s the Way of 
the Gods and there is also the Way of Humanity. Although the ways are different, they are all 
termed ‘jiao’”.91  
 The debate on the state-religion issue was as intense in the parliament as in the public. 
On 23 September 1913, Zhao Bingling 赵炳麟 (1876-1927) of the Nationalist Party proposed 
to the parliament to institute Confucianism as the state-religion. On 13
 
October, the 
parliament started voting on the state-religion proposal and only 8 out of 40 members of 
parliament who attended the session supported the motion. Without the two-third majority, 
the state-religion proposal was voted down. On 28 October, Wang Rongbao 汪荣宝 (1878-
1933) of the Progressive Party proposed adding the clause “Confucius principles shall be the 
basis for citizenry education” to Article XIX of the “Temple of Heaven” Draft Constitution. 
This was approved when the members of parliament finally reached a compromise after a 
long period of debate. The result was quite far from the Confucian Association’s aim of 
instituting Confucianism as the state-religion. The Confucian Association immediately 
renewed their campaign and lobbied hard for the recognition of Confucianism as the state-
religion. The state-religion question was temporarily put on hold when Yuan Shikai dissolved 
the parliament in 1914. 
92
 
Yuan Shikai appeared to be an enthusiastic supporter of the Confucian revival 
movement. Yuan gave recognition to Confucianism as the moral foundation of the nation, and 
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he restored the study of Confucian classics and the spring and autumn sacrifices to Confucius 
in public schools in 1913.
93
 Demonstrating his support for the veneration of Confucius, Yuan 
not only sent his representative to officiate the 1913 autumn sacrifice, he also personally led 
the state sacrifice at the Confucian temple as the chief priest in September 1914. In 
preparation for the restoration of monarchy, Yuan also reinstated the imperial sacrifices to 
heaven and Confucius.
94
  Impressed with the Meiji-Taisho model of State Shintoism and 
under the influence of his Japanese advisor, the Confucian Ariga Nagao 有贺长雄 (1860-
1921), Yuan wanted to make Confucius the national icon and employed Heaven sacrifice to 
create the ritual oneness of the Chinese nation.
95
 Unlike Kang Youwei and Chen Huanzhang, 
Yuan was not interested in the spiritual aspect of Confucianism. He valued the Confucian 
religion only in functional terms, as an useful means of producing moral citizens and 
buttressing his political authority. As Ernest Young eloquently argues “While at every point 
attempting to win elite assent to his revivals by ‘modernizing’ them, he sought to broaden his 
base in the population not by new social policies, but with ceremonial. Striking the right poses, 
he seemed to think, and the people would show the wonderful reverence for authority that 
they had before the revolution. Had it not worked in Meiji Japan?”96 Yuan Shikai never 
supported the idea of a state-religion and he rejected it pragmatically on the belief that having 
a state-religion would encourage the secession of Buddhist and Muslim regions and also 
prevent his appropriation of temple properties for his modernization policies. The Confucian 
Association also as a whole rejected Yuan’s attempt to restore the monarchy. Kang Youwei 
vehemently condemned Yuan’s action and advised him to abdicate. Other prominent leaders 
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When the parliament reconvened on August 1916 shortly after the death of Yuan 
Shikai, the Confucian Association again petitioned the central government to have 
Confucianism installed as the state religion. This time the state-religion movement not only 
met strong oppositions from the other religious organizations, it was opposed also by the 
vocal New Cultural movement. The New Cultural movement started in 1915 against Yuan 
Monarchy and began the first iconoclastic and totalistic attack on Confucianism in modern 
Chinese history.
98
 The new Cultural intellectuals believed that Yuan monarchial restoration 
and the common people’s apathy to republicanism was due to the shackles of the old Chinese 
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Figure 9. Yuan Shikai sacrificing to Heaven at the altar of Heaven in Beijing, 23 December 
1914 




cultural mind-set produced by centuries of Confucian indoctrination. They argued that 
Confucianism which preached political, familial and gender subordinations was incompatible 
with the modern world defined by democratic freedom and equality. The New Cultural 
intellectuals passionately declared that to give birth to a new China, Confucianism must be 
entirely eliminated from Chinese culture. One of the most vocal critics of Confucianism, 
Chen Duxiu 陈独秀 (1879-1942) argued that Confucian teachings emphasized social 
hierarchy and deference to social superiors and this was why it was appropriated by autocratic 
rulers of various dynasties to perpetuate despotism. For Chen, to be modern means to be free 
in thoughts and action, however, Confucian ethics helped to produce “obedient subjects”99 
and created a fertile ground for the emergence of despots. The continued strength of 
Confucianism in Chinese culture, Chen believed, was the reason behind the weakness of 
democracy and many attempts to restore the monarchy since the fall of the imperial system in 
1911. The death of Yuan Shikai in 1916, Chen predicted, will not be the end of monarchial 
restoration in China. He warns that if Confucianism was not abolished, “many other Yuans 
will certainly emerge and re-emerge to abolish the Republic and restore imperial rule.”100 As 
Chen painstakingly asserts, “restorations needed Confucianism and Confucianism needed 
restorations”101  
The Chinese intellectuals not only found the idea of a state-religion incompatible with 
democracy, but it was also antithetical to science.
102
 The firm rejection of Zhang Taiyan of the 
existence of religion in China is very telling on the “anti-religious” attitude of the Chinese 
elites during the time. Self-professed Confucians firmly rejected the state-religion movement 
because they believed that classifying Confucianism as a religion was smearing the “national 
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essence” of the Chinese nation. Liang Shuming梁漱溟 (1893-1988), the last fervent defender 
of Confucianism according to Guy Alitto,
103
 for instance, writes:  
The invention and exposition of rational principles was his fundamental contribution, 
and had immensely inspired those who came after him. This is why in the last 2000 
years, Confucius was much influential than the Duke of Zhou. To determine whether 
Zhou-Kong jiaohua is a religion, we need to first and foremost examine the person of 
Confucius and his school….Religion is inescapable from matters of life, death, spirits 
and gods, and Confucius deliberately avoided discussing them….All the core elements 
of religion were absent from Confucius; the spirit of Confucius that was not permissible 
for religion was his belief in the rationality of human beings…Confucius did not 
discriminate against or criticize religion (this was something extremely unwise during 
his time), however, he was in fact the most powerful enemy of religion. This was 
because he focused his work on inspiring the rationality of human beings….(Unlike 
religion) Confucianism does not impose any dogmas on people; in sum, it only teaches 
people to reflect on themselves, only to rely on their own rationality and nothing 
else….To ask: what is this? (Confucianism) It is a morality (daode 道德), not religion. 
Morality belongs to the realm of rationality, in the self-consciousness and discipline of 
human beings. Religion is on matters of faith and rested on believers’ observance of 
religious teachings and regulations. China since Confucius was influenced by his 
teachings and was on the historical path of replacing religion with morality (yi daode 
dai zongjiao 以道德代宗教).104  
The secular image of Confucius and his teaching presented by Liang was the 
dominant interpretation among Chinese intellectuals from 1920s to 1940s. In fact, in all the 
books on Confucianism published in the twenties and thirties, Rujiao, which had a religious 
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connotation, was rejected totally in favor of Rujia in describing the Confucian tradition.
105
  
Liang asserted that all cultures and nations originated from religion, China was no exception, 
and religion faded in influence with the rise of rationality. However, what marked China from 
the other civilizations was the early stage in which religious authority declined under the 
rationalizing influence of Confucianism. According to Liang, Confucius rationalized Chinese 
ancient religion into rites (li 礼) and civilized the people with morality. Interestingly, he 
acknowledged that morality and religion are contemporary terms which did not exist in the 
past, and Confucius might not have had the intention to substitute religion with morality. 
However, “On hindsight, this was what happened in Chinese history and Confucius was 
crucial (in this development). Confucius firmly loved and believed in rationality. He wanted 
to arouse the rationality of the masses and to realize ‘a perfectly rationalized society.’” The 
sharp boundary Liang Shuming drew between “rational” Confucianism and “superstitious” 
religion was premised on modern distinctions between the secular and religious domains. 
Notably, though Liang was aware of the modern (western) origins of “religion” and 
“morality”, he found it unproblematic to apply them in his analysis of Chinese historical 
development. Liang’s understanding shows that by the early Republican period  “religion” 
was accepted as a universal reality by Chinese elites and an integral concept by which 
Confucianism had to define itself against to become modern.  
  By 1917, the Confucian Association was fighting a losing battle to make 
Confucianism the state-religion as the New Cultural Movement gained ground. Discursively, 
the argument of Kang Youwei and Chen Huanzhang that Confucianism was a “special 
religion” became less credible as scientism became entrenched in the mindset of Chinese 
intellectuals and nurtured an anti-religious attitude in them. It was against this background 
that the state-religion proposal was rejected again by the parliament on 14 May 1917. In 
addition, the clause “Confucius principles shall be the basis for citizenry education” in Article 
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XIX of the “Temple of Heaven” Draft Constitution was repealed. This was the last time the 
state-religion question was raised in the parliament and the movement officially failed. 
106
 
Furthermore, the abortive attempt of Kang Youwei and General Zhang Xun 张勋 (1854-1923) 
to restore the abdicated emperor Puyi溥仪 (1906-1967) back to the throne on 1 July 1917 
totally discredited the Confucian Association and the whole Kongjiao movement. After the 
disastrous failure, Kang Youwei resigned as the president of the Confucian Association, and 
he lived in retreat in Tianjin and never participated in politics again. Chen Huanzhang took 
over the presidency of the Confucian Association thereafter.  
 
The defeat of the state religion did not mean the end of the whole Kongjiao movement. 
Indeed, as Li Shipin wrote to Yanfu after the state-religion proposal was voted down in the 
parliament, “Not making Kongjiao the state religion is not the same as denying the status of 
religion”107  Under the leadership of Chen Huanzhang, the Confucian Association continued 
its effort to establish the Confucian Religion. In the propagation of Kongjiao, the Confucian 
Association founded a new newspaper in 1917, the World Ordering Paper (Jingshi bao经世
报) to replace the Confucian Association Magazine.  The newspaper basically served similar 
functions as its predecessor, and in term of emphasis, the World Ordering Paper stressed 
more on rejuvenating Confucian learning and applying the principles in the classics to 
improve customs and order society. In addition, the Confucian Association concentrated its 
effort in building a Kongjiao University and a Main Association Church (Kongjiao zonghui 
tang 孔教总会堂) in Beijing. After years soliciting funds for the project, the Kongjiao 
University was finally inaugurated in 1923 on Confucius’ Birthday. The university 
emphasized the study of classics and implemented sacrifices to Confucius and other 
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Confucian  rituals. The university, Chen  clearly  pointed out, was  built  to counter  the social 
influence of Christianity and to preserve Kongjiao in a hostile republican context:
108
 The 
Main Association Church was also constructed with the same objective of rejuvenating 
Kongjiao. Chen complained that while Muslim mosques, Daoist monasteries, Buddhist 
temples and Christian churches were widespread in China, Confucian temples and Academies 
were scanty and many of which were in a ruined state. To reverse the fortune of Kongjiao, he 
reasons, “more Confucian churches must be built, the Main Association Church will be the 
beginning and we should never lag behind the other religions.”109  
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Figure 10. Illustration of the Kongjiao main association church 








Despite the efforts of the Confucian Association in reinventing and instituting 
Confucianism as a modern religion, the project ultimately failed. This was so because of 
several reasons. First, the Confucian Association wanted to construct a hierarchical church-
like institution for Kongjiao according to the Christian model. Organizationally, however, the 
Confucian Association was weak and decentralized, and coordinated efforts between the main 
association and other branches difficult. Second, the Confucian Association could be 
categorized more as a study association than a religious institution as its main activity was on 
reading and lecturing of traditional classics. Third, the scholar-gentry class made up the bulk 
of the associations’ member and unlike Christian missionaries, they lacked missionary zeal in 
proselytizing the religion. Furthermore, Kongjiao did not address and serve the religious 
Figure 11. Chen Huanzhang and leaders of the Confucian Association at the construction 
site of the main association church in 1922. The church was planned to be constructed next 
to the Kongjiao University in Beijing. The church was conceived as the beacon of 
Confucianism against the tide of the anti-Confucian New Cultural movement. However, it 
was never completed because of financial difficulties.  




needs of the Chinese masses and was not popular in the way the leaders of the Confucian 
Association intended.
110
  The Kongjiao movement in China officially ended in 1930 when 
Chen Huanzhang moved to Hong Kong and established the Confucian Academy (Kongjiao 
xueyuan孔教学院), which continued his vision of making Confucianism a “religion” and a 
state-religion till the present day.
111
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        Chapter Three 
         Redemptive Societies, Popular Confucianism and Confucian 




t a time the Kongjiao activists were campaigning for Confucianism as the state-
religion, a huge wave of religious movements emerged advocating moral 
cultivation and transformation of the world. These religious societies dominated 
the religious and cultural scene of republican China until their suppression by the Nanjing 
KMT government and the successive communist regime. Before recently, these religious 
societies were labeled negatively as seditious “secret religion” (mimi zongjiao秘密宗教) or 
“counter-revolutionary sects and societies” (fandong huidaomen 反动会道门) and largely 
ignored in scholarship.
1
 Scholars began to take interest of these republican era religious 
societies and called them “redemptive societies.” The Wanguo daodehui founded in 1921 was 
one redemptive society in the republican era. The Daodehui saw Confucianism as its tradition 
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and actively promoted Confucian morality as the means for individual and world salvation. 
After the failure of the Confucian Association, the Daodehui and other Confucian redemptive 
societies became the main current in the revitalization of Confucianism in modern China. The 
first part of the chapter will examine how Confucian redemptive societies such as the 
Daodehui evolved from the late imperial historical trajectory of “popular Confucianism” 
(minjian rujiao民间儒教). In the rest of the chapter, we will focus our discussion on how the 
Daodehui under Jiang Xizhang and Wang Fengyi reinvented the Confucian tradition into a 
universal salvationist faith.  
 
REDEMPTIVE SOCIETIES AND POPULAR CONFUCIANISM 
The term “redemptive societies” is coined by Prasenjit Duara to refer to the new religious 
groups that arose in the turbulent early Republican era of 1910s and early 1920s.  These 
religious groups were redemptive in the sense that they all advocated the salvation of 
individuals and the world as their main goal. In contrast to their late imperial counterparts 
which were proscribed by the state as “heterodox teachings” (xiejiao邪教) or “White Lotus 
Society” (bailian jiao白莲教),2 redemptive societies enjoyed legal status in the new Republic 
under the freedom of religion and association. They registered and operated openly as 
religious, philosophical, educational or philanthropic associations. Many of the redemptive 
societies were national organizations with head office and branches and were mostly 
concentrated in the urban centers. The prominent redemptive societies in the Republican 
period were the Tongshanshe 同善社(Fellowship of Goodness), Daode xuehui  道德学会
(Moral Studies Society), Daoyuan 道院  (School of Dao) and its charity arm, the Shijie 
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hongwanzi hui 世界红卍字会(World Red Swastika Society), Wanguo daodehui, Wushanshe 
悟善社 (Society of the Awakened Goodness), Yiguandao 一贯道(Way of Pervading Unity), 
Zhongguo sanshengdao zonghui 中国三圣道总会(China’s Main Association of the Three 
Sages Teachings) or Xiantiandao 先天道 (Way of Former Heaven) and Zalijiao 在理教 
(Teaching of Abiding Principle). These large redemptive societies dominated the religious 
landscape in the Republican period, and some of them even spread overseas to Chinese 
diasporic communities and developed transnational religious networks.
3
 According to 
contemporary observers, the redemptive societies were a notable and large-scale social 
phenomenon, in contrast and opposition to the anti-religion New Cultural Movement of the 
1910s and 20s.
4
 These societies commanded a large following, which was estimated to be in 
the tens of millions. According to the 1949 estimation of the Public Security Bureau, 
“counter-revolutionary sects and societies” had a membership of 13 million or about 2.9 
percent of the total population.
5
  
 Republican redemptive societies shared some or all of the following characteristics. 
First, these organizations were salvationist in character. Second, they advocated a set of 
syncretic doctrine and ritual practices. Redemptive societies revered the founders and 
teachings of the five major world religions (Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, Christianity 
and Islam; Judaism was added in some groups) in their effort to unite all religions for the 
salvation of individuals and the world. In some redemptive societies evolutionary theories and 
pseudo-scientific spiritualism (lingxue 灵学) were incorporated into their cosmology and 
                                                          
3The expansion of Chinese commerce and migration networks in the 19th century facilitated the movement of 
religious groups overseas. For instance, the Way of the Former Heaven, a prominent religious group in southeast 
China, expanded its religious network to Hong Kong and Southeast Asia through the migration of Cantonese. See  
Marjorie Topley “The Great Way of Former Heaven: A Group of Chinese Secret Religious Sects,” Jean 
DeBernardi ed. Cantonese Society in Hong Kong and Singapore: Gender, Religion, Medicine and Money (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011)  
4 Frank Rawlinson and Paul de Witt Twinem, “Modern Syncretic Religious Societies I and II” in The Journal of 
Religion, Vol.5, No.5 (Sept.1925) and No.6 (Nov.1925).  
5 Tan Songlin 譚松林 ed. Zhongguo mimi shehui: dangdai huidaomen, dangdai heishehui中国秘密社会: 当代会
道门,当代黑社会(Secret Societies in China Vol.7 Contemporary Religious Sects and Clandestine Organization) 
(Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin chubanshe, 2002), p. 28 






  Third, redemptive societies saw the world as in a state of moral degeneration and 
some of them propagated a millenarian doctrine of the Three Kalpas (sanqi mojie三期末劫). 
They believed that moral rectification (zhengxin，xixin 正心，洗心), charitable actions, 
vegetarianism, and the practice of bodily techniques such as sitting meditation (zuogong坐功) 
and breathing techniques (qigong 气功) were crucial salvational methods for surviving the 
impending human and natural catastrophes. In line with their self-cultivation (xiushen修身) 
programme and salvationist message, redemptive societies ran a myriad of social and 
philanthropic projects such as hospitals, schools, orphanages, disaster relief, old folks home, 
factories and farms for the poor, drug rehabilitation programmes, and funeral service for the 
destitute.  Fourth, redemptive societies were evangelical in propagating their faith. They 
organized public lectures and operated presses which printed large quantities of morality 
books (shanshu善书) and scriptures, usually derived from planchette (fuluan扶鸾) and spirit 
writing séances (fuji 扶乩 ) to spread their salvationist message to the public. Fifth, 
redemptive societies were established by literate charismatic leaders or members of the 
scholar-gentry and merchant groups. Some societies were made up predominately of the 
powerful and wealthy, others were mixed socio-economically in their membership and 
comprised of prominent political and military figures to groups at the middle and lower social 
hierarchy, such as teachers, clerks, workers, farmers, craftsmen, street peddlers, hooligans and 
paupers. Female members formed a sizable portion in many of these redemptive societies.
7
 
Sixth, redemptive societies often espoused a politically and culturally conservative stand and 
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they often saw themselves as guardians of traditional Chinese culture and social-ethical order 
(lunli伦理) against the total Westernization of Chinese society.  
 Duara perceived the redemptive societies as a novel phenomenon of republican China, 
and at the same time traced its evolution from the older late imperial sectarian tradition. He 
highlights that:  
These societies have to be understood in terms of the complex interplay between the 
particular historical tradition of their derivation and the contemporary context of 1910s. 
These societies clearly emerged out of the Chinese historical tradition of sectarianism and 
syncretism. While some of were closely associated with the sectarian tradition and 
involved the worship of Buddhist and folk deities like the Eternal Mother, they also 
represented the late imperial syncretic tradition (sanjiao heyi) that combined the three 
religions of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism into a single universal faith. Late 
imperial syncretism, which urged the extinguishing of worldly desires and engagement of 
moral action, gained popularity among the Confucian gentry and the Buddhist and Daoist 
laity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The modern redemptive societies 
inherited the mission of universalism and moral self-transformation from this syncretism. 
At the same time these societies also retained the association of the older syncretic 
societies with sectarian traditions, popular gods, and practices such as divination, 
planchette, and spirit writing. In this way they continued to remain organically connected 
to Chinese popular society. 
8
  
Indeed, for some redemptive societies, scholars have traced their genealogies to 
sectarian groups in the late Ming and Qing. Shiga Ichiko, for instance, traced the history of 
late Qing and Republican Xiantiandao to the Green Lotus Sect (Qinglian jiao 青莲教), a 
millenarian “White Lotus sect” proscribed in mid-Qing. In fact, she pointed out that late Qing 
and Republican redemptive societies such as the Tongshanshe, Guigen-men归根门(Return to 
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the Root school) and Pudu-men 普渡门(Universal Salvation School) were developed from the 
fragmentation of the Green Lotus sect following its suppression after the White Lotus 
Rebellion (1794-1804).
9
  While some redemptive societies traced their history to the older 
sectarian tradition, others were founded in the unique context in the early years of the 
twentieth century. The contemporary circumstances of the 1910s had provided the favorable 
ecology for the explosive growth of these religious societies.  
The chaotic political situation marked by weak central authority and internal and 
external internecine warfare created the fertile condition for preaching salvationist faith. In 
contrast to the Qing state, the republican state was uninterested in the regulation of religion. 
Moreover, religious groups were protected under the freedom of religion guaranteed by the 
new constitution. The intensification of China’s connection with the world also helped to 
produce an internationalist orientation in the mission of these societies. Redemptive societies 
often developed a civilizational discourse in which Western civilization was condemned as 
overtly materialistic and destructive in nature and would cause the stagnation of human 
civilizational development or even doom the human race with massive global violence such 
as the First World War. Redemptive societies preached the regeneration of the world by 




Adding to Duara’s point on the popular sectarian root of redemptive societies, the 
evolution of these religious groups exemplified, as compared to state Confucianism, another 
less studied historical trajectory of Confucianism, which is that of “popular Confucianism.”  
The notion of popular Confucianism posits the development of the tradition within the realm 
of eclectic popular culture. In the milieu of popular culture, diverse symbols, ideas and 
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practices are freely shared and appropriated by various social communities or actors 
according to their own needs and purposes.
11
 Therefore, popular culture is not culture of the 
lower classes, as opposed to elite culture, it is a dynamic cultural space in which different 
cultures interacted and interpenetrated within a set of shared cosmological belief system. 
Powerful actors such as the imperial state could shape popular culture in a couple of ways but 
by no means dominate it.
12
  Within Chinese sectarian tradition, popular religious communities 
appropriated Confucianism as well as the other two teachings and combined them into a 
syncretic faith. 
 In this sense, “popular Confucianism” can mean broadly popular interpretation and 
practice of Confucian ideas and practices. It can also refer more specifically to popular 
religious organizations which assert a strong Confucian identity and sense of purpose, and 
maintain Confucianism as their tradition (yiru weizong以儒为宗) while espousing a set of 
syncretic ideology and ritual practices. Philip Clart argued that the term “popular 
Confucianism” must be self-referential and not a label imposed by scholars. In his study of 
Taiwanese phoenix halls (luantang 孪堂), Clart has demonstrated that popular religious 
groups like “the Sacred Religion of Ru Ancestry” (Ruzong shenjiao 儒宗神教) designated 
themselves as “Ru”, as inheritors of “the tradition of the Confucian Way” (daotong道统), 
and perceived the promotion of Confucian goals of “sageliness within and kingliness without” 
                                                          
11 Appropriation” as a concept was conceived by Roger Chartier to explain how popular culture in early modern 
France were created by different interpretations and utilization of a same set ideas or practices by different social 
groups. See Roger Chartier, The Cultural Uses of Print in Early Modern France (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), pp. 6-7  
12 See James Watson, “Standardizing the Gods:  the Promotion of T’ien Hou (Empress of Heaven) along the South 
China Coast, 960-1960” in David Johnson, Andrew Nathan, Evelyn Rawski, eds. Popular Culture in Late Imperial 
China (Berkeley:  University of California, 1985); Michael Szonyi argued that standardization was illusory in 
some cases as the local elites might not follow the regulations of the state. In addition, local elites might follow 
state regulations on the surface but still carried on their own ritual performances, thus resulting in pseudo 
standardization. See his “The Illusions of Standardization: The Cult of the Five Emperors in Late Imperial China,” 
The Journal of Asiatic Studies Vol.56 No1 (Feb.1997), pp. 113-135; and “Making Claims about Standardization 
and Orthopraxy in Late Imperial China: Rituals and Cults in the Fuzhou Region in Light of Watson’s Theories,” 
Modern China, Vol.33 No.1 (2007), pp. 47-71  




(neisheng waiwang内圣外王) as their religious mission. 13 In one phoenix hall religious text, 
“‘sagelines within’ consists in overcoming oneself…One only needs to remove selfish desires 
and innate knowledge (liangzhi 良知) will appear by itself. This is what is called ‘fulfilling 
one’s nature’ (jinxing 尽性)” and “‘kingliness without’ consists in saving the world and 
sacrificing one’s own advantage to help others.”14Concurring with Philip Clart,” Taiwanese 
scholar Zhong Yunluan demonstrated further in her study of “popular Confucianism” in late 
Qing and Republican China that Confucianism was “religionized” (zongjiao-hua宗教化) at 
the popular level. Confucius was apotheosized in the religious worldview of these popular 
Confucian societies and the Confucian Four Books were perceived as sacred texts crucial for 
religious cultivation (xiudao 修道 ). Qing and Republican popular Confucian groups 
interpreted and absorbed Confucian concepts such as nature (xing性), principle (li理) and 
cosmic ether (qi 气 ) religiously (yijiao dujing 以教读经 ) and defined salvation in the 
Confucian concepts of self-cultivation (xiushen修身) and the ordering of the society and the 
world (zhiguo, pingtianxia治国平天下) as envisioned in the Great Learning(daxue大学).15  
A number of redemptive societies can be called, in Philip Clart’s definition, “popular 
Confucianism” as they all identified with the Confucian tradition. The most prominent ones 
were the Daode Xuehui established by Duan Zhengyuan 段正元 (1864-1939) 16 , the 
Tonshangshe by Peng Tairong彭太荣(1873-1950)17, the Daoyuan by Wu Fusen吴福森 and 
                                                          
13 Philip Clart, “Confucius and the Mediums: Is There a ‘Popular Confucianism’?” T’oung Pao Second Series 
Vol.38 (2003), pp. 1-38 
14 Ibid, p. 34  
15 Zhong Yunluan 钟云鸾, Qingmo minchu minjian Rujiao dui zhuliu Ruxue de xishou yu zhuanhua 清末民初民间
儒教对主流儒学的吸收与转化(The Absorption and Transformation of Mainstream Confucian Learning by  
Popular Confucianism in Late Qing and Early Republican China) (Taibei: Taida chubanzhongxin, 2008)  
16 Fan Chunwu, “Confucian ‘Religion’ in the Early Republican period: Historical Questions Concerning Duan 
Zhengyuan and the Morality Society” in Chinese Studies in History, Vol.44, No.1-2 (Winter 2010/2011). pp. 135-
155 
17  Wang Jianchuan, “An Exploration of the Early History of Tongshanshe (1917-1945),” Chinese Studies in 
History Vol.44, No.1-2 (Winter 2010/2011). pp. 121-131  




Liu Shaoji刘绍基18, the Yiguandao by Wang Jueyi 王觉一 (1821-1884)19 and the Daodehui 
by Jiang Xizhang江希张 (1907-2004) and Wang Fengyi 王凤仪(1864-1937) (which will be 
discussed in greater details later) These societies saw Confucianism as the core of their faith 
and the promotion of morality (daode道德) as the panacea for individual and social ills. The 
Tongshanshe, for instance, declared that it was primarily a Confucian organization (yi rujia 
weizhu 以儒家为主 ) and actively promoted national studies (guoxue 国学 ) for the 
revitalization of Confucian learning in the republican era. Similarly, Duan Zhenyuan of 
Daode Xuehui proclaimed that “all teachings belong to the Confucian school” (wanjiao 
guirumen 万教归儒门) and “to realize the true learning that promote morality, humaneness 
and righteousness, that safeguard the nature and destiny (xingming性命) of all human beings, 
and the cultivation of the self, ordering of the family and pacification of the world; making 
our main aim the removal of the divisions of race and nation for the creation of a world 
republic, the Great Harmonious Unity (datong tongyi大同统一)”20  
The origins of “popular Confucianism” and the “religionization” of the Confucian 
tradition could be traced to the rise of syncretism in late Yuan and early Ming dynasty. The 
Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 (1328-1398) pronounced officially that “there are no 
two ways under heaven” and the unity of the Three Teachings (sanjiao heyi三教合一).21 The 
syncretic movement in the Ming, however, was more than an official policy, it was a broad 
trend that cut across social and religious boundaries. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
practitioners of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism cultivated all Three Teachings (sanjiao 
                                                          
18  Thomas David Dubois, “The Salvation of Religion? Public Charity and the New Religions of the Early 
Republic” Minsu quyi, No.172 (June 2011) 
19  Song Guangyu, “The Heavenly Way Transmit the Light: Yiguandao and Contemporary Society” Chinese 
Studies in History, Vol.44, No.1-2 (Winter 2010/2011),  pp. 76-90  
20  Shao Yong 邵雍 , Zhongguo huidaomen 中国会道门(Societies and Religious Sects in China) (Shanghai: 
Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), p. 167 
21 For syncretic thinking in Zhu Yuanzhang see John D. Langlois Jr. and Sun K’o-K’uan, “Three Teachings 
Syncretism and the Thought of Ming Tai-tsu,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies Vol.43 No.1 (Jun.1983), pp. 97-
139 




jianxiu 三教兼修 ) with little regards for doctrinal boundaries. Within Confucianism, a 
popular syncretic movement developed during the Ming dynasty under the influence of Wang 
Yangming, seeking to absorb the other two teachings into the Confucian tradition and 
popularize the faith.
 22
  Using the metaphor of a single family divided into separate 
households after many generations, Wang maintained that the Three Teachings were of the 
same origin (sanjiao tongyuan三教同元) and they merely represented different paths to the 
same end, that is to cultivate the moral “innate knowledge of goodness” (liangzhi 良知) in 
individuals and to remove evil in the world.
23
 Wang’s populist belief in the common moral 
nature of all humans, hence the ability of even “ignorant men and women” (yufu yufu愚夫愚
妇) to attain sagehood, produced a strong commitment in him and his followers to popularize 
Confucianism. Among Wang’s followers, Wang Gen 王艮 (1483?-1540) a petty merchant 
and the founder of the leftist Taizhou school, was most prominent in popularizing 
Confucianism. Wang composed popular songs and conducted didactic lectures in market 
places which drew hundreds and even thousands of people. In his proselytization of 
Confucianism, Wang also emphasized that the Confucian Way must be accessible to the 
commoners and be responsive to their daily needs (baixing riyong百姓日用).24  
What Ming Confucians wanted was to make Confucianism a living tradition, as part 
of the everyday spiritual-moral cultivation of the masses and to bring about the salvation or 
                                                          
22 Kandice Hauf, “‘Goodness Unbound’: Wang Yangming and the Redrawing of the Boundary of Confucianism,” 
Chow Kai-wing, Ng On-cho and John B. Henderson eds. Imagining Boundaries: Changing Confucian Doctrines, 
Texts, and Hermeneutics (New York: State University of  New York Press, 2000)  
23 Cited by Ngoi Guat Peng, “From ‘Innate Knowledge of Goodness' to 'Confucian Regulation’: Evolution of 
'Three Teachings in One Discourse' among Yangming scholars", History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol.4 (December 
2008), p. 97. When asked about the similarities and differences between the three teachings, Wang replied:  
The Great Way is nameless, if to say that there were divergent ways, it is narrowing of the Way…Just like a hall, it 
was originally one room; as later descendants lived apart, the room was partitioned into center chamber and side 
compartments, and as the family grew further, hedges were installed, but (the descendants) could still associate and 
assist one another. As time passes, there were quarrels, and even conflicts among one another. Originally they 
were one family, removing the hedges, they are still one family. The separation of the three teachings is likewise; 
in the beginning each mastered fragments of the Way based on their similarity in substance (资质 zizhi), and they 
loss their similarity in essence (本之同 ben zhi tong) as their teachings were further transmitted for four or five 
generations. 
24 De Bary, “Individual and Humanitarianism” in Self and Society in Ming Thought edited by Wm. Theodore de 
Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 157-178 




ordering of the world. This was in fact the main objective of the Learning of the Heart-
Mind/Dao (xinxue/daoxue心学/道学) or what is commonly referred to as Neo-Confucianism 
in Western scholarship.
25
 Against earlier scholarship that perceived Neo-Confucianism as the 
ideological support of the increasingly autocratic imperial state, Peter Bol has demonstrated 
convincingly that Neo-Confucianism arose in late Tang and Song dynasties as an independent 
philosophical and local movement seeking to revive and restore Confucian teachings from 
later corruption, and to realize its moral ideals in the world. In the reformation of 
Confucianism, the Song Neo-Confucian masters replaced the Five Classics (Book of Change, 
Record of Rites, Book of Documents, Book of Odes, and the Spring and Autumn Annals) with 
the Four Books (the Analects, Mencius, the Great Learning and the Doctrine of Mean) as the 
authoritative texts of Confucianism. The Four Books were chosen because they are focus on 
matters pertaining to moral learning of individuals and the extension of moral consciousness 
and action to the progress of the world, in other words, the ideal of “sageliness within and 
kingliness without.”  
From its inception in the Song dynasty, Neo-Confucianism promoted the self-
cultivation of the moral nature of individuals and social voluntarism among the literati for the 
moral and material betterment of local society in late imperial times.
26
 In addition, as Joseph 
Esherick, Mary Backus Rankin and others have pointed out, literati-gentry became involved 
in social projects to establish their leadership status and dominance in local society.
27
  Thus 
instead of serving the autocratic state, Neo-Confucianism often provided the moral 
                                                          
25  De Bary explained that what the West termed as Neo-Confucianism referred to two separate intellectual 
movements, the Learning of the Way and the Learning of Mind-heart in the Song and Ming dynasties. He argued 
that both could be called Learning of the Mind-Heart as they were concerned with the moral cultivation of 
individuals through rectification of the human mind-heart, though with different emphases on the methods. See De 
Bary, Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of Mind-and-Heart . 
26 The community compact and granary were two important state-independent institutions invented by Song Neo-
Confucians to promote moral order in local society. See Wm Theodore de Bary, “The Community Compact” in de 
Bary ed. Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 58-60; Richard von Glahn, “Chu Hsi Community Granary in Theory and 
Practice” in Robert Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer eds. Ordering the World: Approaches to State and Society in 
Sung Dynasty China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 221-254 
27 See Joseph Esherick and Mary Backus Rankin, Chinese Local Elites and Pattern of Dominance (Berkeley, C.A: 
University of California Press, 1990) 




justification from which the imperial government was criticized and served as the impetus for 
literati social actions in late imperial times. The teachings of Zhu Xi 朱熹(1130-1200) and 
Wang Yangming were proscribed as heretical during their times and were later incorporated 
by the imperial state as the state orthodoxy.
28
 The conventional statist perspective painted a 
picture of a static and rigid Neo-Confucian tradition, an oppressive and conservative 
“intellectual strait-jacket” 29 imposed by the state. By moving away from the top-down statist 
perspective and looking at the Neo-Confucian movement as a local spiritual-religious and 
social reform movement, we will be able to appreciate the rich and complex development of 
the tradition at the popular level in late imperial China.  
The syncretic cultural environment of the Ming was crucial for the popularization of 
Neo-Confucianism and the development of “popular Confucianism.” The most important 
popular Confucian religious sect in mid and late Ming was the Three-in-One teaching 
(Sanyijiao 三一教 ) established by Lin Zhaoen 林兆恩  (1517-1598). The Three-in-One 
teaching was distinguishable from other Buddhist and Daoist syncretic sects in its emphasis 
on the primacy of the Confucian tradition while absorbing the ideas and practices of the other 
two traditions in his creation of a syncretic religion.
30
  Lin came from an official and wealthy 
family in Putian, Fujian. Between 1546-47, Lin met Luo Hongxian 罗洪先(1504-1564), a 
student of Wang Yangming, and became convinced of the importance of cultivating the mind-
heart as opposed to book learning. He left the Confucian academy and gave up on the civil 
service examination entirely for the goal of sagehood. At this point in time, he also met a 
Daoist priest, Zhuo Wanchun卓万春 and a mysterious Master who taught him Daoist internal 
                                                          
28 James T.C Liu, “How did a Neo-Confucian School become the State Orthodoxy?” in Philosophy East and West , 
Vol.23,  No.4 (October 1973), pp. 483-505  
29 J.K. Fairbank, E. Reischauer, and A. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1973), p. 151 
30 Lin Zhaoen perceived the syncretization of the three teachings as the return to Confucianism: “(In the ancient 
time of the three dynasties) No one spoke of “My Confucianism,” “My Daoism,” or “My Buddhism.” (Viewing 
things) in this way, the Daoists (can) return Confucianism, the Buddhists (can) return to Confucianism. In this way 
the expression “the three teachings” in reality is but the one teaching of Confucianism.” Kenneth Dean, Lord of the 
Three in One: Spread of a Cult in Southeast China (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 108 




alchemy methods (neidan内丹) and the Confucian inner alchemical “Heart Method”, which 
was most likely derived from a syncretic mix of Confucian ideas and Daoist bodily 
techniques. Around this time, he devoted his whole attention on synthesizing the three 
traditions into one teaching and started preaching as a religious teacher in Putian in 1551.
 31
 
Buddhist and Daoist ideas and practices were incorporated by Lin Zhao-en into his Confucian 
program of moral self-cultivation and social harmony.  
 Lin utilized Buddhist meditation and Daoist inner alchemy method, what he termed 
as other-worldly techniques (chushi fa出世法), for individuals to cultivate their mind-hearts 
and to attain sagehood. Moreover, Buddhist ideas of karmic retribution and Buddha nature in 
all sentient beings provided the cosmological or philosophical basis for Lin to preach good 
moral behaviors among the masses. The development of the Three-in-One movement locally 
was rapid during the Ming-Qing transition (1570-1670) through the efforts of Lin Zhaoen and 
his disciples. Numerous Three-in-One temples were built during this period by Lin and his 
followers and they surpassed even the lineages as the dominant local organization. This was 
also the period in which state apparatuses in local society collapsed and Putian was devastated 
by pirate attacks, warfare and epidemic outbreaks. The Three-in-One teaching enjoyed 
popular support from the people in Putian during this period as the religion filled the power 
vacuum left by the imperial state and got involved in providing protection and social welfare 
for the people.
32
 Moreover, their syncretic religious messages and techniques were appealing 
to the masses whose culture was a blend of Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism and local 
tradition.  
                                                          
31 See Dean, Lord of the Three in One, especially Chapter 2 for the biography and hagiography of Lin Zhao-en.  
32 Ibid., p. 20 




Towards the end of the Ming dynasty, there was a strong backlash against the 
syncretism of the earlier period.
33
 The fall of the Ming dynasty was blamed on moral collapse 
caused by Wang Yangming and his followers who corrupted the Confucian orthodoxy with 
heterodox Buddhism and Daoism, and also because of their emphasis on empty speculation 
rather than practical statecraft. Confucian thought from the eighteenth to the nineteenth 
century was driven by powerful currents of purism, ritualism and classicism. Qing scholars 
engaged in evidential learning on the classics to recover “pure” Confucian teachings from the 
centuries of heterodox corruptions by Song and Ming Neo-Confucians. Qing Confucians also 
turned their backs on the populism of Ming Neo-Confucians who believed optimistically in 
the innate ability of all human beings to realize the moral goodness within themselves. In 
place of didactic proselytism, Qing literati emphasized on rites as a means to cultivate virtues, 
to modify improper behaviors and promote social order and harmony.
34
  
 Officially, the Qing state was adverse to syncretism and tried to keep the Three 
Teachings compartmentalized. Emperor Yongzheng declares “Within our region there are the 
Three Teachings, namely Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. The foundation of 
Confucianism is the sages’ (way) in helping the masses establish their destinies. Moreover, 
the concepts of ‘illuminating the mind-heart and revealing the nature’ in Buddhism and 
‘cultivating the breath and focusing the mind’ in Daoism are not contradictory to the 
Confucian principle of ‘preserving the mind-heart and cultivating the breath’. Furthermore, all 
religions admonish the people to do good and caution them against committing evil, which 
could supplement governance.”35 Clearly, while the outlook of Emperor Yongzheng was not 
anti-syncretic, he saw the Three Teachings as distinct traditions. He perceived the Three 
                                                          
33 See Judith A. Berling, “When They Go their Separate Ways: The Collapse of the Unitary Vision of Chinese 
Religion in Early Ch’ing” in Irene Bloom and Joshua A. Fogel eds. Meeting of Minds: Interaction in East Asian 
Traditions and Thoughts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 209-237 
34 For the turn towards ritualism and evidential learning in the Qing dynasty, see Chow Kai-wing, The Rise of 
Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China: Ethics, Classics and Lineage Discourse (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford 
University Press, 1994) and Benjamin Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of 
Change in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984) 
35
Liu Jinzao 刘锦藻,Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao 清朝续文献通考(General Survey of Literary Sources of the 
Qing Dynasty) Vol. 89, p. 8493 




Teachings as similar only in their function, as a technique (shu术) for the ruler to maintain 
socio-political order.  
The state and literati anti-syncretic attitude, however, did not mean the waning of late 
imperial syncretism. To the chagrin of the state and purist scholar-officials, syncretism 
remained a strong feature in the worldview and religious practices of the illiterate and semi-
literate masses, as well as popular sectarianism. Huang Yupian黄育楩, a zealous magistrate 
collected a considerable number of sectarian religious writings or precious scrolls (baojuan宝
卷) and wrote the A Detailed Refutation of Heresy (Poxie Xiangbian 破邪详辩) in 1834 to 
warn people against the danger of heterodoxy. He criticized the blurring of the lines between 
the Three Teachings, and how they were heretically combined with the Eternal Mother 
millenarianism in sectarian literature to incite uprising. 
36
 Many sectarian societies in the 
Ming and early Qing survived and spawned more groups, ironically, often as a result of 
government persecutions which caused sects to splinter, in the late Qing and the early 
Republican period.
37
    
Literati participation in syncretic popular religious movement as witnessed during the 
Ming dynasty was resumed after the abolishment of Confucianism as the state orthodoxy and 
the fall of the imperial state in the early years of the twentieth century. The momentous 
collapse of the imperial system, the end of the civil service examination and traditional 
academies in early twentieth century had left millions of classically-educated literati without 
an institutional basis to express their identity or fulfill their ideals. Like the Confucian 
                                                          
36 For the content of late imperial sectarian precious scrolls, see Daniel Overmyer, “Values in Chinese Sectarian 
Literature: Ming and Ch’ing Pao-chūan” in Johnson, Nathan and Rawski eds. Popular Culture in Late Imperial 
China and his Precious Scrolls: An Introduction to Chinese Sectarian Scriptures from the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999)  
37 For the history of late imperial sectarian groups, see Susan Naquin, Millenarian Uprising in China: The Eight 
Trigram Rebellion of 1813 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), Shantung Rebellion: The Wang Lun 
Uprising of 1774 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), “The Transmission of White Lotus Sectarianism in 
Late Imperial China” in Johnson, Nathan and Rawski eds. Popular Culture in Late Imperial; Daniel Overmyer, 
Folk Buddhist Religion; Dissenting Sects in Late Traditional China. Cambridge; Harvard University Press 1976); 
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Association, redemptive societies provided the outlets for traditional literati to express their 
identity as Confucians and to revive the sage’s teaching for a new age. Furthermore, official 
proscription against heterodoxy ended as the new republican state defined itself not as the 
custodian of orthodoxy but an agent of modernization. This provided the fertile environment 
for religious interactions and experimentation, and with this background we will discuss the 
founding of the Wanguo Daodehui.  
 
RELIGIONIZING AND UNIVERSALIZING CONFUCIANISM: THE FOUNDING AND 
BELIEFS OF WANGUO DAODEHUI, 1921-1928 
The Wanguo daodehui was officially established on 28
th
 August 1921, the birthday of 
Confucius, at Taian County, Shandong by Jiang Shoufeng江寿峰(1875-1926) and his young 
prodigious son, Jiang Xizhang. New-born Kong Decheng孔德成 (1920-2008), the seventy-
seventh generation descendent of Confucius, was made the president, and Kang Youwei 
(Kang took over the presidency  in 1923 as Kong Decheng was too young to head the society) 
and American missionary Gilbert Reid were appointed as vice-presidents. Its honorary 
presidents included illustrious figures such as the military commander and governor of Shanxi, 
Yan Xishan 阎锡山  (1883-1860) and ex-prime minister of the Beiyang regime, Wang 
Shizhen王士珍 (1860-1931). Jiang Shoufeng was appointed as the general manager of the 
society. 
38
 The Daodehui was established with the mission of “promoting morality and 
progress to the Great Commonwealth; to save and rectify the mind-heart of human beings, 
and to avert the disastrous fate (of the human race).
39
  
                                                          
38 Wanguo daode zonghui gaikuang 1921-1980  万国道德总会概况 1921-1980 (Overview of the Head Office of 
the Worldwide Ethical 1921-1980) (Taibei: Daodehui Press, 1980), p. 16  
39 This mission statement was part of the charter the Rehe (Jehol) branch of the society submitted to the authority 
in 1923. Cited from Lei Hui 雷辉, Wanguo Daodehui de lishi kaocha 万国道德会的历史考察(Historical Survey 
of the Worldwide Ethical Society) MA Dissertation Shandong Normal University, 2008. 




The establishment of Daodehui was conceived much earlier in 1915, when the New 
Cultural Movement and the First World War were in full swing, by the then 9 years old Jiang 
Xizhang in his On Ending War (xizhan lun 息战论).  The child prodigy was moved to 
compose the writing because he was saddened by the anti-religious fervent of the New 
Cultural Movement and the carnage of the European war. He wished to enlighten people on 
the truth of religion and to end the bloodshed. He believed that the disaster was caused by the 
triumph of Western materialism and the decline of religion in the world: “Since the advance 
of material science, the authority of religion has been declining; as technology progresses day 
by day, so does the destruction of war.” Jiang believed that war was rampant in the modern 
age because “the more civilized the world is the higher is the material standard of human 
beings; man becomes more extravagant, insatiable, and attracted to new and interesting items; 
(they) compete to brandish themselves, competing to look good on the superficial. As the 
competition for material goods becomes harder, the more humans wanted to compete for 
them. Competitions led to wars, and wars resulted in wanton killings. To the point where 
people kill because they could without any sense of compassion, and humanity is facing the 
threat of extinction.”40 He also condemned the imperialism of stronger states which used their 
military might to subjugate the weaker states for their own selfish ambitions. Jiang argued 
that the only way for the world to stop bloodshed and avert the impending extinction of 
humans was to promote religion. “Religion doesn’t speak of power; it is focused on ending 
strife and killing….Eliminating competition and stopping slaughters; calming the (vicious) 
spirit of the people and admonishing their hearts; the Great Unity in Confucianism, the Three 
Purities (sanqing 三清) in Daoism, the Sukhavati (jile 极乐) in Buddhism, the Heavenly 
Kingdom (tianguo天国) in Christianity and  the Abadan (changchun长存) in Islam would all 
                                                          
40  Jiang Xizhang, Shishu baihua jieshuo 四 书白话解说 (Vernacular Annotation of the Four Books) 
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be realized in the world at the same time”41 Jiang criticized as preposterous the view of New 
Cultural intellectuals who believed that the world progresses because the age of science has 
replaced the age of religion, and spared no effort in the destruction of religion as irrational 
superstitions. He argued that the exceedingly secularized modern world needs religion to 
supplement and correct its excesses. “The world will benefit once religion is widespread, all 
nations in the world will end their rivalries once morality is explicated.”  
  In his On Ending War, Jiang Xizhang included his proposal for setting up of a 
“Worldwide Ethical Society” for promoting and explicating the truths of the world religions. 
Jiang planned to set up a head office in every nation, which will coordinate the building of 
branch offices. The association was designed from the very beginning as a world religious 
organization. During the registration of the Daodehui, the authorities wanted the removal of 
“wanguo” from the title before getting official approval.  Jiang Shoufeng was adamant and 
fought hard with the authorities to keep the original name because he believed that the 
mission of the association was to promote morality for the salvation of the whole world.
42
 In 
every association building, seven academies (yuan 院 ) will be established, namely, the 
Confucian academy, Buddhist academy, Daoist academy, Christian academy, Islam academy, 
the academy of science and philosophy and a head academy (zongyuan总院). The association 
will serve as a meeting point for the adherents of different religions to research and expound 
on religious truth which was, according to Jiang Xizhang, the “study of human nature and 
destiny” (xingming zhixue性命之学). Jiang firmly believed that the many world religions are 
different only in “outer forms”(xing 形)  but not in “spirit” (jingshen 精神)as what all 
religions teach is the “rectification of individual’s nature and destiny” (gezheng xingming各
正性命) emphasized in Confucianism:  
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Confucianism teaches each person to rectify their nature and destiny, this is also true 
for Daoism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. To put it simply, it means protecting 
and gathering the great harmony (taihe 太和). The great harmony is the true essence 
(zhenjing 真精 ), the true ether (zhenqi 真气 ) and the true spirit (zhenshen 真
神 ).…The method to protect and gather the great harmony begins with the 
investigation of things (gewu 格物 ) and destroying all troubles in the mind to 
cultivate the noble ether (haoran ziqi 浩然之气), the ether will naturally gather and 
protect by itself; eliminating all addictive desires to cultivate the truly one essence 
(zhenyi zijing 真一之精), the essence will naturally gather and protect by itself; 
terminating all bigotries within the self to cultivate the heaven endowed spirit (tianbi 
zhishen 天赋之神), the spirit will naturally gather and protect by itself. If every 
person in the world could work on this, the world will be pacified. The world is not 
peaceful because the heart-minds of humans are not calm, that is the case because all 
troubles of the mind exhaust the ether, all desires exhaust the essence and all 
bigotries exhaust the spirit; (people) no longer know what is their nature and destiny, 
as a result they are devoid of compassion and love and bloodshed becomes prevalent 
in the world. The research on nature and destiny is the number one agenda for the 
salvation of the world today.
43
  
Jiang optimistically asked: “If (people of ) the whole world and the future generations all 
know their destinies and become gentlemen (junzi 君子),all set their hearts on compassion 
(ren仁)and not commit evil. How can the world not enjoy everlasting peace?”44  
  On one hand, the Daodehui as conceived by Jiang Xizhang was a pan-religious 
organization espousing the unity of all religious traditions, on the other, on closer inspection, 
it can be considered a Confucian redemptive society as Confucianism was the basis in which 
the other religions were absorbed. Indeed, Jiang’s argument that the common spirit of all 
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religions in the world was the study of nature and destiny and pacification of the world was 
connected to the cultivation of individual’s mind-heart betrayed his (neo)Confucian 
understanding of jiao as moral teaching. Moreover, there was an element of inclusivism in his 
thinking that is a reduction of others to self-sameness. Timothy Brook convincingly 
demonstrated that rather than combining distinct religious worldviews into a single entity, 
inclusivism was the tendency in Chinese syncretism.
45
 Wang Zhihe suggested that harmonism 
is a better concept than syncretism in describing Chinese religious pluralism since the 
dominant theme in Chinese thought was correlation of diverse elements within an organic 
whole.
46
 It is clear in his design of the Daodehui, Jiang wanted not only to harmonize the 
different religions, but also to absorb scientific materialism into the whole to create a 
salvationist religion for the whole world.  
    
 
                                                          
45 Timothy Brook, “Rethinking Syncretism: The Unity of the Three Teachings and their Joint Worship in Late-
Imperial China,” Journal of Comparative Religion, Vol.21 (Fall 1993)   
46 Wang Zhihe, Process and Pluralism: Chinese thought on the Harmony of Diversity (Germany: Ontos Verlag, 
2012), especially Chapter 5 Chinese Harmonism.  
Left: Figure 12. The nine years old child prodigy, Jiang Xizhang  
Right: Figure 13. The organization emblem of the Worldwide Ethical Society  




The desire of Jiang to unify the other religions under Confucianism and to spread 
Confucian teachings to the whole world was expressed earlier. In 1913 when the Confucian 
Association held the celebration of Confucius birthday in Qufu, Shandong, Chen Huanzhang 
asked the child prodigy about his ambition. Jiang replied with the poem:  
Trains and steamships connect the five continents, Heaven instructs the small child to 
travel the globe, Christianity, Islam, Daoism and Buddhism together civilize 
(humankind), The rain of Lu and the wind of Zou (Confucianism) will sweep the world. 
铁路轮船遍五洲， 天教小子再周游， 基回道佛同开化， 鲁雨邹风满地球。47 
Out of curiosity, Chen asked Jiang Xizhang why he placed Confucianism at the same level 
with the other religions. Jiang answered that “Confucians of Han and Song dynasties attacked 
other religions for the veneration of Confucianism, the kid Xizhang, on the other hand, 
believed that tolerating and absorbing other religions is the way to venerate Confucianism; the 
Han and Song dynasties were periods of small prosperity (xiaokang 小康), it was fine to 
discriminate against other religions. From now on, it will be the age of Great Commonwealth, 
it is definitely not wise to discriminate against other faiths because of the freedom of religious 
beliefs.” Furthermore, “Confucianism is the teaching of Great Unity, it penetrates everything, 
encompassing all other religions, and has the power to absorb all cultures in the world.”48 
Interestingly, Jiang’s conception of Confucian inclusivism corresponded with the 
concept of universal Hinduism peached by Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902). Speaking to the 
American audience on Hinduism in the 1893 World Parliament of Religion, Vivekananda 
criticized the dogmatic exclusivism of Christianity, and he argued that in contrast to the 
intolerant western religion, Hinduism seek not destruction but the spiritual enrichment of 
other religions. “The Hindu religion does not consists in struggles and attempts to believe a 
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certain doctrine or dogma, but in realizing; not in believing, but in being and becoming”49 He 
argued that Christianity was exclusive in nature because they insisted that their belief is the 
Truth and negated the beliefs of others as falsehoods. They did not realize that religious 
beliefs are subjective and thus divisive and would encourage bigotry and destruction if it was 
seen as the essence of religion. The difference between religions are not truth and untruth but 
different variation of the same truth that is the “the divine nature of Man” and “to evolve a 
God out of a human being.” On the final session 27 September 1893, Vivekananda preached a 
message for unity for all religion:  
If the Parliament of Religions has shown anything to the world it is this: It has proved to the 
world that holiness, purity and charity are not the exclusive possessions of any church in 
the world, and that every systems has produced men and women of the most exalted 
character. In the face of this evidence if anybody dreams of the exclusive survival of his 
own and the destructions of the others, I pity him from the bottom of my heart, and point 
out to him that upon the banner of every religion would soon be written, in spite of their 
resistance: “Help and Not Fight,” “Assimilation, and Not Destruction,” “Harmony, and 
Peace, and Not Dissension.”50 
 The Confucian character and origin of the Daodehui is unmistaken. According to the 
“Organization’s History,” “The founder of the society, Mr Jiang Zhongxiu, styled Shoufeng 
from Jinan (Shandong) witnessed the degeneration of the society and wished to restore the 
past morality. He made promulgation of the great way of Confucius and Mencius his life 
mission.”51  Jiang Shoufeng at the age of 16 devoted himself to the study of Confucius 
teachings. Like many classically educated literati of his time, Jiang was shocked by the end of 
the civil service examination and the removal of classical studies from the school curriculum 
during the late Qing reform and at the beginning of the republic. He saw this as the 
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destruction of the Sage’s teaching not unlike “the burning of books and burying of Confucian 
scholars” in the Qin dynasty. He was also alarmed by the radical New Cultural movement in 
the republican era which blamed the decline of China on Confucianism and pushed for its 
complete eradication or replacement by Western learning. Jiang believed that the reason why 
China did not progress (jinghua 进化) was because she was deficient in politics, law and 
material culture not in morality. Furthermore, China faced the threat of racial extermination if 
Confucianism, the basis of Chinese culture and identity, was discarded for total 
Westernization. 
 Jiang Shoufeng spared no effort in his promotion of Confucianism. Jiang and his son 
wrote vernacular Confucian texts such as Great Principles in Venerating Confucius, 
(Zunkong dayi 尊孔大义) and Vernacular Annotation of the Four Books (Sishu baihua 
xinbian四书白话新编), and financed their publications. From this, we can see the desire of 
the Jiangs, not unlike Ming Confucians, in proselytizing Confucianism beyond the literati 
class.  In the first year of the Republic, he wrote to the President, Congress and various 
government bodies to petition for the restoration of classic reading in public schools. In 1913, 
Jiang Shoufeng and his son also participated in the Kongjiao Conference in Qufu, Shandong, 
in which the young Jiang Xizhang lectured on the idea of Great Unity. Xia Mingyu and Lei 
Hui argued that the organizational strength of the Confucian Association greatly impressed 
Jiang Shoufeng and it provided him the inspiration for the founding of Daodehui.  
 The Daodehui evolved from the broader wave of Kongjiao movement in the late Qing 
and early Republican era; however, unlike the Confucian Association which was campaigning 
for the institutionalization of Kongjiao as the state-religion, the Daodehui had a grander 
vision that was to assist the world to progress into the Confucian age of Great Commonwealth. 
Daodehui’s notion of the Great Unity was basically derived from the “Evolution of Rites” 
(liyun礼运) in the Book of Rites:  




When the Great Commonwealth was pursued, a public and common spirit ruled all 
under Heaven. They chose men of talent and ability, whose words were sincere, and 
they cultivated harmony. Men did not love only their own parents, or nurture only their 
own children. The elderly were cared for till the end of their life. The able bodied 
would be employed and the young reach adulthood. Provisions were made for widows, 
orphans, childless men, and the disabled. Men would have roles and women have 
places to depend on.  Possessions were used, but not hoarded for selfish reasons. Work 
was encouraged, but not for selfish advantage. In this way, selfish schemes were 
repressed. Robbers, thieves, rebels, and traitors had no place, and hence the outer doors 
remained open, and were not shut. That was what we called the Great Commonwealth. 
The Great Commonwealth according to the Daodehui is a world of material abundance and 
moral excellence, and it could be brought about by the synthesis of Eastern and Western 
civilizations.  The Daodehui basically adopted a civilizational discourse that distinguished the 
East and West in essence: Western civilization was secular, faustian and materialistic in 
character, while the East was religious, spiritual and moral in spirit. This essentialization of 
Eastern and Western civilizations were prevalent in the aftermath of the First World War 
among Asian intellectuals as the tumultuous event discredited totally the earlier European 
imperialist claim in the superiority and universalism of Western Civilization.
52
 Founders of 
the Daodehui believed that the world was full of bloodshed and heading for an apocalyptic 
end as the hegemonic Western civilization promoted destructive materialism and hedonism. 
The material progress provided by the West had to be supplemented and redeemed by the 
moral-spiritual resources of the East for the world to evolve to the stage of Great 
Commonwealth.  
For Jiang Xizhang, the spiritual reform takes precedence over material progress in the 
evolution of mankind. “Evolution rested totally on the spirit, material is just the consequences; 
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spirit is the driving force (of evolution) while material is created by humans. That is to say, 
the spirit is the sovereign (zhuzai 主宰) of human beings and as the spirit progresses the 
material will naturally advance.”53 Furthermore, without spiritual advancement human beings 
would remain at the level of barbarism or child-like immaturity and would not be able to 
utilize or enjoy the fruits of material progression.
54
 Using a Confucian idiom, Daodehui 
described how the evolution of the world begins with the Spiritual-moral reform of the 
individuals: “Transforming the world must begin with the reform of individuals.  To let 
everyone have a comfortable life, a high education and a strong moral character; this will 
make an all-rounded individual. Forming nations with this kind of quality person, all 
countries will be well-governed, and thereafter the world will be pacified. Hence, the 
cultivation of quality citizens is the only way to save the world.”55 More concretely, self-
cultivation entails the inner dimension of moral introspection and an outer dimension of 
ascetic behavior and public service. Jiang’s design of Daodehui included an impressive plan 
of establishing an array of social service institutions such as orphanages, aged nursing homes, 
workhouses and hospitals in every association of the society and also relief for the poor, 
diseased and disasters.   
After the founding of the society in 1921, the Daodehui focused its effort on 
publication, public lectures (xuanjiang宣讲) and establishing branches. In 1922 the society 
published Jiang Xizhang’s works such as Discourse on the End of War, Vernacular 
Annotation of the Four Books (Sishu baihua jieshuo 四书白话解说 ) and Vernacular 
Annotation of the Evolution of Rites (Liyun baihua jieshuo礼运白话解说) to propagate the 
teachings and mission of the society. In addition, the society also printed their own newspaper, 
The Morality Daily (Daode ribao 道德日报) In February of the same year, the Daodehui also 
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set up a “public lecturing class” and upon graduation 200 students were sent out to 
promulgate the faith.
56
Jiang Xizhang in June 1924 embarked on a lecturing tour from Jinan to 
Jinzhou (Liaoning), Changchun, Jilin and Haerbin, and it was reported that he was well-
received by local military officials and merchants, and thousands attended his lectures.
57
  
The branches of the Daodehui were concentrated mainly in North and Northeast 
China, in provinces such as Shandong, Hebei, Henan, Rehe, Fengtian, Jilin, Liaoning and 
Heilongjiang. The expansion of the Daodehui from 1921 to 1928 was slow and not as 
prominent as other redemptive societies, such as the Tongshanshe and the Daoyuan, in social 
influence. The growth of the society was further hampered by the deaths of Jiang Shoufeng in 
1926, Kang Youwei in 1927 and in the same year, the departure of Jiang Xizhang, who left 
China for France to study in the University of Paris. In 1927 after the unification of China by 
the KMT, the Daodehui together with other redemptive societies were immediately 
suppressed by the Nanjing regime as “superstitious organizations” or “anti-revolutionary” 
because of their close associations with the warlords.
58
  
The Daodehui emerged relatively unscathed from the “anti-superstitious” campaign 
of the KMT as in the aftermath of what is known as the “Great Unity Society Incident” 
(Datonghui shijian 大同会事件), it changed its identity from a religious organization to a 
secular cultural association. In 1923, the Datonghui, another redemptive society, began to 
preach the imminent coming of the apocalypse after the 1923 Tokyo earthquake and caused 
great social panic.  The authorities swiftly banned the society and arrested its leaders for 
spreading religious “superstitions” and causing civil unrests. The Daodehui was implicated as 
well because of its connection with the Datonghui. After the incident, the Daodehui changed 
its charter and emphasized the non-religious character of the association: “Our association 
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made the reform of society, the establishment of the Great Commonwealth, promoting the 
evolution of the world, pursuing human happiness, implementing plans that improve people’s 
livelihood, intelligence and morality as the objectives.”59 
          
 
 
In 1928, at the time when the Daodehui was in decline and secularizing itself, 
ironically, the joining of Wang Fengyi, a 65 year old popular religious proselytizer from 
Manchuria revitalized the society and spurred its development into a mass movement in the 
1930s and 1940s. In 1928, a General Meeting of the Daodehui was convened in Qingdao, In 
this meeting, Du Shaopeng杜绍彭 a wealthy philanthropist from Manchuria was elected as 
the Chairman and he introduced Wang into the society as the head of its public lecture 
division.
60
 The organization expanded tremendously with the joining of Wang and his vast 
network of “virtuous schools” (yixue义学) into the society in 1928.61 At its height during the 
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Left: Figure 14. Jiang Xizhang in his twenties 
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Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945), the society had 1600 associations and a total membership of 
several millions in Manchuria. The society also built an array of social institutions such as 
schools, vocational training institutions, orphanages, aged nursing homes, and moral-religious 
classes, which had great social influences.  The mark that Wang Fengyi left on the character 
was so deep that it was widely believed that he was the one who established the Daodehui.  
 
POPULAR CONFUCIANISM: WANG FENGYI’S THOUGHT 
 ON NATURE AND DESTINY 
Wang Fengyi was born as Wang Shutong 王树桐 to a poor peasant family in Chaoyang 
County, Rehe in 1864.
62
 Though Wang was too poor to afford an education, he had developed 
a strong sense of ethics since young from the popular moral stories circulating in the rural 
society. He believed ardently in the fulfillment of social responsibilities (lunchang伦常) and 
was famous locally as a filial son and hardworking laborer.  At the age of 24, Wang had a 
painful ulcer growing on his stomach and he became disillusioned with his moral beliefs as 
his condition became worse. “I say there are no gods and Buddhas in heaven. I only know 
how to love people and how to work hard, why am I suffering from this ailment?” The 
watershed of Wang’s life came in 1898 when he was 35 years old. In this year, he gained 
sudden enlightenment and recovered from his long-term ailment after listening to a lecture on 
morality books. He realized that “The sages in the past vied to admit their sins while the 
foolish people in the present struggle to win quarrels (zhengli争理); I’m always quarrelsome, 
no wonder I became a foolish person.” After he recovered, he said “I know the cause of my 
illness now. There will be no illness if you don’t blame the others (for your misfortunes) or 
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hurt the social relationship.” 63  From his personal experience, he was convinced of the 
connection between social morality and physical ailments which became the theoretical 
foundation of his psychological-ethical healing technique called “dialogue on sickness” 
(jiangbing 讲病). After this incident, Wang became an enthusiastic listener of morality books 
lectures. At one point, he was disillusioned again after he compared the moral values and 
injunctions taught in the lectures with the real sinful world that he was living at present. He 
tried to end his own life through starvation and it was this life and death situation that he 
realized that his death would not do any good to the betterment of the world and worse still, 
his aging parents would lose their only support. After this momentous incident, the 35 years 
old Wang Fengyi made up his mind to become a popular religious proselytizer and healer to 
admonish the people to goodness.
64
  
From the account of Wang religious journey, we can see that morality books were an 
important source in the formation of his religious thoughts. Morality books were didactic 
popular religious texts written by elites to admonish people to good behaviors. Morality 
books as a genre began in the Song dynasty and became extremely popular in the late Ming. 
Morality books are syncretic in content, Daoist and Confucian moral precepts are combined 
with Buddhist idea of karmic retributions and the ancient Chinese ideas of moral Heaven and 
“the mutual responsiveness of human and Heaven” (tianren ganying 天人感应 ). They 
detailed how the destinies (ming命) of individuals are connected to their moral behavior and 
hence the possibility of establishing one’s destiny (liming 立命). Some morality books are 
Ledger of Merit and Demerit (gongguo ge功过格) which consisted of a list of moral and 
immoral actions with merit and demerit points attached to them. Virtuous actions would be 
awarded with merit points and be rewarded in this and the after-life. Cynthia Brokaw 
demonstrated in her study of the Ledgers that these texts were important means by which 
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Confucian elites popularized Confucian precepts and upheld the moral order in late imperial 
China.
65
During the Qing dynasty, moral books were communicated to a wide audience 
verbally through lectures and story-telling and visually through paintings and staged opera. 
Moral books lectures and performances were sponsored by the Charity Halls or carried out by 
itinerant entertainers or “moral man” (善人 shanren).66  
Through the morality books and his own contemplation, Wang devised a syncretic 
religious theory of Nature and Destiny (xingming zhixue 性命之学) based on Buddhism, 
Daoism and Confucianism, Yin-Yang cosmology and the five elements. Wang’s theory can 
be summarized in the three spheres (jie界) of Nature (xing性), Heart-mind (xin心) and Body 
(shen身); the five elements of Water, Fire, Metal, Soil and Wood; and the four realms (jie界) 
of Devotion (zhi 志), Intention (yi 意), Heart-mind and Body. Wang’s religious theory 
centered on the Way of humanity (rendao 人道 ), more concretely, it dealt with the 
relationship between human nature and destiny. Wang Fengyi believed that one’s nature has a 
great impact on his/her destiny. “Nature is the root (gen根) and Destiny is the outcome (guo
果).”67  Wang was against fatalism, he believed that humans could shape their destinies 
(zaoming 造命) through understanding and transforming their nature (huaxing 化性).  In 
Wang’s conception, “ming is social roles (ming 名).” He did not define the term ming 
conventionally as merely fate, it is also the multiple social roles (renlun人伦) that individuals 
are born into or assume in the course of time. For Wang, establishing destiny (liming立命) 
meant the fulfillment of one’s social roles and responsibilities. In sum, Destiny is the concrete 
manifestation of Nature in everyday life and Nature is the determinant of Destiny. Using the 
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metaphor of a lamplight and shade, Wang explains the inter-relations, “Destiny is like a 
lamplight and Nature a lamp shade. The lamplight will be bright only with the aid of the 
shade; Man cultivating its Destiny has to nurture his/her Nature in order to be effective.”68  
 Wang Fengyi believed that “Human destinies are all good; it is because of the bad 
nature of people that ruined their lives.” That’s why he “teaches people how to eliminate their 
learned nature (xixing习性), to transform their intrinsic nature (bingxing禀性) and to perfect 
their heavenly nature (tianxing 天性)”69  Like the Neo-Confucians, Wang interpreted the 
heavenly nature as naturally endowed by Heaven and it is essentially good or virtuous and is 
shared by all, animate or inanimate objects, in the whole universe: “A person is a supreme 
ultimate (taiji太极), a Heaven and Earth, and also a world. There are evil in Heaven and 
Earth, but my (heavenly) nature is without evil.”70The learned nature refers to the negative 
habits acquired postnatally such as gambling, drinking and material wants. The learned nature 
caused one to be insatiable and greedy and often caused moral degeneration as well 
competition and conflict among human beings. It is the root of all human troubles and social 
strifes. Intrinsic nature can be understood as the temperament of individuals, which is inborn 
and postnatal. Wang believed that different people are born with different temperament 
because the balance of the five elements within every person is different. Human beings, like 
all other objects in the world, are constituted by the five basic elements of metal, wood, water, 
fire and soil. However, a single element is dominant in every individual and that accounts for 
the difference in their characters. In addition, using the theory of Yin and Yang Wang further 
differentiated the elements into their negative and positive attribute. For instance, “Wood 
nature is separated into negative (yin阴) soil and positive (yang阳) wood…Negative wood is 
rude in temperament, like verbal confrontation and is melancholy in disposition…easily 
swayed by emotions, is prejudicial and stubborn, arrogant and unapproachable.” Whereas, 
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“Positive wood is the original nature of the wood element; it is primarily compassionate and 
virtuous. (People with this nature are) upright and decisive, dare to act and accept 
responsibility, abhor killings, act impartially and sincerely.” 71  Transforming the intrinsic 
nature (hua bingxing 化禀性) requires changing the negative attribute of the elements to 
positive.  
  Transformation of the intrinsic nature constituted the core of Wang Fengyi’s healing 
technique. In Xia Mingyu’s study of Wang’s medical cases, she found that other than 
supernatural causes (possession by animal spirits, etc) majority of the cases were caused by 
negative temperament, disharmony in interpersonal relations and moral faults.
72
 For instance, 
“(Person of fire nature) gathers negative fire internally. This produces hatred and harms the 
heart. In extreme cases, it could lead to anxiety, vomiting of blood, headache and insomnia, 
mental disorder and breakdown, and even death…to cure the illness the negative fire must be 
transformed to positive; this involves making the heart-mind yielding and reproaching more 
on the self.”73 Wang’s “dialogue of illness” treatment consisted mainly of making the patient 
conscious of his/her character and moral deficiencies and to transform his/her intrinsic nature 
accordingly. Negative temperament of individuals caused social conflicts and in turn resulted 
in sickness. Social relations could be harmonized through understanding the intricate inter-
relationship of the 5 elements and utilizing it in daily conduct with others. As Wang explains:  
If I am of fire nature, when someone tries to overcome (ke 克) me with water I will 
move to the position of earth; if I am of earth nature, when someone tries to overcome 
me with wood I will move to the position of metal; if I am of metal nature, when 
someone tries to overcome me with fire I will move to the position of water; if I am of 
water nature, when someone tries to overcome me with earth I will move to the position 
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of wood; if I am of wood nature, when someone tries to overcome me with metal I will 















In Wang Fengyi’s understanding, Nature together with the Heart-Mind and Body are 
the three main components of a human being. “Heaven endowed the Nature, Earth endowed 
the Destiny that is the Heart-Mind and Parents give birth to the Body. These are called the 
three realms.”75 According to Wang, Nature is pure yang, the Heart-Mind is half yin and half 
yang and the Body is pure yin. Nature is pure yang as it is heavenly and egoless goodness and 
is shared with everything in the world. The Body is pure yin because it is inclined towards the 
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Figure 16. Wang Fengyi’s theory of character and sickness 




selfish pursuit of material pleasures (wu 物) and encourages the development of learned 
nature.   The Mind-Heart is half good and half evil as it is the link that connects Nature and 
the Body. Following the Neo-Confucians, Wang distinguished the Mind-Heart into the Mind-
Heart of the Way (daoxin道心) and Human Mind-Heart (renxin人心). The former is in-born 
and characterized by selfless compassion while the latter, which includes attributes such as 
competitiveness, greediness and jealousy, is developed after birth under the influence of the 
Body. Cultivation of the self involves preserving the daoxin and purifying the renxin.
76
 Wang 
believed that Nature, Heart-Mind and the Body are inter-connected and must be cultivated 
together. “There is no temper after Nature is purified, there will be no selfish desire after the 
Heart-Mind is purified and there will be no bad habits after the Body is purified.”77 Wang 
argued that the three teachings focus on different aspects of the cultivation of human beings; 
Buddhism focuses on Nature, Confucianism on the Heart-Mind and Daoism on the Body. 
Furthermore, Wang argued against the demarcation of different religions as he believed that 
all religions were different paths to the same Way, which is to enlighten people (kaihua开化) 
to the recognition of their heavenly nature:  
The harmony of Nature with the Heavenly Principles (tianli 天理), the harmony of 
Mind-Heart with Reason (daoli 道理) and the fulfillment of the Body in accordance 
with emotional sense (qingli 情理 ) that I taught is summarized as the “Three 
Spheres.” It is the same as the Three Refuges (sangui 三皈) in Buddhism, the Three 
Treasures (sanbao 三宝 ) in Daoism, and the Three Bonds (sangang 三纲 ) in 
Confucianism. The Five Elements that I preached is the same as the Five Precepts 
(wujie 五戒) in Buddhism, the Five Ethers (wuqi 五气) in Daoism and the Five 
Relationships (wuchang 五常) in Confucianism. That’s why if you can restrain 
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yourself (克己) and fulfill the Way; you would be able to be in One with Heaven 
and Heaven, and would naturally be One with all religions.
78
  
The above demonstrated that Wang Fengyi was a religious innovator who created his 
own distinctive religious theory through synthesizing elements from the three teachings. 
Another novel aspect of his religious theory is his idea of the four realms. The four realms of 
Devotion, Intention, Heart-mind and Body represented four levels of spiritual-moral 
development. Wang explains the differences of the four realms as follow:  
If the original nature (benxing 本性) is unwavering, and he/she could uplift the 
ignoramuses in the world to become wise; this is the realm of Devotion, the realm of 
Buddhist paradise; if the heart-mind can be unimpeded by material desires, always 
in the state of happiness and without worries, and helping others without asking for 
rewards in return; this is the realm of Intention, this is heaven; If the (mind-heart) is 
always troubled  and insatiable, this is the realm of the Heart-Mind, the realm of 
suffering (kuhai 苦海); If being competitive, greedy or worried for fame and profits 
and always indulge in bodily pleasures; this is the realm of Body, the realm of hell.
79
  
The four realms corresponded to the three spheres of Nature, Heart-Mind and the Body. 
People in the realms of the Body and Mind-Heart are misguided by their selfishness (sixin私
心) and enslaved entirely by bodily pleasures and not able to recognize their moral mind-heart 
or nature. People in the realms of Devotion and Intention are able to realize their moral nature 
through the subordination of the Body and Heart-Mind to the dictates of Nature. The selfish 
Heart-Mind is transformed to become the moral Heart-mind and rather than a medium for 
bodily pleasures the Body becomes the vehicle for the realization of the Way.  
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MORALITY AND WORLD TRANSFORMATION:  
WOMEN, FAMILY AND THE PROGRESS TO DATONG  
Wang Fengyi was determined to become a religious proselytizer because he believed that he 
could reform the world (fan shijie 翻世界) through moral transformation of the common 
people. “When I was 35 years old, I knew that the World of the Later Heaven (houtian shi 后
天世) is coming to an end and it would be the World of the Former Heaven soon (xiantian shi
先天世).” According to Wang, the World of the Former Heaven is characterized by moral 
perfection as human beings care more about public well beings than their own personal or 
familial interests; the World of the Later Heaven is the nadir of human moral development 
marked by selfishness and competition over material wants. In contrast to Kang Youwei who 
subscribed to a linear progressive model of historical development, Wang saw history in the 
traditional way as cyclical in motion. “In the beginning it was the World of Great 
Commonwealth; slowly it became the period of Lesser Prosperity (xiaokang小康世)….In the 
present time, social discipline slackened and ethics deteriorated, even a child is quarrelsome 
and assertive. This is the reason for today’s disastrous wars and this is called the period of 
Disorder (juluan shi 据乱世).”80 However, Wang was confident of his mission to return the 
World of Former Heaven or Great Commonwealth, as in the central tenet of Neo-
Confucianism, he believed that the transformation of the world begins from moral cultivation 
of the self.  
I always said that great matter is accomplished by working on the small details and 
minor matter must be handled elaborately. Pacification and ordering of the world is 
a great matter, however its accomplishment must be traced from the world to the 
country, from the country to the family, from the family to the self, from the self to 
the Heart-Mind, from the Heart-Mind to intention, and from intention to knowledge 
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and the investigation of things (zhizhi gewu 致知格物). Isn’t this tracing to the 
smallest detail? I’m a farmer. I always said that I want to reform the world and 
everyone laughed at me because they don’t understand the true tenet of the Great 
Learning. I thought if the intentions of individuals are truly sincere (cheng 诚), what 
is so difficult about harmonizing and ordering the world?
81
  
Moreover, Wang viewed the Self and the World as an unified whole and thus the moral 
progress of the world is inseparable with that of the individuals. “I’m the world and the world 
is me; if I’m good the world will be good, if I’m evil the world will be evil.” 82 interestingly, 
he argued that in the present age of democracy, everyone has the responsibility to shoulder 
the fate of the world. He said “Although we are the common folks, however we must always 
reproach ourselves that the world is not ordered is all because of our fault.”83 
 Wang Fengyi perceived the family as the basic unit of human society and its 
improvement was vital to the transformation of the world. He believed that family reform 
depended heavily on the enlightenment of women and became an avid champion of female 
education. From 1898 to 1928, through the financial aid of his followers and philanthropists 
Wang helped to establish a total of 450 female “virtuous schools” spanning across the whole 
of north and northeast China.  In 1904, while Wang Fengyi was mourning the death of his 
father, he suddenly realized that “women are foundations of an orderly household, and the 
origins of a purified nation.”84 He believed that the families were in discord and society in 
disorder because women were not morally upright and educated:  
“The women now are all like two-headed snakes. When they were young, women only 
know how to gather valuables to get ready for marriage, and don’t know how to fulfill 
their responsibilities to their parents and siblings. When they get married, they want 
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more valuables (as dowry) and don’t know how to devote themselves to the Way (尽道
jindao)….(Men) become officials and traders mainly to earn money for their wives. 
(Women) have destroyed a lot of loyal and filial sons. My main objective of 
establishing virtuous schools is to slay the two-headed snakes, and I have killed quite a 
number already.”85  
What Wang meant by “slaying the two-headed snakes” is to let women understand the Way 
(明道 mingdao) through education in his virtuous girl’s schools. The curriculum of these 
schools comprised of 2 main components: the teaching of Confucian classics and later 
modern academic subjects, and lectures on the “Way” that is Wang Fengyi’s own “Nature-
destiny” theory.  
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In Wang’s conceptualization, the role of man is to lead and the main function of 
woman is to complement him. In concrete terms, women fulfill the Way by taking up their 
role (fen) as “wise mothers and good wives” and devote themselves to the nurturing of their 
children and the happiness of the whole family. This was important for Wang as the quality of 
the next generation of human beings depended on natal education of the mother (taijiao胎教) 
and the family environment. In the words of Mrs Liu, another student of the virtuous school, 
“Wang Shanren said that the whole point about going to school is not merely for learning 
knowledge; apart from spreading literacy, school must teach students to understand the Way, 
teaching them how to change their disposition, and how to make the house orderly when they 
return home….(He) also said that women in the world have great responsibilities. They have 
to shoulder the burdens of child birth and the education of their off-springs.”86  
Wang also stressed that women should be financially independent so that they will 
not become a burden to their husbands. Without the familial burdens, men could devote 
themselves to fulfill the roles as filial sons and loyal subjects to their parents and the state.  
Wang encouraged female members to developed self-reliance (立身 lishen) and financial 
independence (立业 liye) through a provident fund instituted by the Daodehui. After fulfilling 
their primary role in the family, Wang believed that women should move out of their homes 
and participate in the uplift of others, to become a “moral person” (德人 deren). It should be 
highlighted that, although, Wang saw women as secondary in role as compared to men, he 
held that “man should lead not dominate his wife.” Men can only lead women into the “Way 
of wives” (妇道 fudao) by being a good moral example and getting rid of their “temper, 
desires and bad habits.”87 Moreover, Wang was entirely against the total subordination of 
women to patriarchal authority. “Our traditional saying of the ‘Three Obedience’ (of women) 
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is unreasonable. For instance, ‘obeying your father at home’, if the father want to sell his 
daughter to the brothel the daughter must follow? This is why I want to overthrow the ‘Three 
Obedience’ and promote the independence of women.”88   
 Another innovation in Wang’s family reform was his frugal wedding (chongjian 
jiehun崇俭结婚). Wang advocated frugal wedding because he believed that the reason why 
women become the greedy “two- headed snakes” was because women are financially 
dependent and also due to the traditional lavish wedding customs. The expensive bridal 
payment borne by the groom’s family encourages the objectification of women and their 
subordination:  
How our customs deteriorated? Taking wedding as an example, in the region of 
Changchun to take a bride into the house, families have to pay at least 30 shi 石 
(6750kg) of soya beans, and (as a result) woman all become two-headed snakes!.... This 
time I lecture on women morality and advocating frugal wedding, no dowry as well as 
wedding gifts, men and women both independent , is to create a “new family” and to 
slay the two-headed snakes.
89
 
The distinctions in wealth, social status, looks, age and other material and physical criteria 
were ignored in frugal wedding. What was emphasized is that the husband and wife are both 
involved in religious works (deye德业) and after marriage both are independent. The idea of 
frugal wedding was first announced by Wang Fengyi in 1925 on the “Conference of Family 
Education” in Anda County, Manchuria. Ever since a few thousand couples were reported to 
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 The aim of frugal wedding was to create model families and Wang Fengyi wanted 
these “new families” to engage in rural reconstruction and form “New Villages”(xinchun新
村). Wang envisioned the New Villages as the beginning and concrete model for the future 
world of Datong. In 1937, just before Wang passed away he gathered the couples who 
underwent frugal wedding and instructed them to learn how to live an austere life. He told 
them “only those who went through hardship know what is happiness; for the reform of 
customs, we must select the model families and send them to the rural areas to organize 
communities.”91 Wang’s devoted follower Zhu Xuntian朱循天 was sent by him to learn farm 
work and later after Wang’s death, Zhu and a few model families set up the Liangzhong New 
Village in Changtu County in 1942. The families in the New Village agreed on the village 
compact drew up by Zhu, which includes not losing temper, communal ownership of all 
agricultural produce and the observance of communal regulations.  The communal regulations 
stipulated that all adults have to be engaged in agriculture production, wedding and funeral 
must be frugal, not to engage in vices, not to house statues of gods or Buddha or conduct 
fortune telling, not to practice usury and engage in the four evils identified by Wang Fengyi 
(abusing children, mistreating the wife, nepotism and siblings rivalry for family inheritance). 
In addition, inhabitants of the new village have to sing the Datong article together every 
morning and listen to lectures on Wang Fengyi’s theory of Nature and Destiny when they 
were not engaged in agriculture production. In the new village, a kindergarten and an elderly 
home were established to care for the young and old. By the end of the war, the New Villages 
expanded from Changtu County to ten other counties in Northeast China.
92
 The “New 
Villages” bear similarities to the rural reconstruction project of Liang Shuming which was 
inspired by the Confucian ideal of Datong. In comparison however, Wang Fengyi’s New 
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Village was more egalitarian and communal than the Confucian elite led rural community of 
Liang Shuming’s rural reconstruction movement in Zouping, Shandong.93  
 At the same time when Wang Fengyi conceived his “virtuous school” project, the 
reformers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were also advocating for female 
education. Kang Youwei the leading reformer in the 1898 reform movement echoed western 
(missionary) condemnations of the debilitating effects of illiteracy and foot-binding on 
women. He championed female education, gender equality and the participation of women in 
the public spheres as professionals and office holders. During the 1898 reform, the first 
Chinese female modern society, the Diffusion of Knowledge for Women (Nuxuehui 女学会) 
was founded. The society was headed by Li Run 李闰 (1869-1925) and Huang Jinyu黄谨娱 
(1869-1939), the wives of reformers Tan Sitong谭嗣同 (1865-1898) and Kang Guangren 康
广仁 (1867-1898), with the explicit objectives of promoting women’s education and rights.  
The society launched the first Chinese female journal, The Chinese Girls’ Progress 
(Nuxuebao女学报) for diffusing knowledge and a forum for the discussion of national issues. 
Moving beyond traditional family centered girls’ schools that basically taught women to be 
“Wise Wives and Good Mothers”, the women’s public schools set up by reformers were 
geared towards the production of professional talent (rencai人才) for the nation.94 Reformers 
promotion of female education and rights were primarily motivated by nationalist concern for 
the survival of the nation. Liang Qichao held that the Chinese nation would never become 
strong if its women remained docile and dependent. Women must be educated to become 
productive citizens (guomin国民) to contribute to the strengthening of the nation (qiangguo
强国). In the family realm, women also have to continue their traditional roles as “Good 
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Wives and Mothers” and improve the Chinese race (shanzhong善种) through assisting their 
husbands and instructing their children (xiangfu jiaozi相夫教子).95  
Wang Fengyi’s religious understanding of women education as means for women to 
attain moral self-cultivation, autonomy and fulfilling the Way (jindao) provided an interesting 
juxtaposition to the secular nationalist discourse of the reformers. While women were 
important for the salvation of the nation in nationalist discourse, they were central to the 
transformation of the world in the civilizing discourse of Daodehui. Mrs Zhang, one of the 
graduates of Wang Fengyi’s virtuous schools and later member of the Daodehui, recalls her 
encounter with the society:  
I first encountered the Daodehui because I was accompanying my friend to the society 
to listen to the religious lectures (讲道 jiangdao). I was slowly influenced and later 
frequently attended the lectures. When Wang Shanren 王善人 asked “Who can change 
the world?” my mind was greatly impacted. Furthermore seeing the tyrannical rule of 
the Japanese in Northeast China, although I’m a weak woman, but my patriotism is 
comparable to men. A strong sense of patriotic feelings gushes up my mind, and I 
thought if I don’t save my country who will?…Driven by this powerful sense of 
nationalistic feeling, I had the strong desire to promote education to save my country; 
and the strong urge for knowledge also brought me to the Daodehui to learn reading and 
writing. At there I learned The Four Books for Women, now not many people know the 
Classics. Wang Shanren always emphasized the importance of women in learning to 
read and write, therefore he established a lot of female virtuous schools in Northeast 
China. These schools were important components of the Daodehui and were the 
predecessors of the Society….Another important reason why Wang Sharen set up 
female virtuous school was to fill the gap of Confucianism. Among the 72 disciples of 
the Confucian school, none were female and that was a saying which said that female 
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and the petty man are the hardest to cultivate. If women are ignorant, they will cause 
great chaos to their family, society, nation and the world…Later I donated all my assets 
to the Daodehui to aid the society in promoting education, to save the nation, and to 
spread the teachings (传道 chuandao). Women like me are numerous in the Daodehui.96   
What is most striking in the above account is how participation in the Daodehui empowered 
women like Mrs Zhang and imparted in them a strong sense of mission towards their society, 
nation and the world. Interestingly, this was achieved by the Daodehui through a Confucian 
education in the form of The Four Books for Women that taught the traditional model of the 
submissive “wise wives and good mothers”. At the same time, while maintaining the 
traditional role of women in households as wives and mothers, the Daodehui also emphasized 
the need to “fill the gap of Confucianism”, that is the importance of women’s moral and 
intellectual education, and their roles in the public spheres for national and world redemption. 
 Prasenjit Duara has demonstrated how Daodehui’s patriarchal notions of female 
inferiority and selfless service to the family fitted the patriarchal nationalist ideology of the 
Manchukuo state. Both the Daodehui and the conservative Manchukuo state shared the same 
representation of women as a “figure of tradition within modernity,” a representation of 
timeless essence of the nation/civilization and an agent of modern changes. As a civilizing 
agency, the Daodehui was seen by the Manchukuo regime as an important instrument of the 
state in penetrating the family and producing discipled and self-sacrificing subjects. The 
patriarchal ideology of the state and the society, however, did not mean that women were 
constituted into obedient subjects or being confined into the familial ream. Indeed, ideological 
indoctrination of the women by the Daodehui and the state could not explain why thousands 
of women joined the society and devoted themselves selflessly to living and propagating the 
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 Numerous women, like Mrs Zhang we encountered earlier, joined the Daodehui 
because they found meaning, self-worth and empowerment through their participation in the 
society. From the religious ideology of the Daodehui, women found spiritual solace and 
strength against adversities and social injustices, and the education and public activities of the 
society helped them achieve independence and to break away from the prescribed domain of 
the family.  
 
The redemptive societies were part of the wider Confucian resurgence in the republican 
period. However, unlike the Confucian Association which devoted their energy on the 
political project of reinstating the state-religion status of Confucianism, Confucian redemptive 
societies such as the Daodehui wanted to reinvent the Confucian tradition into a universal 
salvationist religion. As we have seen in this chapter, the main objective of the Daodehui was 
to provide salvation to individuals and the whole world on the basis of Confucian morality. 
The Daodehui was not interested in the theoretical exposition of Confucianism, but on its 
practical application (riyong 日用 ) to the moral cultivation of the self and the ethical 
transformation of the world into stage of Great Commonwealth. In contrast to the May Fourth 
movement which maintained the total destruction and secularization of Chinese culture, the 
Daodehui saw no oppositions between religion and science, “tradition” and “modernity.” 
Indeed, for the Daodehui and other Confucian redemptive societies, traditional ethical and 
religious resources were the basis for the evolution of the world not material advancements. 
In the production of Chinese modernity, an argument could be made that redemptive societies 
like the Daodehui, with its large number of members and engagement in public services such 
as education and charity, was much more influential than the intellectual May Fourth 
                                                          
97 See Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity, Chapter 4 and “Of Authenticity and Woman: Personal Narratives of 
Middle-Class Chinese Woman in Modern China” in Yeh Wen-Hsin ed. Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity 
and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000)  




movement, which was hardly a popular movement. The historical significance of redemptive 
societies in the history of modern Confucianism should not be understated as well. After the 
collapse of imperial Confucianism and the Kongjiao movement, redemptive societies 
represented the main force of Confucian revival in the modern era. Despite its suppression by 
the KMT and Communists regimes, popular religious groups which held Confucianism as 
their tradition (yiru weizong) still thrive in present day Taiwan and China. Furthermore, it 












                 
Conclusion 




he main question of this thesis is simply what happened to Confucianism in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century, when the tradition encountered Western 
modernity? In his Confucian China and Its Modern Fate, Joseph Levenson argued 
that in intellectual and institutional terms Confucianism has died a natural death in modern 
China.
1
 In the first volume of the trilogy subtitled The Problem of Intellectual Continuity, 
Levenson followed up on his earlier analysis of Liang Qichao and traced the intellectual crisis 
and breakdown of Confucianism among Chinese intellectuals.
2
 He suggests that Chinese 
intellectuals were caught in a dilemma of choice between “history” (emotional attachment to 
the Confucian tradition) and “value” (intellectual attachment to Western modernity).  This 
intellectual crisis was caused by the breaking down of the traditional socio-political order by 
the impact of the West and the inability of Confucianism to offer any intellectual resources to 
meet the challenges of the West and the modernization of China.  Chinese intellectuals 
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initially tried to resolve the tensions of “history” and “value” through the dichotomized binary 
of essence (ti)-application (yong). However, the strategy failed as the “persistence of Chinese 
ti inhibited the Chinese acceptance of yong, and the grating injection of Western yong 
doomed the indigenous social order which was the base of the Chinese ti”3 Ultimately, the 
intellectual crisis of the Chinese was resolved either through the totalistic abandonment of 
Chinese culture or its petrification. In his volume two titled as The Problem of Monarchical 
Decay published in 1964, Levenson documented the institutional death of the Confucian 
tradition. Institutionally, Confucianism was tied to the monarchy and the bureaucracy, thus 
the transformation of the bureaucracy according to Western model in the late Qing and the 
final collapse of the imperial system in 1911 also doomed Confucianism. In his volume three 
The Problem of Historical Significance, Levenson seeks to refute the view in Western 
scholarship that the Communist revolution did not symbolize a break with “tradition” and the 
Chinese communist regime is merely a traditional Chinese state in modern Marxist garb. The 
thrust of Levenson’s argument is that the continuity of Confucian institutions and ideas in 
Communist China was merely “historically significant,” that is they are dead and have no real 
significance for the present and future. For Levenson, Chinese communists are not the carriers 
or prisoners of Chinese timeless Confucian tradition but its curator. Confucianism was not 
resuscitated but preserved or “mummified” as a museum piece for the national pride of China. 
In short, Communist claim of continuity with the past was inauthentic as it was motivated by 
their nationalistic claim to be the true successors of China’s long and brilliant tradition. 
 The Levensonian interpretation of China’s stagnation and Western transformative 
impact has been criticized by various scholars and the sharpest critique came from Paul 
Cohen. Levenson’s assumption, as Cohen highlighted, is “that Confucianism and modernity 
were fundamentally incompatible and that the traditional order had to be torn down before a 
new modern society could be built up.” 4 Cohen noted that, for Levenson, Western civilization 
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impacted on Chinese culture in two ways simultaneously: “first, as a solvent, against which 
the old culture stood defenseless; and second, as a model on which a new Chinese culture was 
increasingly patterned.”5 Thus, according to Cohen, the main flaw in Levenson’s “impact-
response” argument is to assume that that the West was the sole author of Chinese 
transformation and, as the modern society of the West is viewed by Levenson as the universal 
model of development, therefore, modernization is nothing but Westernization.  
 The issue of Western intellectual impact is carefully examined by Chang Hao. 
Concurring with Cohen, Chang argued that the transformative role assigned by earlier 
scholars such as John Fairbank and Levenson to the West is exaggerated. Chang argued that 
Western intellectual impact on Chinese thinkers was significant only during the 1890s when 
the empire was threatened politically by aggressive Japanese and Western imperialism. 
Furthermore, through his study of Kang Youwei, Tan Sitong, Zhang Bingling and Liu Shipei 
of the transitional period (1890-1911), Chang shows that the crisis facing them was not 
merely socio-political in nature prompted by imperial threats, but also moral-spiritual as these 
intellectuals were seeking “perfection for the self and society.”6 He argues that in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century there were mounting “crises of order in both political and 
orientational senses.”7  These were brought about by internal uprisings and socio-economic 
dislocations and externally by the growing pressure of imperialism since the Opium War of 
1840. These crises led intellectuals to question directly the Chinese cosmological order of the  
“three bonds”, which at the core are the universal kingship and the family system. Against the 
Weberian thesis that the Confucian tradition is devoid of critical impulse, which Levenson 
largely derived his explanation for the failure of Confucian China to modernize from within, 
Chang Hao demonstrates that Confucians possessed “transcendent consciousness” (chaoyue 
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yishi超越意识), a reflective and critical consciousness that enable them to critique the socio-
political order and even the emperor, the earthly representative of Heaven.
8
  
This form of transcendence developed by the Confucians can be described as “inward 
transcendence,” as the Self discovered the divine nature of humaneness (ren仁) within and 
attain sagehood through introspection and self-cultivation. 
9
 While Confucians possessed the 
transcendent mind with transformative potential, Chang Hao also highlights, they were at the 
same time trapped by the “cosmological myth of the three bonds” which they never 
successfully break free from.
10
 This tension between the inner transformative consciousness 
of ren and prescriptive roles and propriety of li (礼) formed the predicament that Thomas 
Metzger brilliantly illustrated in the Confucians.  Thus, though Confucians such as Huang 
Zongxi 黄宗羲 (1610-1695) criticized the autocracy of Chinese emperors who acted for their 
own selfish interests (si私) rather than in the public welfare (gong公) of the people,11 they 
could not imagine an alternative to the cosmological order of the three bonds. For Chang Hao, 
the function of the West was to act as a “cultural catalyst.” More concretely, “the contact with 
the West not only injected new ideas and values into Chinese consciousness, but also had the 
catalytic effect of intensifying the internal tensions within Chinese tradition to the point of 
making its elements of universalism incompatible with the ‘particularism’ of its cosmological 
myth.”12 
Indeed, at the last decade of the nineteenth century, we have Chinese intellectuals 
such as Tan Sitong criticizing the ethical norms of the three bonds as inhumane (buren不仁) 
as well as reformers and revolutionaries like Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) 
advocating for the Confucian ideal of  “equality for all under Heaven”(tianxia weigong天下
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为公 ) against imperial autocracy. What is different in the situation of these Chinese 
intellectuals in the transitional period from their predecessors was that the West challenged 
the universalism of the Chinese cosmological order and provided new language and model of 
socio-political institutions. In this study, I used the concept of strategic Occidentalism to 
demonstrate how Kang Youwei appropriated the separation of church and state in the West as 
an universal principle to assert the independence of Confucianism as a “religion” from the 
imperial institution.  
The institution of universal kingship in imperial Confucianism became a target of 
Kang Youwei’s attack in his attempt to release Confucianism from the mooring of the 
imperial state. In the ideology of imperial Confucianism, the emperor is the cosmic pivot 
linking the cultural-moral and socio-political order, and as the receiver of the Heavenly 
Mandate, the ruler is also a sage-king exerting civilizing influence (jiaohua) on all under 
Heaven. Kang saw his historical role as akin to Martin Luther, the religious reformer who 
renewed Christianity through the intellectual challenge and institutional separation from the 
corrupted Catholic Church. In his textual exegesis, Kang boldly declared that the Old Text, 
which imperial ideology rested on, was full of forgeries and he rediscovered the universal and 
progressive true teachings of Confucius from the New Text. Furthermore, Kang’s promotion 
of Confucius as the messianic “uncrowned king;” the sole receiver of the Mandate of Heaven, 
served to sacralize Confucius and desacralize the emperor. As China transformed from a 
universal empire to a national-state, Kang believed that the newly created Confucian churches 
would replace the imperial state as the institution responsible for carrying out the universal 
moral-civilizing mission of Confucianism.  
 Kang’s attack on the institution of universal kingship had far-reaching consequences 
for the moral-cultural order which he tried to preserve. Lin Yu-sheng has eloquently argued 
that the iconoclastic attack of Chinese culture witnessed in the May Fourth movement was 
made possible by the collapse of the monarchy. “Precisely because the universal kingship was 
the necessary link that held the sociopolitical order and the cultural order together in a highly 




integrated fashion”, as Lin explains, “the breakdown of the former as a result of the collapse 
of the universal kingship inevitably undermined the latter.”13 The main reason why Kang 
Youwei wanted to restore the monarchy during the early years of the Republic despite the fact 
that the emperor has been drained of his charisma, was to exert a stabilizing effect on the 
cultural-moral order as the country underwent socio-political transformation. Kang believed 
that the Japanese imperial system was what led to the successful modernization of Japan 
without moral disintegration or having to sacrifice its cultural identity.    
 What Chang Hao pointed out for us is the moral-religious kernel of the Confucian 
tradition and how it produced the critical transformative impulse within Confucians. As David 
Keightley rightly observes, “The strength and endurance of the Confucian tradition, 
ostensibly secular though its manifestations frequently were, cannot be fully explained or its 
true nature understood, unless we take into account the religious commitment which assisted 
at that tradition’s birth and continue to sustain it.”14 To be fair, Levenson, shortly before his 
death in 1969, began to appreciate that the “essence” (ti) in Confucianism is not intellectual 
but moral-religious. In China, An Interpretative History which he co-authored with Franz 
Schurmann, Levenson argued in his study of Han Confucianism that “The sanctions behind 
these Confucian injunctions were thus hardly moral or philosophical, but openly religious.”15 
It is probable that not for his untimely death in 1969, Levenson might have revised his earlier 
interpretation on Confucianism.  
 Building on the insights of scholars like Thomas Metzger, Chang Hao, Wm Theodore 
De Bary, Tu Weiming and Rodney Taylor, this study tries to show how Confucian religiosity 
in Kang Youwei and Wang Fengyi cuts across the elite-popular divide, and imbued them with 
meanings and a messianic mission to save China and the whole world with the Confucian 
moral utopian ideal of the Great Commonwealth. From the Confucian ideal of the Great 
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Commonwealth, Kang and Wang envisioned a new civilizational order for China and the 
world. Both Kang and Wang believed that the civilizational progress of the world begins with 
the moral-spiritual transformation of human beings. This understanding is informed by the 
Neo-Confucian doctrine of “inner sageliness and outer kingliness,” that is the connection 
between inner moral regeneration of individuals and the transformative ordering of the outer-
social realms of the family state and the world. The main objective that all the teachings (jiao) 
in the world shared, they understood is to remove the evilness of human beings and make 
them realize their original heavenly endowed moral nature (benxing本性).  Both Kang and 
Wang saw Confucianism as an all-encompassing and inclusive teaching capable of absorbing 
and uniting all other world religions for universal spiritual-moral progress. 
 The ultimate goal of Kang Youwei and Wang Fengyi was the salvation of the world 
through proselytizing the religious-moral teachings of Confucianism and realizing the Great 
Commonwealth utopia. Both, however, differed in their respective attitudes toward Western 
modernity. Influenced by the dynamism in Western historical conception, Kang Youwei 
incorporated evolutionism into Confucian cosmology to create the linear progressive 
teleology of the Three Ages. In Kang’s evolutionary cosmology, the utopia of Great 
Commonwealth is not a past golden age but something to be realized in the future as the 
cosmic spirit of ren slowly breaks down the boundaries (jie界) that divide human beings in 
the historical progress to the Age of Universal Peace. Furthermore, through his reading and 
travelling Kang was deeply impressed by the material civilization of the West.  He believed 
that Western material-technological knowledge and institutions not only could save China as 
a means to “wealth and power” but also provide material abundance for the happiness of Man. 
Kang combined Western material-technological utopianism and Chinese moral-spiritual 
utopianism in his conception of a universal modernity for mankind.
16
 For Kang, the Great 
Commonwealth will be the pinnacle of human moral-spiritual and material-technological 
development.   
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In contrast, Wang Fengyi did not espouse a linear evolutionary model of thought in 
his conception of transformation. He regarded time as cyclical and understood the progress of 
the world to the Great Commonwealth as a return to the World of the Former Heaven, a 
utopia in the past ages when the sage-rulers Yao and Shun ruled and humans were moral and 
uncorrupted by greed. Wang also did not see material-technological advances as integral for 
the coming of the Great Commonwealth.  It should be pointed out that Wang Fengyi was not 
an anti-modernist.  He was not against wealth or scientific development but warned against 
seeing them as an end itself. For Wang, unrestrained pursue of material wealth only 
encourage human strife and scientific inventions will be used for wars and destructions if 
humans remained selfish and immoral. Thus, instead of seeing the industrial city as the foci 
for the renewal of China and the world, Wang advocated a frugal and moral way of life 
through the construction of New Villages in rural Manchuria. 
 It is certainly untrue, as Levenson claims, that Confucianism died an intellectual 
death and became a museum piece. However, his argument that Confucianism died an 
institutional death in modern China is a stronger thesis which is widely accepted by scholars. 
The only remaining institutional expression of Confucianism in the twentieth century is in 
academic institutions and promoted as a rationalist philosophy and an idealist moral 
philosophy. Chan Wing-tsit argued that after the failure of the state-religion movement, 
Confucianism went through a renaissance and lived on as an academic learning.
17
 According 
to Chan, the reevaluation and reinvention of Confucianism as an academic discipline occurred 
at the height of the anti-Confucian New Cultural movement in 1918. Feng Youlan 冯友兰 
(1895-1990) was the most prominent modern Chinese thinker in promoting Confucianism as 
a rational philosophy. Feng created a new system called New Rational Philosophy (xin lixue 
新理学 ) through the reinterpretation of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian rationalism and 
metaphysics with Western philosophical realism and logic.  Another influential figure in the 
philosophical reinvention of Confucianism is Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885-1968). Xiong 
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maintained the Lu-Wang Learning of the Mind-Heart as the true Confucian tradition and 
created the modern idealist school of Confucianism through synthesizing Neo-Confucian 
idealism with Buddhist Yogacara idealism (weishi唯识).18In addition, He Lin贺麟 (1902-
1992), a Chinese philosopher schooled in German philosophical idealism, created a new 
school called the New Idealist Philosophy (xin xinxue 新心学 ) from the synthesis of 
Confucian Mind-Heart Learning with Kantian and Hegelian philosophy.
19
  
 Feng Youlan, Xiong Shili and He Lin formed the pioneers of the later conservative 
and Confucian revival intellectual movement known as New Confucianism (xin rujia新儒
家).20 New Confucianism grew outside of China after the Communist Revolution through 
second and third generation New Confucians such as Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909-1995), 
Tang Junyi唐君毅 (1907-1978), Xu Fuguan徐复观 (1904-1982), Du Weiming 杜维明 and 
Cheng Zhongying 成中英 in academic institutions in Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United 
States. The movement has also spread to mainland China since the 1980s with the resurgence 
of Confucianism as a result of the rise of Chinese cultural nationalism.
21
 Yu Yingshih 
complained that as an academic discourse, New Confucianism is mere “clever talk” 
(zhuishang gongfu 嘴上功夫) and has no relevance to the everyday lives of the Chinese 
people.
22
 Moreover, New Confucian subscribed to a protestant form of intellectually abstract 
and subjective religiosity that abhorred ritualistic expression of religion. Thus, Confucianism, 
for Yu, is a wandering spirit (youhun) as it is no longer a living tradition.  
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To be fair, New Confucians such as Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan perceived their 
intellectual exercise as the means to sagehood and to reconstruct Confucianism so as to make 
the tradition intellectually relevant in the modern world dominated by Science and 
Democracy. For New Confucians, the academy functions as the institution undertaking the 
Confucian mission of spreading the sages’ teachings and ordering the world. Nevertheless, 
the confine of academy meant that ultimately what New Confucians could achieve is inner 
sageliness and not the transformation of the outer realm. Furthermore, modern academic 
institution is deemed a place for dispassionate acquisition of knowledge and preparation for 
career, rather than for religious-moral contemplation or social action as what the New 
Confucians wished.  
 This is why activists of the Kongjiao movement were against the conceptualization of 
Confucianism as a form of learning (xue 学). Kang Youwei, for example, expressed his strong 
distaste for traditional learning which was focus on the mastery of the eight-legged essay and 
passing the civil service examination. Kang complained that students studying the teachings 
of Confucius were motivated by nothing more than a career in the imperial bureaucracy. He 
reasoned that the eight-legged essay had the effect of paralyzing the minds of scholars, not 
unlike the physical mutilating effect foot-binding had on women.
23
 During the Wuxu reform, 
Kang urged the emperor to abolished the eight-legged essay and the civil service examination 
and to established Confucian churches to spread Confucian teachings beyond the scholar class 
and moral-civilize the whole populace. In the Republican era, Chen Huanzhang strongly 
objected to the classification of Confucianism as Confucian learning (ruxue) as it had the 
effect of narrowing the Confucian tradition to private scholarship. Chen asserted that 
Confucianism should rightly be classified as a “religion” (zongjiao) as it is all encompassing, 
covering everything this and other-worldly. More importantly, Chen believed that “religion” 
shaped the mind-heart of the people and produced faith and sincerity in its believers, 
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something which secular learning can never achieve. This was why Chen believed that 
Confucianism, a holistic teaching, will certainly perish if it is not recognized as a “religion”.  
 As in other parts of the world, the introduction of “religion” in China was the result of 
the encounter with Western modernity in the 19
th
 century. Westerners, especially Christian 
missionaries, advocated the idea that “religion”, “democracy”, “capitalist economy”, 
“science” and the “nation-state” were positive attributes which marked the West as “modern” 
or “civilized” and the absence of these in other societies made them “traditional” or 
“barbaric.” Furthermore, Chinese elites perceived Christianity as the cultural arm of 
imperialism, and religious conversion was understood as Westernization (xihua西化), which 
if left unchecked, would ultimately lead to the elimination of the Chinese nation and race 
(wangzhu miezhong 亡族灭种). To maintain the civilizational status of China and to combat 
the threats of imperialism and racial extinction, Kang Youwei proposed the creation of a 
Confucian Church. When Kang encountered the secularized society of the West, he was 
impressed by the strength of the Church vis-à-vis the state and inspired to transform 
Confucianism into an institutional religion. The demarcation of the religious and secular 
domains in the West provided a concrete model from which Kang could imagine and argue 
for the first time since the Han dynasty the separation of Confucianism from the imperial state. 
In the context of a globalized world integrated by capitalism and technology, an 
institutionalized Confucianism was crucial in Kang Youwei’s grand plan to proselytize 
Kongjiao as a World religion outside of China so as to eventually bring about the Confucian 
utopia of Great Commonwealth. 
The secularizing project of Kang Youwei, not only entailed the creation of a separate 
domain of religion but also the destruction of all teachings and temple cults outside Kongjiao 
as “superstition” and under the slogan of “destroying temples to build schools.” It was 
certainly true that anti-clericalism and temple destructions existed in China before the 19
th
 
century. Campaigns against “immoral” temples and spirit mediums were commonly launched 
by zealous Confucian officials within their jurisdiction to correct the customs of the populace 




and to purge the local society of religious swindlers. However, large scale prosecution was 
rare and the imperial state often choose co-opting popular local cults into the state cult for the 
fear of inciting large-scale unrests such as the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864).
24
 Compared 
with earlier temple destructions campaign, Kang’s plan for the complete destructions of 
temple cults and even state-sanctioned Buddhism and Daoism was unprecedented in scope. 
He was motivated by the desire to eliminate harmful “superstitions” that inhibited the 
intellectual and spiritual progress of the Chinese nation and earned the China the derogatory 
label of “semi-civilized” among the western powers.  
Seen in the wider context of religious reform in the other parts of the world 
encountering western modernity, Chinese secularism was extremely violent both discursively 
and in practice as compare to other places. In his comparison of Chinese and Indian 
secularism, Peter van der Veer observed “In India, the colonial state has to perform a certain 
secular neutrality toward religion because of its colonial nature. It avoids an outright attack on 
the beliefs and customs of the natives, while cloaking it in neutrality. In China, reformers 
within the Qing dynasty and later in the Republic do not have to perform this neutrality while 
introducing Western notions (of religion and superstition) and enforcing them in society. 
Chinese reformers can therefore call for the destruction of temples.”25  
Another force for secularization was the creation of a nation-state. Chinese reformers 
and revolutionaries saw the modern world as a family of nation-states and the strength 
generated by the model in the West and sought to transform China into one. A modern nation-
state is a secular entity, as such it necessitated the creation of a religious domain as distinct 
from politics. In a modern nation-state, political power is secular in nature as sovereignty is 
derived from popular mandate not from any transcendental source. Moreover, the primary 
form of identification in a nation-state is citizenship, and religious identity is secondary and a 
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matter of private beliefs. The Qing Empire was in essence a politico-religious institution as 
the rulers derived their legitimacy as the “cosmic pivot” between human and the luminous 
realms. Furthermore, religion was the fabric used by the Qing rulers to integrate a large multi-
ethnic and multi-cultural empire. Qing emperors like Qianlong (1711-1799) styled himself 
variously as the Son of heaven, the Manjusri Buddha and the defender and patron of Islam in 
managing the Han people, the Buddhist population of Tibet and Mongolia, and the Muslims 
in the Northwest. In the beginning, the Qing court was extremely resistant to the idea of a 
nation-state as it meant eliminating the sacred basis of Qing rulers and shifting political power 
to the nation. The disastrous Boxer uprising shattered the conservatism of the imperial state 
and propelled the Qing court to institute constitutional reforms. The Xinzheng reform 
constituted the first experiment in Chinese history to build a modern nation-state on the basis 
of popular sovereignty and nationalism.  
The early Republican and Nationalist regimes that succeeded the Qing dynasty after 
the 1911 Revolution were extreme in their secularism. The early Republican and Nationalist 
regimes informed by an evolutionary scheme of historical development and the May Fourth 
ideology of scientism perceived no distinction between “superstition” and “religion”. 
“Religion” is synonymous with “superstition”, a mark of historical backwardness and bound 
to be eradicated by science in modernity.
26
 The Chinese revolutionaries, in contrast to the 
reformers, never contemplated the creation of a national religion such as State Shinto in Meiji 
Japan. Chinese revolutionaries studied and emulated the examples of revolutionary France, 
Communist Russia and Kemalist Turkey, and attacked the religious legitimacy of the previous 
monarchial system, which they identified as Confucianism. After the revolutionaries took 
power in 1912, they immediately separated Confucianism from the ideological, ritual, 
bureaucratic and educational functions of the state.    
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The loss in status of Confucianism as the state orthodoxy as a result of state secularization 
created a sense of crisis in traditional elites, but it also provided them with an opportunity to 
institutionalize Confucianism as an independent religion. State secularization in China was 
fundamentally different from the historical experience of Europe. In Chinese context, there 
was no dominant Church which the state had to limit for the development of a secular realm. 
Historically, religion had always been weak institutionally in China because of a dominant 
imperial state that sought the monopolization of both secular and religious powers.  In 
contrast to the West, state secularization in China in the republican era, therefore, meant the 
creation of a religious sphere free from the control of state authority. The principle of 
religious freedom enacted in the Constitution encouraged the institutionalization and 
expansion of religion in the newly constituted civil sphere in the early Republican era. The 
Confucian Association was formed in this period to reinvent Confucianism as a “religion” and 
to institute Kongjiao as the state-religion of China.  
Campaigning for a Confucian state-religion was the main focus of the Confucian 
Association and other Confucian organizations created during the republican period.  I tried to 
demonstrate that the state-religion movement was not an ideological movement in support of 
monarchial restoration or a cultural nationalist movement. Indeed, twentieth century 
Confucians did not lament the fall of the imperial state and many welcomed the revolution 
and republicanism. What they were against was the separation of politics and society from the 
religious-moral values of Confucianism which was advocated by secularist revolutionaries. 
The extreme secularism of the revolutionaries convinced Confucians that the 1911 revolution 
was more than a political revolution; it was in fact a “moral-civilizational revolution” against 
Confucianism (jiaohua geming 教化革命 ). 27 For Confucians, a socio-political order 
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established solely on the basis of the rule of law was unimaginable. They argued that morality 
was the foundation of an orderly and harmonious republic not law, and a Confucian state-
religion would serve the function of correcting the “hearts and minds” and customs of the 
citizens. Moreover, it was equally unimaginable for Confucians that Confucianism would 
become a privatized religion such as Christianity, Buddhism and Daoism, as Confucian 
religiosity demands the transformation of the inner and outer realm.  Attaining sagehood is 
the central goal of Confucianism, however, as Stephen Angle perceptively observes, 
“Sagehood is not just a matter of personal ethics…it is intimately involved in shaping one’s 
broader community.”28  
In closer inspection, the state-religion movement was also not a cultural nationalist 
movement. Confucians maintained that Confucianism was the national soul of the Chinese 
nation, at the same time, they also insisted that it was the Way of humanity, the universal 
religion for all human beings. Thus by not instituting Confucianism as the state-religion, 
Confucians warned that the Chinese would not only lose their cultural identity but also 
degenerate to the level of bestial barbarism. This is not to suggest that state-religion activists 
such as Kang Youwei and Chen Huanzhang were not nationalists, but a claim that they were 
more than nationalists. They were concern with the salvation of China and the world through 
the proselytization of the Confucian religion. As such, I have argued that the Confucian 
religion and state-religion movement can be perceived as a form of religious nationalism with 
the wedding of nationalism and universalism. For religious nationalists, religion is the basis of 
national identity, and as compared to secular nationalists, they did not see the nation-state as 
the highest good or their vision and activities confined by national boundaries. 
The tasks of the Confucian Association were marred with difficulties from the very 
beginning. To begin with, unlike Buddhism and Daoism, Confucianism lacked the 
paraphernalia of religion such as religious organizations, clergy and sacred scriptures. 
Furthermore, Confucian religiosity of “inner sageliness and outer kingliness” remained “this-
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worldly” concerning the moral transformation of the self and the world, and did not fit the 
image of religion as a system focus on “other-worldly” concern or as a privatized faith. In 
short, Confucianism did not match the mold of “religion”, which was based on Christianity as 
the archetype. The religious status of Confucianism became a major controversy during the 
republican era as the Confucian Association attempted to create a Confucian religion and 
campaigned for its institutionalization as the state -religion of the republic.   
The religious status of Confucianism was first under question during the the Rites 




 centuries. According to Lionel Jensen, “Confucius” and 
“Confucianism”, as a philosopher and a philosophy or a set of moral and ethical teachings, 
were manufactured by 17
th
 century Jesuits, in particular Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) to address 
the accusation of their Dominican and Franciscan rivals that they were accommodative to the 
“idolatrous” Confucian ancestor worship and political rites. 29   While Jensen is certainly 
mistaken in his conclusion that “Confucius” and “Confucianism” as we understood today is 
predominately a creation of the Jesuits, as Nicolas Standaert rightly points out, the historical 




 century through the mediation of 
the Jesuits was crucial in giving birth to the modern idea of “religion.”30 Standaert argues:  
Indeed, the Jesuits’ encounter with ru (with what we call today Confucianism), which 
normally should have fallen under the category of “false religion,” profoundly called 
into question the “true”/”false” religion dichotomy. Impressed by its moral and ethical 
teachings, Jesuits found it difficult to call “ru” “false religion” or “idolatry”; they 
preferred to use terms like “civil” or “political” for their rituals. Moreover, they 
considered ru a “philosophy”…This invention was taken over and reformulated by 
eighteenth century European thinkers who, among others, took China as  a place where 
“religion” was not needed. This birth of non-religion led to the birth of the modern 
category of religion (as opposed to science, rationality, etc). 
31
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The categories of “religion” and the “secular” were then introduced back to China in 
the nineteenth century under the context of the rise of the West and the decline of China. This 
gave rise to three main questions among the Chinese intellectuals: Does China have a 
“religion”? Does China need a religion? If China needs one and does not possess one natively, 
which foreign religion should she adopt?
32
 With regards to these questions, three main 
positions can be identified among the Chinese intellectuals.  The first is China needs a 
religion for her spiritual-moral progress and the native “religion” of Confucianism is best 
suited for the Chinese nation. This is the position taken by Kang Youwei and other supporters 
of the Kongjiao and state-religion movements. The second position is that China needs a 
religion and it should adopt either Christianity or Buddhism as the national faith. The last 
position is taken by intellectuals who believed that China has no “religion” and does not need 
one since “religion” is opposed to science and rationality, and thus a mark of “backwardness.” 
In the beginning the twentieth century, the third position became dominant among Chinese 
intellectuals as the ideology of scientism gained currency. As a result, Chinese intellectuals of 
different ideological persuasions opposed the Kongjiao and state-religion movements during 
the republican period.  We have neo-traditionalist intellectuals such as Zhang Taiyan who 
found it absurd to create a religion in China which was historically secular, and there were 
also defenders of Confucianism like Liang Shuming who fervently advocated a rationalized 
image of Confucius and his teaching. The Kongjiao movement was also fiercely attacked by 
the  iconoclastic Westernized intellectuals like Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi who wanted to purge 
“divine authority” (shenquan 神权) from Chinese society during the New Cultural Movement 
in the 1910s and 1920s. In short, Kongjiao activists became a minority among the 
intellectuals and were soon isolated and marginalized in the larger secularized environment of 
the Republic.   
The state-religion project failed entirely when the proposal was again voted down in 
parliament in 1917. This meant that the Confucian religion had to compete with other 
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religions in the religious milieu for converts and to provide religious services to the public.  
By the end of the 1920s, it was clear that the Confucian Association had failed in its objective 
to reinvent Confucianism as a modern religion.  However, the failure of the Confucian 
religion project did not mean the dissipation of the Confucian movement in Republican China.  
I have tried to show in this study that the Confucian revival mission of the Confucian 
Association was carried on by the redemptive societies that emerged at the end of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century.  The redemptive societies were extremely 
diverse in composition and were a combination of the three strands of Chinese religiosity: 
modern Confucian associations, literati spirit-writing cults and lay salvationist sectarianism.
33
 
Among these redemptive societies, there were societies that made Confucianism their 
tradition, and the transmission of Confucian scriptures, morality and religiosity their mission. 
The Wanguo daodehui, discussed in this study, is one such Confucian redemptive societies.  
As compared to the Confucian Association, the Daodehui was more universalist in 
orientation and had a strong religious overtone, emphasizing the salvationist aspect of the 
Confucian doctrine. This was particularly so after the joining of Wang Fengyi, an illiterate 
and pious religious man from Manchuria. Not unlike the Confucian Association, the 
Daodehui started as a Confucian society promoting Confucian teachings in response to the 
iconoclasm of the New Cultural movement and the moral degeneration of the world. Early in 
its history, the Daodehui functioned like a study society with members predominately from 
the literati class, and it was in decline by 1927 with the passing of Jiang Shoufeng and Kang 
Youwei, and the departure of Jiang Xizhang. The Daodehui was transformed in character and 
rejuvenated with the joining of Wang Fengyi and his vast network of virtuous girl’s schools in 
North and Northeast China. Wang taught a theory of “Nature and Destiny” for the spiritual 
enlightenment and salvation of individuals, and as I tried to demonstrate, his religious ideas 
were expression of “popular Confucianism.” At the popular level, Confucian concepts and 
practices are interpreted religiously and combined eclectically with ideas and techniques from 
Buddhism, Daoism and Chinese sectarianism.  The historical development of “popular 
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Confucianism” can be traced to effort of Wang Yangming and his followers to popularize 
Neo-Confucian teaching of the Mind-Heart, and also a result of the rise in religious 
syncretism in late imperial time.  
Wang Fengyi was the religious-spiritual leader of the Daodehui and it was under his 
leadership that the society developed into a massive religious movement. The Daodehui 
claimed a following of 8 million in Manchuria alone, which had a total population of 40 
million in the 1930s. The huge following was inspired by the charisma that Wang possessed 
as a religious-spiritual leader. Max Weber defined charisma as “supernatural, superhuman, or 
at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities” that was endowed in certain 
extraordinary individuals and set them apart from the common people.
34
 The closest 
equivalent in Chinese language to charisma is the concept of “ling” 灵 , which is used 
commonly to describe the efficacious and numinous power of gods, dead spirit and religious 
specialists in China.
35
 Wang Fengyi was widely regarded as a sage or holy man (shengren, 
shanren圣人 善人) in Northeast China. His charismatic authority was derived from his claim 
to access the transcendence and was undergirded by Confucian idioms of the moral Heaven 
and the unity of Heaven and Man (tianren heyi天人合一).  The religious charisma of Wang 
Fengyi was recognized by his followers as he healed and guided them in moral-spiritual 
cultivation through his theory of “Nature and Destiny.”  In comparison, Confucian literati 
such as Kang Youwei were elitist and antagonistic in their attitude toward popular religiosity 
and tried to eradicate popular religious expressions and practices of Confucianism as 
“superstitions.”  This was why the Confucian Association lacked popular roots and was 
unable to create a mass movement. In addition, religious charisma is not only about the leader, 
as Stephan Feuchtwang and Wang Mingming show in their anthropological study of 
grassroots charisma, it is also a relationship mutually constituted by the leader and the 
followers. To build and sustain a mass movement, it is imperative for charismatic religious 
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leaders to build an affective relationship with their followers and be responsive to their needs 
and goals.
36
 The success of Wang Fengyi as a religious leader can be certainly attributed to 
his responsiveness to the aspiration of women to be independent and their need for moral-





 After the collapse of imperial Confucianism, redemptive societies became the main 
organizational expression of Confucianism and the agent of its resurgence in modern China. 
To be sure, organizations and religious specialists like the lineages, temple cults and ritual 
scholars (lisheng礼生) played an important role in the transmission of Confucian knowledge, 
values and practices after the abolishment of the examination system and the state cult. This 
area, in my opinion, is where more research has to be done to understand the continuation and 
transformation of Confucianism in China in the post-imperial period. Despite being 
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expressions of living Confucianism, the lineages, temple cults and ritual scholars were 
increasingly marginalized by the “anti-superstition” and “anti-religion” campaigns of the state 
and reformers. Arguably, in the metaphor of Yu Yingshi, redemptive society is the body in 
which the lost soul of Confucianism found an abode and came back to life (huanhun 还魂).  
Redemptive societies suffered a period of repression by the KMT government when it came 
to power in 1927. The Nanjing regime denied the redemptive societies legal status as religion 
and banned them as “superstitious organizations.”  After the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, the Communist government continued the suppression of 
redemptive societies. Many Confucian redemptive societies retreated to Taiwan with the 
nationalist government and continued with their religious activities in a more liberal and 
pluralistic environment.  The Daodehui and other Confucian redemptive societies remained 




At present, mainland China is witnessing a revival of Confucianism and that includes 
the emergence of new Confucian moral-civilizing organizations such as the Confucian 
redemptive societies. One such organization is the Beijing based Yidan Xuetang一耽学堂. 
The Yidan Xuetang is a non-profit organization promoting Confucianism as religious-moral 
doctrine for the moral renewal of the Chinese people. 
38
 In addition, the controversy on the 
religious status of Confucianism witnessed in the early republican era has been revived and 
hotly debated by intellectuals ever since Ren Jiyu任继愈, a prominent historian, proposed the 
definition of Confucianism as “religion” in 1978.39  There are also attempts at present to make 
Confucianism the sixth official religion and the civil religion or state-religion of China.
40
 The 
concluding chapter on the modern fate of Confucianism has yet been written. It is still unclear 
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whether Confucianism will become a “religion” in the present or future, as envisioned by 
twentieth century Kongjiao activists. What is clear, however, is that Confucian religiosity is 
and will remain the dynamic force behind the development and reinvention of the Confucian 
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